The experience of this battle, and of the war generally, proves conclusively that, when armies are equal in respect of fighting efficiency, it is futile to hope that frontal attack will lead to decisive results. There has been a tendency on the part of some military writers to deride the traditional preference of the Germans for enveloping tactics and their distaste for frontal attack, forgetting that the principle of envelopment is directly inculcated by our own Field Service Regulations. Every decisive success obtained during the war of which detailed information is available has been obtained by envelopment, or threatened envelopment, of the enemy's flank. The rapid advance of the enemy on Paris, the victory of the Allies on the Marne, and those won by the Russians at Lvoff (Lemburg), Lublin, Rava Russka, and on the Vistula in October, were all due to tactical or strategical pressure on one or both flanks.

Except for the battle on the Marne we must, in fact, turn to the east to find decisive victories. The Russian battles have all been manoeuvre-battles; and the Russian commanders have shown themselves capable of handling the immense forces which distinguish this war from all previous wars with a skill that neither the Germans nor the Austrians have approached. The first phase of the campaign was characterised by strategical operations similar to those of Napoleon in the campaign of 1814 in France. The Russians concentrated the bulk of their forces alternately against the Austrian armies in Poland and Galicia, defeating them successively in the three battles of Lvoff, Lublin, and Rava Russka, and pursued the remnants beyond the river Wisloka almost to the forts of Cracow. A pause in the active operations then ensued, towards the end of September, at which point our review of the operations in the eastern theatre of war begins.

Alarmed at the success which had attended the Russian arms in every quarter, except for the temporary reverse sustained at Osterode in East Prussia, the Germans, about this period, began to concentrate important forces on the frontiers of Posen and Silesia, and, by throwing advanced bodies of troops across the Warta, to threaten an offensive movement on the Vistula.

The Russian General Staff appears to have ascertained the enemy's plans about Sept. 22, when the further progress of the army beyond the Wisloka was arrested. Subsequent to that date the official communiqués preserve complete silence concerning events in Galicia and Poland, till, on Oct. 1, a statement was issued at Petrograd announcing that considerable German forces had been concentrated in the Petrokoff and Kielce districts, against which the Russian cavalry, supported by infantry detachments, were operating vigorously. It soon became evident that during this period of silence, and for some days afterwards, the Russian army in Galicia was being withdrawn behind the San, while the main armies were assembling behind the Vistula from Sandomir to Warsaw. These movements were covered by a large force of cavalry, which came into contact with the enemy approximately on the line Lodz-Petrokoff-Kielce. Meanwhile General Rennenkampf, commanding the Russian army of the north, who had retreated to the Niemen before von Hindenburg's advance, defeated the latter in the battle of Augustovo on Oct. 3 after many days' severe fighting in the forests and marshes of Western Russia, and drove the enemy back to their entrenchments, which had been previously prepared on the East Prussian frontier. These entrenchments had been armed with heavy artillery, and partly occupied by Landsturm troops and detachments from the fortress garrisons. The East Prussian frontier being thus secured, von Hindenburg, with part of his army, proceeded to Poland to take command of the main army operating against the Vistula.

The operations which followed were on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. Irrespective of the forces in North Poland and East Prussia, which exercised no direct influence on the principal operations, the front on which the Austro-German armies advanced was three hundred miles in extent, reaching from the Vistula below Warsaw to Marmaros Sziget in the Carpathian Mountains. Eliminating the area south of the Dniester, where the operations were of a secondary and disconnected character, there remains a front of 230 miles along which the ensuing battle was violent and continuous. This main theatre of operations may be divided into three sections,

the northern extending from the lower Vistula (below Warsaw) to the Pilica, which became the scene of the decisive operations; the centre, from the Pilica to the Vistula above Sandomir; the southern extending thence to the Dniester. The northern Austro-German army was stated (unofficially) to comprise twelve army corps, with two cavalry divisions, amounting to about 500,000 men and 2000 guns, chiefly German troops. The army of the centre was of nearly equal strength, composed chiefly of Austrians. The southern army was entirely Austrian, and was said to be 300,000 strong with, probably, 700 guns. To ensure co-operation between these vast armies, the German General Staff assumed supreme control of the operations, superseding the Austrian General Staff, who had, indeed, shown little ability during the earlier phase of the war. German officers were also appointed to the principal commands.

The German design was probably to obtain possession of the western districts of Poland and Galicia up to the Vistula and the San, and to secure the line of these rivers, with the fortresses of Novo-Georgiewsk, Warsaw, Ivangorod, and Przemysl, with the view of holding it against the Russians during the winter. They also, no doubt, intended to gain the line of the Narew by forces operating from the East Prussian frontier; but this plan was defeated by the successful defence of the fortress of Osowetz at the end of September, and by the operations of a Russian force in the direction of Soldau.

The enemy's offensive was admirably timed, and the attack began simultaneously along the whole front of 230 miles on Oct. 15. The defeat of the northern army in front of Warsaw was completed on Oct. 20. At about the same date the left wing of the army of the centre was driven back to Glovacheff, where a stubborn resistance was maintained till Oct. 26. The right wing was driven from the Vistula, and Sandomir was occupied by the Russians on Nov. 3. Its retreat was followed two days later by the retirement of the Austrians from the San, on the banks of which they had hitherto fought with great obstinacy.

It would be impracticable to examine these operations in detail. The essential points to note are that the prolonged resistance of the army of the centre led to

its separation from the northern army, and that the tenacity with which its right wing maintained its position till Nov. 3 caused its left to be thrown back, necessitating a retreat in a south-westerly direction towards Czestochowa and Cracow, and increasing the gap between it and the northern army. The information available leads to the conclusion that the retirement of the Austrians from the San was in a great degree due to the retreat of the army of the centre.

The battle of Warsaw, which decided the first phase of the campaign, was distinguished by the ability displayed by the Russian commanders in handling large bodies of troops, and the skilful use made of the railway system east of the Vistula. The bulk of the army was assembled some distance behind the screen of the river, on the railways leading to the city, while the remainder stubbornly opposed the German advance on the left bank, falling back to within a few miles of the outer forts, and inducing the enemy to deploy. Meanwhile reinforcements were brought up by rail, a column crossed the river about Goura, twenty miles above Warsaw, while a large body of cavalry issued from Novo-Georgiewsk, which the Germans had neglected to mask. Assailed in front and on both flanks, the Germans were driven in disorder as far as Skiernewice before they could make a stand. Thence they fell back more deliberately to the frontier, blowing up the roads and bridges, and destroying the railways, thus making effective pursuit impossible.

The separation of the northern German army from the army of the centre seemed to offer the Russians an opportunity for defeating them in detail by manœuvres similar to those which they had employed successfully in September at Lublin and Rava Russka. There can be little doubt that they entertained this design, but were prevented by the wholesale destruction of the communications, which made rapid movement impossible and enabled the enemy's armies to make good their retreat beyond the Warta, the northern army between Thorn and Kalisch, and that of the centre on Czestochowa and Cracow. After several minor engagements, the Russians began to close in about the latter place from the east and north-east by Nov. 15; while in the north

their cavalry, on Nov. 9, reached the line NieschawaSlupce, close to the frontier between the Vistula and the Warta. Here their progress was arrested, though a Cossack detachment contrived to penetrate to the vicinity of Pleschen on Nov. 10, where it damaged the German strategic railway. Two or three days later a new German offensive movement began to develop on both banks of the Vistula, extending southwards towards Kalisch, before which the Russian cavalry was obliged to retire. On the Kalisch-Wielun front the enemy were retiring towards the frontier. Between Czestochowa and Cracow they attempted an offensive movement, but were driven back to an entrenched position previously prepared, where fighting was still going on at the time of writing.

This situation marked the beginning of a new plan of operations which the German General Staff had matured during the retreat from the Vistula. By destroying the road and railway communications they gained time to effect an important redistribution of troops with the aid of the strategic railways which run parallel to the frontiers of East Prussia, Posen and Silesia. A considerable force, probably comprising the bulk of the German army corps with the addition of some Austrian corps and the whole of the cavalry, was rapidly concentrated between the Vistula and the Warta. A relatively small force was left about Kalisch and Wielun, while the bulk of the Austrian armies occupied the entrenched position between Czestochowa and Cracow, and extended south to the Carpathians. North of the Vistula, troops were railed from East Prussia to Thorn, with the view of taking the offensive on the right bank of the Vistula in order to ensure the left flank of the main army against attack. The design was to force the northern Russian army to accept battle under unfavourable conditions, and, if successful, to gain possession of Warsaw and the line of the Vistula, thus accomplishing part of their original plan. Defeat in the battle would entail the retreat of the Russian army in South Poland, and endanger its line of supply and retreat through Kielce, Radom, and Ivangorod. The situation was, in fact, similar to that which would have arisen in October if the Russians had retained their position in Galicia