tendency which all things have towards Him as the absolutely Good, the object and end of all effort, of all desire'. The universe itself is eternal, a perfect sphere the circumference of which is composed of the purest element, ether, and is carried round in circular motion by the immediate influence of the Deity. In it are the fixed stars, themselves divine. All above this Primum Mobile is the abode of divinity, in which there is no body, no movement, no void, and therefore no space and no time. The lower planetary spheres have a less perfect movement and are under the guidance of subordinate divinities. Still, throughout the whole space, from the outermost sidereal sphere down to the lunar sphere, all is ordered with perfect regularity according to Nature. It is only in the sublunary region. extending from the moon to the earth, which is fixed in the centre, furthest, removed from the First Mover and composed of the four inferior elements with their rectilinear movements, centripetal or downwards in the case of earth and water, centrifugal or upwards in the case of air and fire, that the irregular forces of Spontaneity and Chance make their appearance, and impede or modify the working of Nature. Yet even here we find a constant progressive movement from inorganic into organic, from plant into animal, from life which is nutritive and sensitive only into life which is locomotive and finally rational in man. The human soul is a microcosm, uniting in itself all the faculties of the lower orders of animated existence, and possessing,

1 Aristotle's words Kiveî ws épúμevov (Met. XII, 7), remind us of the yearning after the First Fair, treated of in the Symposium and other dialogues of Plato.

besides, the divine and immortal faculty of reason. As each thing attains its end by fulfilling the work for which it is designed by nature, so man achieves happiness by the unobstructed exercise of his special endowment, a rational and virtuous activity. Pleasure is the natural accompaniment of such an activity. Virtue, which may be described as perfected nature, belongs potentially to man's nature, but it becomes actual by the repetition of acts in accordance with reason. It is subdivided into intellectual and moral, according as it is a habit of the purely rational part of the soul, or as it is a habit of the emotional part, which is capable of being influenced by reason, but not itself rational. Every natural impulse is the potential basis of a particular virtue which may be developed by repeated actions freely performed in accordance with the law of reason so as to avoid either excess or defect. Since man is by nature gregarious, his perfection is only attainable in society, and ethical science is thus subordinate to political science.

I have here given the briefest possible summary of Aristotle's general system, as it is contained in the Physica, the Metaphysica (so called as following the Physica) and the Nicomachean Ethics. Of the latter and of the Politics I have added a fuller analysis below, in order to enable the reader to compare them with Plato's Republic. In the remaining works we have a sort of encyclopaedia of science. The Organon contains the theory of deductive reasoning. It includes (1) the Categories in which

1 There is an excellent edition by Waitz with Latin notes: Mr Poste has brought out an English translation of the Posterior Analytics and Fallacies, with introduction and notes. See also Trendelenburg's Elementa Logices Aristoleae.

all predications are classified under ten heads, Substance (ovoia), Quantity (róσov), Quality (rotov), Relation (πpós T), Place (Tou), Time (TÓTE), Situation (Keîσbai), Possession (exev), Action (TOL), Passion (máσɣew). Their use may be thus illustrated, 'Socrates is a man, seventy years old, wise, the teacher of Plato, now sitting on his couch, in prison, having fetters on his legs, instructing his disciples, and questioned by them'. It has been often pointed out that the classification here given errs both in excess and in defect, but it has the merit of being the first attempt of the kind. Trendelenburg suggests that it was borrowed from the grammatical division of the Parts of Speech. The 2nd of the Logical treatises is the De Interpretatione, dealing with the Proposition, in which the distinction between Contrary and Contradictory, and between Possible and Necessary ('Modal') Propositions, is for the first time clearly explained. In the 3rd, the Analytica, we have the doctrine of the Syllogism set forth with as much completeness as in Whately or Aldrich, together with an account of applied reasoning under the two heads of Demonstration (arródeığıs) and Dialectic (StaλEKTIKY). It further distinguishes between Induction (maywyn), arguing upwards to Universals from Particulars, which are γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν, more familiar and intelligible to the learner or investigator, and Deduction (ovλoyoμós), arguing downwards to Particulars from Universals, which are pure yvwpuwтepa, naturally and in themselves clearer and more intelligible. But though Aristotle thus derives the major premiss of the Syllogism from previous Induction, he has nowhere attempted to state the laws of the Inductive process, as he has done those of the Syllogism. He only tells us that the general idea, which

(διαλεκτική).

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Plato thought to be a separate existence known to the soul in a previous state of being, was simply a truth attained by gradual process of Induction, and certified by the unerring principle of reason (vovs). The steps were perception (alonois), memory (μvýμn), experience (eμteipía); and the half-conscious judgment contained in the last, when taken up, examined and approved by the supreme faculty vous, was stamped as absolutely and universally true. Dialectical reasoning is the subject of the 4th of Aristotle's logical treatises, called the Topica, because it treats of the 'places' or 'storehouses' (Tóπo) in which arguments are to be found. In it Aristotle gives the principles and rules of the Socratic dialogue, the original 'Dialectic' before the term had been twisted by Plato to mean not only the art of philosophical discussion, but the highest part of philosophy itself. Aristotle on the contrary carefully separates it from science (πorýμn) and connects it more with rhetoric, since both deal with matters of opinion and make use of probable arguments. Its end is not so much to prove truth as to expose inconsistency: it is useful both as a stimulating mental exercise, and as clearing the ground for a scientific treatment of a subject by bringing to light the difficulties on all sides. The Tóжоɩ are arranged under the four Predicables, genus, differentia, proprium, accidens, which express the various relations which the predicate may bear to the subject. The last of the logical treatises is the Sophistici Elenchi, in which we have a careful enumeration of the various kinds of Fallacies. The fundamental axioms of Logic, viz. the Maxim of Contradiction and the Maxim of the Excluded Middle are treated of in the Metaphysica.

From the art of reasoning we proceed to the art of

2

persuasion, which forms the subject of the Rhetoric.1 Aristotle begins by clearing this art, which he calls an off-shoot of Dialectic, from the reproach which had been brought upon it by its sophistical misuse, and which had caused it to be repudiated with such contempt by Plato. He defines it as 'the power of discovering in each case the possible means of persuading, (δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν, Rhet. 1 2), and shows that it is really an art founded on scientific principles, and that, if it is liable to abuse, that is common to it with all other methods of increasing human power. The fault lies in the motive (poaípeσis) of the speaker, not in the command of the resources of speech supplied by the art. It is unfair to expose justice unarmed to the attack of injustice armed with rhetoric. The means of persuasion are divided into the scientific, supplied by the speech. itself, and the unscientific, which exist independently of the speech, such as the evidence of witnesses, &c. The scientific means are of three kinds, (1) probable proofs (TiOTELS) contained in the speech, (2) the moral weight (0os) of the speaker, (3) the emotions of the audience (Tábos). The proofs are either of the nature of Deduction, or of Induction. The former is the 'consideration,' or enthymeme (évoúμŋμa), a probable syllogism constructed out of signs and likelihoods (σημεῖα καὶ εἰκότα) with the major premiss omitted; the latter is the example

1 See Cope's edition with the Introduction.

2 See Cope, Introduction, p. 103. In Rhet. II. 21 it is said that a maxim (yun) is turned into an enthymeme by adding a reason. Among the examples given is one from the Medea 294 foll. in which over-education is blamed for the envy it excites. As a syllogism this would require the additional statement of the major, 'the envy