There is no doubt about this, that Dollfuss' death made the greatest political difficulties for Hitler, and Dollfuss' death, as such, hadn't been necessary and it actually did great damage for many years. However, here was a case where two men had been executed by the Austrian government and the Austrian Nazi Party had pictured them as martyrs. What sense would there be to upset this after they had already been martyrs? That did not mean that the act of killing or the act of assassination of Dollfuss had been approved. That was the thing that the Fuehrer had against Habicht, among other things. The Fuehrer knew exactly just what relationship there was between Dollfuss and the Duce. Then the death of Dollfuss brought the relationship between Germany and Italy and Austria in this whole connection into the greatest conflicts. You will remember the speech that the Duce held. At that time, the wife of Dollfuss was paying a personal visit to the wife of the Duce, and thus it was a very unpleasant situation. Q. You don't know what negotiations may have been carried on by Dr. Rieth with respect to the murder of Dollfuss, is that correct? A. No, I don't know, and I don't really believe that Rieth, who did not belong to the Party, entered into any negotiations for the assassination of Dollfuss. Q. It may have been so without your knowing it; right? A. It is possible, but Rieth was a diplomat and I think it is out of the question. Q. Do you think that diplomats don't conduct such negotiations? A. Not in general. Von Papen's Mission In Austria Q. Are you familiar with the instructions which Hitler gave to von Papen? A. Yes, in substance. I wasn't there when he gave them to him, but I know just about the thoughts. Q. Papen did go to Vienna and secure, first, an agreement between Schuschnigg and Hitler? A. The immediate reason for Papen's dispatch to Vienna was that he was to pacify the turmoil that had been created by Dollfuss' death. You must remember that Papen was a very prominent politician, and that he also was a Catholic. He moreover was an ambassador who did not belong to the Party. There was one point in his favor for this assignment. The second one was that he was a prominent Catholic and he came to a Catholic country. Moreover, as a third point, he had been Vice-Chancellor until then and thus he had held a very high position, and that was showing a certain courtesy to these people. Moreover, Papen was not put under the authority of the Foreign Minister, but directly under the Fuehrer. Q. What were the initial instructions from the Fuehrer to Papen? A. Papen was to effect a general appeasement there. He maintained very good relations with Cardinal Innitzer and the Church in general, and that was one thing. When was the Dollfuss affair? 1934? Q. July 25th, 1934. A. The basic instructions that he received were to effect a general appeasement of Austria. Then, in the course of the further events, he received instructions to see that Austria would approach Germany more and more in economic aspects and also in aspects of internal politics. Q. He did secure an agreement between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg; right? A. Yes, but that was in the year 1938. That was very much later-1937. Q. No, '36, July 11, 1936. A. Oh, I thought of the Berchtesgaden agreement. There were two agreements. Q. We are talking about the initial agreement. A. Yes. Q. What was the substance of that agreement? A. I don't know exactly just what the substance of it was. That was the same for the first agreement and for the second agreement; although I was very much interested in the Austrian affair, strangely enough, I was not consulted that time. Q. You know that Hitler did live up to the terms of that initial agreement, don't you? A. Well, you have to call back the conditions of the agreement to my memory a little more, and maybe I will remember a little more about it. I know just a little more about the second one though. Q. The second one was later on. A. Personally, I can remember the second agreement better than I can the first agreement, only if you will just give me an idea about it. Q. As a matter of fact, it was the failure on the part of the Fuehrer to live up to that agreement that led to the meeting at Berchtesgaden, wasn't it? A. As far as I remember, both parts did not live up to the terms. The situation was such. Q. Anyway, the Fuehrer didn't live up to the terms. A. Yes, and the other one didn't either. Q. In fact, he never intended to live up to the terms at the time, did he? A. That I don't know, because I did not participate in that agreement. I would have probably counseled against any agreement. It was always my policy to demand the Anschluss without any reservations. When the English Foreign Minister visited me in October 1937 or the beginning of November 1937, I told Lord Halifax explicitly, and in the presence of the English Ambassador, that the Anschluss of Austria was an integral part of German policy and I told him that nothing short of a total Anschluss would suffice. COL. AMEN TO THE INTERPRETER: Will you read this to him? THE INTERPRETER: "The Reich government recognizes the constitutional sovereignty of the federal state of Austria in the sense of the Fuehrer's and Reichskanzler's statements of May. 21, 1935. (These statements run: Germany has neither the intention nor the desire to interfere in internal Austrian affairs, or to carry through an annexation or Anschluss of Austria. But I believe that no regime, which is not anchored in, supported, and desired by the people, can last.)" A. I believe that he said this in a speech in the Reichstag and it was the difference between me and the Fuehrer that he would do things like this, because the Anschluss of Austria was absolutely an integral point, I may even say the first point of our entire foreign policy. I remember this speech very well, because I got very frightened by it. Q. In any event, that part of the agreement was not lived up to by the Fuehrer, right? A. No. It wasn't lived up to, and it couldn't be lived up to. Excerpts from Testimony of Hermann Goering, taken at Reasons Why Schacht Left Economics Ministry and Reichsbank Q. What were the real reasons for Schacht's departure from the Ministry of Economics in 1937, and from the Reichsbank in 1939 ? A. As far as the Ministry of Economics was concerned, there were strong differences between Schacht and the Ministry for Agriculture. Q. On what grounds? A. I don't remember any particulars about it, but I do remember that the Minister of Agriculture and Food, Darre, came to me repeatedly and told me that he could no longer work together with Schacht in financial and economic matters. Also, the relationship between the Fuehrer and Schacht had become considerably worse. Q. From what causes? A. I really never understood those reasons, but I believe that the Fuehrer thought that Schacht did not believe wholeheartedly in his plans. Also the Party constantly attacked Schacht very strongly. Q. Do you mean in the Fuehrer's plans for aggressive warfare? A. No, just his plans generally. The Fuehrer charged Schacht with carrying out a great many financial plans, and Schacht did not feel capable of carrying out these plans. He was very pessimistic and sceptical at the time, and this was together with the attacks that were being made upon him by prominent functionaries of the Party; that is, they came to the Fuehrer and complained about it. As I have explained before, his leaving the Reichsbank must be brought into connection with the differences he had with the Reichminister for Finance. I believe that at the time he refused to advance the money for the last of the month, which was the usual practice and carried out everywhere. I believe that he picked this as a reason because he wanted to get out. Q. Would there be any truth in the suggestion that he got out because he was opposed to vigorous war measures? A. I don't know just why he wanted to get out. Q. Well, did you see any indications that he was opposed to vigorous war measures? A. Yes, Schacht was a very careful man. Q. But you wouldn't say that that was the reason why he got out. A. He made the suggestion that I was to become the Commissioner for Raw Materials and Foreign Currency. He had the idea that in that position I could give the Minister for Economics and the President of the Reichsbank valuable support. Moreover, in that capacity I should furnish him protection against the attacks that were continually made on him by members of the Party. Moreover, he was very outspoken in the suggestion that he and Blomberg made, that I was to be put in charge of the Four-Year Plan. However, the idea that Schacht had there is that I myself did not know very much about economy, and that he could very well hide in the protection of my broad back and thus ward off those attacks. I believe that these really are the deep reasons for his leaving, but, of course, they are only my personal opinions. He found out that after a certain time, when I was responsible for these things, I insisted on expressing my opinion on them and taking action. He did not like this, and consequently he became an opponent of the Four-Year Plan. Then there were a number of rows between his people and my people. Then after he lost the Ministry for Economics, he also found that he was no longer the complete boss of the Reichsbank, because in the last resort I had some say in what should happen to foreign currency and the gold reserve, and he did not like that at all. I imagine that he had the idea that that lowered his standing, and he felt very well that he no longer completely dominated the Reichsbank affairs. As I said, these are my personal reasons. As I mentioned before, the actual occasion on which I made him leave the Reichsbank was something that he really artificially created. Q. Did you disagree with Schacht on the question of the desirability of the production and expansion of the export-import trade as a means of rearmament? A. I don't think that he could have had a different opinion, really, because my main task in connection with the Four-Year Plan was fixed by a memorandum which I received from the Fuehrer on that subject. My main task was to create an autarchy for Germany, so that she would be agriculturally and economically independent. We might have differed in certain methods. However, all you could do was to buy extensive quantities of raw materials under the most favorable conditions by import, and then export other things in exchange for them. In other words, that was all either one of us could have done about it. Q. Now, after Schacht lost these two positions, did he continue to have any say in matters of government policy? A. No. He still was a member of the Reich Cabinet, but as far as I remember, the last time that it was called for a session by the Fuehrer was in 1937. Q. He remained a Minister without Portfolio? A. Yes. We had quite a large number of those. Q. Did he meet with Hitler from time to time after he lost those positions? A. I believe just a few times. He appeared for the different sessions of the Reichstag, and he would sit on the government bench. That was his main activity as a member of the government. |