It can hardly, then, be called a miscalculation, for there appears to have been no calculation at all. Whatever it was, we have paid and are paying bitterly for it. Our little army-numbering, at first, little over half the promised total-was flung, like a 'forlorn hope,' into the breach; and it has suffered the losses of a 'forlorn hope.' By this time its losses amount to about the full number of men originally sent to the front. That it escaped complete destruction at the outset was due, not to the non-calculations of the late Secretary for War, but to its own extraordinary fighting qualities, which barely averted a disaster more crushing than any that has hitherto befallen the British arms. Had we been able to put only half a million trained men in the field, that risk need never have been run. Since the first woeful inroads upon its strength during the retreat from Mons, that little force has displayed, in the battles on the Marne and the Aisne, a recuperative vigour and a courage in attack which are nothing short of marvellous ; while, in the defence of Ypres, it has withstood day after day, night after night, and week after week, the repeated and concentrated attacks of overwhelming armies. A more magnificent example of stubborn endurance in defence and of courage and vigour in counter-attack has never been displayed. But at what a sacrifice of noble lives has the victory been won! We do not envy the feelings of the politicians-if indeed they are capable of remorse-when they survey the results of a blind and cheese-paring policy which condemned that thin khaki line, daily growing thinner, to bear a brunt which required at least thrice its strength.

That crisis over, the immediate danger staved off, we have now, after nearly three months of fierce and incessant fighting, another problem to solve-how to get, and how to train and equip, the armies which will be required to wear down the resistance of a brave, skilful and resolute enemy. How to get them, first; the rest, we may assume, will follow. A fine response has been made to Lord Kitchener's demand-a response the like of which has never been made in this country before. Speaking at the Mansion House, the Secretary for War avowed that he had no complaint to make on this score; and again, in the House of Lords, on Nov. 26, he expressed

But at the same

himself as satisfied with the results. time he made it clear that he would want more, many more men; and, when the time came, he would make the appeal. Is he so sure, then, and can we be sure, that they will come when called; or will he, like Glendower, call in vain? The future safety of the country, and the durability of the peace that will end the war, depend upon the answer to this question. Recruits are coming in now, Lord Kitchener tells us, at the rate of 'approximately' 30,000 a week. That is well, so far as it goes; but at this rate it will take between eight and nine months to collect another million of men, and it will be a year or fifteen months before a considerable proportion of these will be ready to take the field. That is not the way in which this war can be brought to a successful termination; at all events we cannot contemplate without dismay the idea that the summer of 1916 may find us still engaged. Nothing is so futile as to go on indefinitely dribbling-in reinforcements merely to make good losses. If it is true on land, as Nelson held it to be at sea, that only numbers can annihilate, at this rate we shall never have the numbers. We shall manage to defend positions, to repel attacks, perhaps even to make some progress, but we shall never win the decisive victory. A year hence we shall be holding trenches in Flanders as we are to-day. For the Germans can play this game as well as we; and, unless the Austrians desert their allies, or the Russians completely crush their opponents-which is too much to hope for within many months-they will continue to do so.

The fact to be faced, then, is that we want a great many more men; and the problem is to ascertain what causes hinder us from getting them, or from getting them quickly enough. We can perhaps afford a longdrawn conflict better than our opponents; but, even if we were to think of ourselves alone, we cannot contemplate without the gravest anxiety the economical and other effects of a prolonged struggle. But we are not to think of ourselves alone. War is not raging in this country; it is raging, with all the disastrous results of a ruthless invasion, in France, Belgium, Russia and elsewhere. It was a most unfortunate suggestionfor which certain Ministers are not devoid of blame

that we can look forward with equanimity to a three years' war. The statement is unwise if limited to ourselves; it is absolutely untrue if we consider our allies, and the last thing we should do is to speak or act as if we did not consider them. On every account, we must strive to finish the job as quickly and as completely as we can, and remember that only numbers can annihilate.'

The Government have done well to institute a houseto-house enquiry, with a view to ascertaining what number of able-bodied men may still be relied on to come forward if required; though the implication, that they may not be required for some time, if at all, is, if the foregoing considerations are correct, likely to create an unfortunate impression. But this is not enough. In view of the efforts that are being made, both by individuals and by organisations like the Central Committee, to bring home to the backward portions of the community a sense of their duty to the country, it is very desirable that information should be accessible-not necessarily for publication-as to what districts, towns or villages, and what sections of the people have hitherto failed to produce their proper quota of volunteers. The withholding of such information seems to be part of the secrecy which has enshrouded so much that might well be known. As things are, the efforts referred to are often wasted or misdirected. Meetings are held and stirring addresses delivered in places from which practically every available man has volunteered; others, in which there has been little or no response to the call, are neglected. Civilian assistance in the work of recruiting, as in other matters, seems to be disregarded or even snubbed by the War Office; although, as has been frequently pointed out in the 'Spectator' and elsewhere, it is or may be, if properly informed and directed, of the greatest use. So long as the voluntary system is maintained, and recruits, in large numbers, have to be persuaded to come in, civilian assistance, through the spoken or written word, is in fact indispensable. The military authorities can bring no such pressure to bear.

In some respects the military authorities themselves are, it would appear, to blame for the falling-off in the number of recruits. At one time men were coming in, no doubt,

faster than they could be handled, housed, or equipped. Having never foreseen, or rather having deliberately refused to provide for, the possibility of a war requiring millions rather than thousands of men, the War Office found itself naturally unable to cope with the sudden demand for all that appertains to the training and equipment of large numbers. They were in risk of being ' snowed under,' so to speak, by recruits; they therefore raised the standard and otherwise checked the supply. But military enthusiasm is like a syphon; so long as you let it run, it runs; once checked, it may be difficult to restore the flow. We do not presume to judge of military details, but surely the importance attached to height is, in these days, mistaken. A short man may perhaps be at some disadvantage in a bayonet charge; he is, on the other hand, less likely to be hit by bullets. Girth and depth of chest-to speak of physical qualities only-would seem to be far more important than height; and to insist on a standard which would exclude Goorkhas and Japanese from a fighting force appears absurd. However, by this and other means the supply of recruits was checked; and the result has been unfortunate. The impression was given that men were not wanted; and such an impression is not easy to eradicate. It is hard to see why the War Office should not have adoptedshould not even now adopt-some such plan as that ably advocated in the 'Spectator,' by which all fit men who offer should be accepted at once, but should return to their homes and work, with a retaining fee, till arrangements can be made for them, when they should be summoned to join the force, civilian aid being called in to assist, and what training is possible being given before they join the camps. But, even under Lord Kitchener, the War Office seems slow in adapting itself to novel circumstances.

The attitude of the business community in the grave difficulties that have come upon them is worthy of high praise. They are making, and are evidently ready to make in future, great sacrifices for the common weal. They have, in general, done their best to encourage their employees to enlist and to facilitate such action; and the straits to which they must have been put can only be guessed, but not fully appreciated, by the outsider.

At the same time it may be doubted whether the motto Business as usual' has not been too widely advertised, or pressed too far. Business must be carried on, for the sinews of war depend upon it, and unemployment on a large scale would exhaust our resources. So long as we retain command of the sea, we may and should take full advantage of it and, for the welfare of the whole, carry on our affairs. But business cannot, in the circumstances, go on 'as usual'; and the emphasis so widely laid on the maxim tends to obscure the fact that our first business now is not to trade but to beat the enemy. It is not business first and war afterwards,' but the other way about. In this connexion far too much, in our opinion, has been made of the 'War upon German Trade.' However justifiable it may be to push our wares in markets from which German goods are temporarily excluded, that is not the object for which we went to war; and the world-wide publicity that has been given to this aim, the energy with which it has been advertised in certain newspapers, will inevitably lend credence to the reproach constantly levelled against us by German writers, that the chief motive of our action has been jealousy of their commercial success. Regarded, moreover, from the economical point of view, the cry rests upon a very unsound basis. Trade captured in this accidental way, and not resting on real superiority or greater cheapness of the goods concerned, will not long outlast the war; and the advantage hitherto enjoyed by Germany, if it is due to higher skill, better advertising methods, or any other permanent cause, will speedily be recovered, with the result of serious dislocation and loss to businesses whose energies will have been wrongly directed into lines in which they were unable to compete on equal terms. The worst of it is, however, that, while we are thus wasting our energies on a delusive aim, the enemy is straining every nerve to win a victory in the field which, as a secondary result, would shatter our trade for ever. The whole agitation has and must have a most detrimental result upon recruiting. The ordinary man engaged in industry, manual labour, or business of any kind, is misled into thinking that his first duty is to keep the works going or the shop open. If he is hesitating whether to go or not, this motive will turn