the map of Europe will depend to a great extent on events which cannot yet be foreseen with sufficient clearness. This applies pre-eminently to the redistribution of Turkish and Austrian territories. It is quite clear that both these luckless Powers will have to go into the melting-pot at the close of the war, as a penalty for having sold their soul to the German tempter; but to what extent they may survive the operation no one can exactly predict. Turkey will probably have to pay more dearly than the Dual Monarchy, but how far the latter will be allowed to continue her parasitical existence, to the detriment of the Slavonic populations, is a matter of vague speculation. Nor can one gauge the amount of concessions which will be extorted by the various Powers who are likely to fly at the eleventh hour to the assistance of the victors.

There are, however, certain points on which Russian public opinion seems emphatically settled. One of these regards the future of Poland. The Russian people is resolved to carry out the promise of Polish autonomy which accompanied the appeal made by the Grand Duke to the Poles. Apart from the promise involved, this appeal gave a definite lead as regards the international situation. Russia is striving to bring together the three fragments of Poland dissected by the partitions of the 18th century. Her own Poles have adopted this policy with enthusiasm; the Austrian Poles are naturally less eager, and many of them still side with the Habsburgs; but even they, it is hoped, will settle down into loyal adherents of the Russian Imperial combination if the Polish province of Prussia is wrested from the claws of the Black Eagle. This is a large order; and it remains to be seen how far military success will enable the Allies to achieve the task. It should be carefully noted, however, that though ultra-patriotic Poles sometimes talk about the reconquest of Dantzig and of the lower Vistula, plans of conquest in regard to the German or thoroughly Germanised districts of Prussia find no support in Russian circles. People realise more and more clearly the mischievous futility of the subjection of foreign populations. The Alsace-Lorraine experiment has been an effective object-lesson in this respect.

The second point which may be said to amount to a Vol. 223.-No. 443.

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national claim is the acquisition of Constantinople, together with the opening of the Straits. Russia cannot be expected in reason to continue relegated to the background of Europe, with no other access to the world's sea routes than the two outlets of the Baltic and the Black Sea, which may be closed at any moment by more favoured neighbours. Nor can the historical striving towards 'Tsargrad' be taken lightly. It is one of those tendencies which have ceased to be a matter of statesmanship or diplomacy and have become embodied in the psychology of a mighty nation. The peasants of Russia are not versed in the intricacies of the balance of power and of Near-Eastern intercourse, but they know about the great capital of Eastern Christianity conquered by the Turks ages ago.

The present imbroglio seems to have made it clear that the Western Powers at any rate are not interested in closing Russia's path to the Mediterranean. The old rivals, England and Russia, have found themselves ranged shoulder to shoulder not only against the overbearing militarism of Berlin but against an attempted outbreak of Pan-Islamic fury. The Caucasian army fought for European prestige at Sarakamysh; and it is difficult to guess what repercussion a disaster in the Caucasus might have had in Egypt and in India. One may rationally hope by this time that the sense of the brotherhood in arms will prevent any recurrence of Beaconsfieldian notions in British politics. Political anachronisms die hard, but they do die when confronted by inexorable situations. And the imperative requirement of the present situation amounts to this: it is not enough to win this war, it is also necessary to guard against the outbreak of a similar conflagration in the future. This is why it is of vital importance for every one concerned that Russia and the Western Powers should keep together.

Art. 14. THE WAR AND DOMESTIC POLITICS.

THAT the British genius shuns logical conclusions and loves compromise is a commonplace all the world over. Indeed, as any observer of Canadian politics must realise, it is one of those traits which the British carry with them, modified, it may be, by the presence of other races, but remaining the same in essentials. Seldom, however, has history afforded so striking a contrast of national characteristics as is displayed in the action of the allied French and British nations in the present struggle. For each country the war is a supreme national crisis; and the logical method of meeting a national crisis is a national government. The various members of such a government may continue to entertain their conflicting opinions on matters of domestic policy. They do not compromise about them; they hold them in suspense while they join in pursuing the supreme national interest which is common to all. Such is the course that has been followed in France. Political feeling in that country ran high before the war. In August, however, a Coalition Ministry was formed of the ablest men that all parties could produce. The same appreciation of the national danger combined with the same logical sense led to the law of Dec. 24, 1914, postponing all elections until the war should be over. contrast in England is striking. Parties still oppose each other. For the most part the surface is unbroken, but underneath it the current of feeling flows almost as strongly as ever. Not only so, but now and again the turmoil breaks out openly. Yet, at the same time, vigorous support is given to the Government both in the legislative and administrative action which it takes to meet the various phases of the crisis.

The

Thus it would almost appear that the genius of compromise had achieved the impossible, and that the thinlyveiled hostility of political parties did not affect the national conduct of the war. Indeed, if the explicit question were put to well-informed Englishmen, in nine cases out of ten the answer would probably be that the prosecution of the war suffers nothing from the continued division of political parties. Such a conclusion,

however, plausible as it appears, will not bear closer analysis. In any organic body of men, union alone gives to capacity its full efficiency; and union in the present case means cordiality and confidence. Both are lacking in the present relations of the two political parties, though the ill effect of their absence must not, of course, be overestimated. It is not contended that the Government is the less determined to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, or that the Opposition are the less anxious that this should be done. But the determination is rendered less effective-not greatly so, perhaps, yet perceptibly; and in a crisis like the present every degree is of importance. The Government has acted, and is acting, with great energy, but in all its action it has an eye to party interests. It always has its ear to the ground; and this attitude has affected its action, military, naval, economic, none the less clearly because perhaps unconsciously. So, too, the Opposition claims that it has rendered support such as has been given by no Opposition before. The claim is just. The spirit of its individual members is shown by the fact that one-half of them are on service as compared with one-eighth of the Government bloc.' Yet, while the help of the Opposition has been sincere and in some points most valuable, their general attitude is instinct with distrust and criticism; and these feelings are none the less real because they do not find full expression.

The continued severance of parties operates disadvantageously in yet another way, which is not often noticed but can readily be understood. Robust criticism, at once well-informed, well-intentioned and forcible, is of the very highest importance when a Government is confronted with a crisis like the present; and the Prime Minister has emphatically stated that he would welcome it. But under present conditions it is not and cannot be given. Supporters of the Government will not criticise it in important matters, when their criticisms may serve as a future basis for attack by the Opposition. The Opposition, on the other hand, will not press any criticism sufficiently far to make it really effective. For, where parties are still divided, and party spirit though seldom effervescing is still active, it is felt that criticism pushed strongly home may fairly or unfairly be dubbed factious.

The result is obvious. The chase waxes hot on the scent of a minor matter like a timber contract, and Government supporters join in the cry. But matters of great moment escape searching criticism or may pass entirely without debate.

What has just been said applies almost exclusively to the centre of government. Away from the centre this spirit of mutual party antagonism is not exhibited in nearly so acute a degree. In the country at large there is more of real unity, more of a truce in spirit as well as in act. But, just as the brain directs the limbs, so any cause of weakness at the centre is serious. It should not be overestimated; equally clearly, however, it should be remedied; and this is the more necessary if indeed the heaviest fighting and the severest strain are still to come.

The question is one of the present and future, but is essentially conditioned by the past. Not only so, but much of the trouble has arisen from the inability of each side to see the point of view of the other, and from the absence of any 'honest broker' who could mediate between them. A brief summary of the past, therefore, is necessary. The problem contains four principal factors, distinct yet always interacting-the Irish Question, the Welsh Church Bill, the Plural Voting Bill, and the next General Election. Of these, in July last the Irish Question formed the all-absorbing topic. Gun-runnings, the Ulster Plot,' the Dublin riots, were incidents of the immediate past. The claims of Ulster for exclusion, the demand of Nationalist Ireland for the Bill,' were present dangers, both menacing, if not in equal degree. So far back as March 1914 the Prime Minister had stated that the danger of civil strife was not confined to Ulster, but also existed in Nationalist Ireland; and the danger had subsequently grown more threatening. The appreciation of the danger in Ulster led him to introduce the Amending Bill. It did not please his own stalwarts; it did not satisfy the Opposition. Nor, perhaps, was it likely that it should do so. From the first, however, the Prime Minister treated it as an integral part of his Irish legislation. Only reasons of convenience made the introduction of a separate Amending Bill preferable to

* March 9, 1914, Hansard, col. 906.