his aim all along, and I might say has really remained his aim during the years of the war-he occasionally talked about it-he still hoped he might be able to get perhaps the alliance with Great Britain, which had always been his great aim. Then, I think, he stopped that, hoping perhaps Great Britain would consent in some way to his solving the Polish problem either diplomatically, or probably militarily. So, negotiations went on with Mr. Henderson-and I am sorry I have not all the detailed recollection because the Fuehrer handled it from the date after he took back his advance [Word "advance" supplied by interpreter] on Poland. After he took that back, he took entire charge of the affairs himself, and evidently he did not feel very well about it. Perhaps it was the military, but he took matters entirely in his hands and I think Henderson, as far as I remember, went to London with the proposal of the Fuehrer and came back with an answer which was rather negative and which, at any rate was called by the Fuehrer, negative.

Q. As I understand you, at all times you knew that his program meant war?

A. I may say this

Q. Is that not true? Try to answer my questions if you will. It will save us a great deal of time.

A. I was of the conception that the Fuehrer himself wanted to get all these vital problems of Germany in order by diplomatic means. Of that I was convinced, that he wanted very much to get it diplomatically.

Q. Will you give me an answer to this question, which you can answer yes or no. When you became foreign minister, and his aims were outlined to you, as I understand it, you did not believe that it would be accomplished diplomatically, and you knew that meant war.

A. No. I must say no to that.

Q. I misunderstood you.

A. I am sorry. I did not mean that. I hoped to get these things diplomatically.

Q. Do you mean to imply in your letter that you did not fully understand the foreign policy, and that the foreign policy was not fully imparted to you?

A. I must tell you quite frankly that apart from that which I just told you now, all the further aims of the Fuehrer which he might have had and which I only heard during these interrogations here, and all the documents which were supposed to be in there, the Fuehrer never disclosed to me any of his definite big policy, or the future formation of the Reich. There was the

question occasionally-not often, but once or twice he mentioned it, the idea of creating the German Reich, the greater Germanic Reich was the idea, but he never revealed to me what this conception really meant, or what he understood under this conception. And I may say I have had the feeling all along that he was during the war-he said that once or twice the military timetable of the General Staff came up, and he was driven to one decision after another. His conception later on was a very much larger one.

Q. Do you really want me to go to my associates at this meeting and tell them that it is your position that as foreign minister of the Reich you didn't know what the foreign policy was?

A. I am sorry. I must say so. I am very sorry. The Fuehrer never revealed his definite aims to anybody.

Q. You say to me, on page 5 of your letter, that "My goal as a diplomat was to attain diplomatically the goals of Germany." Yet, you say now you didn't know what the goals were.

A. I mean, the goals that the Fuehrer disclosed to me.

Q. You mean the first steps?

A. Yes. These goals.

Q. Further than that you had no knowledge of the foreign policy of the Reich?

A. I personally don't think the Fuehrer had a real conception of it. Of course, in the course of the war, the conception became a different one. For instance, after the Polish war, the conception came so that the Fuehrer wanted to have a frontier then with Russia and create-he wanted a Polish State created, but the Fuehrer made a General Gouvernement out of it; and after the French victory, over France, I know there have been all sorts of conceptions, but nothing really about Belgium, Holland, or France, became definite, and it always remained open-and the conceptions which he occasionally-but I can say most definitely, I never discussed with the Fuehrer, or he never discussed anything with me of the definite shape of what he called the Definite Reich, or Gross-Deutsche Reich, was to be; but the vague notion I had that he had in his mind a Latin combine; some sort of Germanic combine, in which countries like Norway, Denmark, and Holland, and so on, would have in some way a link, or a closer connection with Germany of some sort. And then, he always talked of the future and still getting in line with Great Britain. That was the conception he had. Then to the East, I must say, after the Russian War he had the idea that he wanted absolutely to have the Ukraine. That was his goal, for food purposes.

Ribbentrop's Differences with Hitler on "Weltanschauung”*

Q. You say in your statement that "I had some very serious divergences of opinion, and differences with the Fuehrer in matters of basic doctrine, as well as the foreign policy." Do not bother to argue them, but just enumerate for me what those differences of opinion on basic doctrine were.

A. My differences of opinion in basic doctrine were, especially -how should I explain it? That only I was not one of the old party followers of his in 1923. I came to the party in 1932 and, therefore, I never personally-and the Fuehrer knew that very well-have had the conception of Weltanschauung, as I was supposed probably to have. The Fuehrer knew that and tolerated it. and most people also knew it. Where I didn't agree with him fundamentally was in the church question, in the Jewish question, in the whole development of this. We knew we had a Jewish problem in Germany. I knew that, and some solution had to be found. I was also of that opinion, but the whole development the Jewish question took; I was entirely against it, and I told the Fuehrer that repeatedly. Also, in written documents which I have.

Q. Have you any copies of the documents which you submitted? A. No, but my collaborators can testify to it. I have none at all. Q. Who can testify to it?

A. I could name you Ambassador Gaus who could, and I could name you probably one or two of my secretaries.

Q. Let us name the people who can testify that you took any affirmative steps whatever in those matters.

A. Ambassador Gaus.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I have never heard of him again. I don't know where he is, but I suppose he is easily to be found. Then, my secretaries. Q. Named?

A. Frau Blank. Then, may I perhaps think it over, and I can perhaps name you a few more later on.

Q. You have named one secretary. The other one was

A. That was Frau Krueger, and I may say this. Perhaps that until about 1934-5, the Fuehrer was comparatively easy to talk with on these matters and I had at that time, for instance, quite a number of Jews who were in my house, and the Fuehrer tolerated that, and he even saw a number of Jews himself, through my intermediation in 1933-4, and probably as far as 1935. When I came back from London, things were changed, and it was very difficult, but I have through the war repeatedly brought forth this *World-view or philosophy.

question, and as I said, also have in writing asked the Fuehrer to come to an evolution-instead of this revolution, to an evolution in the question of churches and of Jews, because this was an intolerable burden to foreign policy.

Q. And your advices were that that policy was making Germany enemies abroad?

A. As I said to the Fuehrer once or twice-I remember something I said that the enmity of the Jews alone, and the churches, would mean the enmity of a big power, and so forth. I said that once or twice to him.

Q. And you are surviving to face that enmity, and he isn't? A. Yes. That is right.

Why Ribbentrop Did Not Resign

Q. What did you ever do about it, when your advice was disregarded?

A. It was I can tell you promptly-it was impossible to do anything at all.

Q. Did you ever resign?

A. No.

Q. Did you tender your resignation from office?

A. Well, I resigned once, in 1941, in which I had a terrible difficulty with the Fuehrer, and I may say

Q. What was that difficulty about?

A. The difficulty in 1941 was this: The occasion was a trifle, but it had accumulated for quite a long time and it was this: That apart from the question of Weltanschauung, I saw that in the whole world these Jewish people-and I have always said to my collaborators, and they can testify to it, that we have taken the whole world on our arms. I have said that a hundred times, that this question of Weltauffassung*-and, furthermore, perhaps I can explain it that way-that the elimination [word "elimination" furnished by interpreter] myself of so many important questions of foreign policy after the outbreak of the war was creating and giving to me the gravest anxieties. I may perhaps explain to you. Already before the war, to a certain extent it may perhaps surprise you, but I, as foreign minister, have never seen one speech of the Fuehrer. Not once. I have once seen it and he once complained about that. You see, the way he had matters in his hands, he told me he did not need a Gouvernante. I mean, he was absolutely 100 percent-he dominated [word "dominated" furnished by the interpreter] the situation, and it can perhaps only be *See Ribbentrop Interrogation, 17 Oct. '45, p. 1255 of this volume.

compared to what I have seen, for instance, of Stalin, and Moscow, and something like that. It was absolutely dominating, and I wasn't in. You see, his Saarbruecken speech. I don't know whether you heard of it.

Q. But even a dominator has to have people understand what he is trying to accomplish if he is going to have it done.

A. Yes.

Q. How did you carry out his policy if you didn't know what it was; and, how could you disagree with it if you didn't know what it was?

A. May I say this; Before the war it was so, that, for instance, at the Saarbruecken speech was the turning point in the British policy, for instance, but

Q. Didn't you know about that speech?

A. I never heard about it. I was amazed when I saw it in the paper.

Q. You mean that as foreign minister you first read of his speech in the newspapers?

A. Everybody can confirm that from my collaborators; everybody. I have never seen one speech of the Fuehrer during the time I was foreign minister, beforehand. Not one phrase which he made in his foreign policy.

Q. And you didn't resign?
A. I will come to this now.

Q. Tell me now about your resignation.

A. Before the war it was very difficult to follow it, because the cancellation of the naval arrangement, which I made, I heard sitting before the Fuehrer in the Reichstag. I heard it for the first time in the Reichstag and I never heard it before. That is the way the Fuehrer dominated the foreign policy. This was before the war. During the war the question had been this: The Fuehrer had during the war taken over matters. For instance, when Poland was taken, he made the Grande Finale. Then, when the Norway incident came, I only heard that very late. I think it was a day or two before, and he went in there-and with the moment we occupied Norway, from that moment on the same thing that was in Belgium and Holland; the Foreign Office was discarded and we had no more to say in these countries. In France I managed to get an ambassador in, but he had it very difficult. Then, when the war with Russia came, the East Ministry was created, and the whole Foreign Office was discarded from the whole sector of the East; and in all these things it, of course, created tremendous difficulties. For instance, in Sweden, Finland, Turkey, and so on we had great difficulties all through there.