genious defence of divination by the Stoics, any more than he does of their elastic allegorical method, which might be stretched to cover the worst absurdities of mythology. Religion is to be upheld, in so far as it is in accordance with the teaching of nature; but superstition is to be torn up by the root. Unfortunately Cicero gives no precise definition of the latter opprobrious word, nor does he distinctly say how the existing religion is to be cleared of its superstitious elements.

In

In regard to ethics Cicero openly disclaims the negative view of Carneades', and only wavers between a more or less thorough acceptance of the Stoic doctrine. general, it may be said that he has a higher admiration for the Stoic system of ethics and theology than he has for any other. Thus he calls it the most generous and masculine of systems, and is even inclined to deny the name of philosopher to all but the Stoics. defends their famous paradoxes as being absolutely true and genuinely Socratic, and finds fault with Antiochus and the Peripatetics for hesitating to admit that the wise man will retain his happiness in the bull of Phalaris*. Similarly he blames the latter for justifying a moderate indulgence of the various emotions instead of eradicating

He

1 Leg. 1. 39 perturbatricem harum omnium rerum Academiam, hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem exoremus, ut sileat; nam si invaserit in haec quae satis scite nobis instructa et composita videntur, nimias edet ruinas.

2 Tusc. III. 22, IV. 53.

8 Paradoxa § 4 mihi ista napádoğa maxime videntur esse Socratica longeque verissima, Acad. 11. 135. Arguing as a Peripatetic in the De Finibus IV. 74, Cicero takes the opposite side.

4 Tusc. V. 75.

them altogether'. At the same time he confesses that Stoicism is hardly adapted for this work-a-day world; it would be more in place in Plato's Utopia'; when it is attempted to apply it to practice, common sense speedily reduces it to something not very different from the Academy or the Lyceum. Indeed we often find Cicero arguing that the difference is merely nominal, and that Zeno changed the terms, but not the doctrines of the original Socratic school of which these were offshoots.

I proceed to give a very brief survey of Cicero's philosophical works, all composed, with the exception of the De Oratore, the De Republica and De Legibus, within the last two years of his life. His object in writing them was to give his countrymen a general view of Greek philosophy, particularly of its practical side; and he claimed that in doing this he was labouring for the good of his country no less than, when he had been most active as a speaker in the Senate-House and the Forum*.

1 Tusc. IV. 38, mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse dicunt esse, sed adhibent modum quendam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat. Modum tu adhibes vitio? and § 42 nihil interest utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent an moderatam injustitiam &c; compare III. 22 and Off. I. 89. On the other hand in the Academica II. 135, where Cicero represents the New Academy, he defends, though in a somewhat perfunctory way, the moderate use of the emotions.

2 Fin. IV. 21, Tusc. v. 3, ad Att. II. I.

3 Fin. v. 22, restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt, Leg. I. 54, 55.

4 N. D. 1. 7 foll. with my notes, Divin. II. I, quaerenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei publicae, nulla major occurrebat quam si optimarum artium vias traderem meis civibus.

The earliest of this later group was the Hortensius, written in 46 B.C., but now lost. This was followed by several oratorical treatises. The De Consolatione, also lost, was written on the death of his daughter in 45. Then came the Academica, of which only a portion has come down to us. In this, as has been already mentioned, Cicero defends the doctrine of Probability, as enunciated by Philo, which may be regarded as a softened form of the scepticism of Carneades, against the 'Certitude' of Antiochus, the champion of the Eclectics. The Academica would be reckoned with the Topica and the rhetorical treatises, as coming under the head of Logic'. Under the head of Ethics we have (1) the De Finibus3, à treatise on the Summum Bonum. In the 1st book the Epicurean doctrine is expounded by Torquatus; in the 2nd it is controverted with Stoic arguments by Cicero; the 3rd book contains an account of the Stoic doctrine by Cato, to whom Cicero replies with an argument taken from Antiochus in the 4th book, in which he endeavours to show, first, that all that is of value in Zeno's teaching is really Socratic, being derived from his master Polemo, and secondly, that the innovations of Zeno, where they are not confined to the use of an unnatural and paradoxical terminology, involve a contradiction between the prima naturae with which he starts, and his final conclusion that virtue is the only good; in the 5th book the doctrine of Antiochus himself-it will be remembered that this is an amalgam of the three anti-Epicurean systems-is expounded by the Peripatetic Piso.

1 Divin. II. 4, Acad. I. 32.

2 On the plural, see Madvig's ed. Praef. p. lxi n. It is uncertain who introduced the idea of a Summum Malum to correspond with the Summum Bonum.

After dealing with the theory of morals in the De Finibus, Cicero goes on to treat of practical morality in the De Officiis (2) addressed to his son, then studying under Cratippus at Athens. In a work intended for direct instruction, Cicero abandons the form of dialogue, which he was accustomed to employ in order to exhibit the views of others without necessarily indicating his own; and lays down in plain terms the principles and rules which he held to be of most importance for the guidance of conduct. It is therefore significant that here, where he is speaking in his own person and not acting a character in a dialogue, he shows himself most distinctively Stoic in doctrine', though he still only claims to be giving utterance to probabilities not to certainties. The treatise is further of special interest as being the earliest we possess on Duty, and on that conflict between different kinds of Duty or between Duty and Expediency, which forms the subject of Casuistry. In the 1st book Cicero treats of the honestum (To kadóv) subdividing it into the four cardinal virtues, and gives directions for action in cases where one duty seems to conflict with another. In the 2nd he does the same for the utile (rò peλuóv). Up to this point he had been able to make use of the πepì κaðýκovтos of Panaetius as his guide; but in the 3rd book he broaches a question to which Panaetius had given no answer, viz. how we are to act, when the honestum conflicts with the utile. For this he finds his authorities in Posidonius and Hecato, and shows, with abundant illustrations from Roman history, that there can be no real expediency apart from duty.

1 See Holden's Introduction pp. xxxiv foll.

2 Off. II. 7.

In the Tusculanae Disputationes (3) Cicero discusses at length particular questions of practical philosophy. Though the form of dialogue is preserved, there is no pretence of real disputation; Cicero simply gives his opinion on the points on which it is solicited by the anonymous questioner, and shows why he has adopted it in preference to others. Here too he is distinctly Stoic, except on the single question of Immortality, where he prefers to share the error of Plato, if it be an error, rather than assent to the depressing doctrines of the other schools. The general subject is to prove that man has in his own power all that is necessary for happiness, and to teach us how to guard against the usual causes of unhappiness. Thus in the 1st book we are armed against the fear of death, in the 2nd against pain, in the 3rd against sorrow, in the 4th against all other passions, while the 5th shows the sufficiency of virtue in itself for happiness, independently of all that is circumstantial and external.

In addition to these larger works we possess the following ethical tracts by Cicero, the Cato Major or De Senectute (4), showing how to spend old age happily; a good deal of this is borrowed from Plato and Xenophon; the Laelius or De Amicitia (5), on the benefits and duties of friendship, chiefly taken from the treatise by Theophrastus on the same subject, but with additions from Plato and Xenophon; there is nothing sectarian in the tone of either of these. The Paradoxa (6) is a defence of the Stoic paradoxes, viz. that the honestum is the only good, that virtue is sufficient for happiness, that good and evil admit of no degrées, that every fool is mad, that the wise man alone is free, that the wise man alone