Q. Now of course, prior to the reoccupation, the Army had drawn up plans to accomplish it upon the date decided? A. Yes, I suppose so because it would be very bad general staff work if it had not been prepared. Q. There was a plan which the army had and which had been prepared by General Von Blomberg dated the 2d May 1935 which outlined the military operations in which they would engage when that took place?* A. For the reoccupation? Q. Yes. A. But that I don't know because these military operations were secret. I didn't know it. Dispute Over Restoration of the Habsburgs Q. Do you remember in February, 1937, a visit with Schuschnigg that you had? A. With Schuschnigg? Yes. I was in Vienna. Q. Do you remember on that occasion whether there was some discussion suggested by Schuschnigg concerning the possibility of the restoration of the Habsburgs? A. Yes. Schuschnigg always played with the idea of taking back the Habsburgs but he had great opposition in his own cabinet against it. I remember that the return of the Habsburgs was a thing which did not directly touch us but it was not useful for Austrian relations after all that had happened with the Emperor Charles, as I remember. Q. From the standpoint of the German Foreign Office, would it have made any difference whether the Habsburgs had been restored or not? A. We foresaw still greater difficulties with Austria. I know, for instance, that the Austrian Foreign Minister Schmidt was absolutely against the coming back of the Habsburgs, and also the Austrian Minister of Defense. Q. Did you indicate to Schuschnigg how such an action would be viewed from the standpoint of Germany? A. Yes, I think so. I must have done. I certainly did it but I cannot tell you in detail. In general, I said to him, "Don't do that because it will make more difficulties in Austria, etc.," because the Nazi movement had already grown enormously, and they did not like a monarchy, so they were against the coming back. Q. It has been said that in that conversation you suggested to Schuschnigg that if they did restore the Habsburgs Germany would march. *See document C-139, vol. VI, p. 951. A. It may be that I said that, because it was the view of Hitler. It is quite possible that I said that. German Justification for Reoccupation of the Rhineland Q. Do you feel that you made a substantial contribution to releasing Germany from the Versailles Treaty? A. Yes, through my work in Lausanne and afterwards the Equality Agreement in 1932. There was not much more left, except the reoccupation of the Rhineland. Q. There is something I have difficulty in understanding and that is, the connection between the reoccupation of the Rhineland, which after all, was a provision of the Versailles Treaty, andA. It was in the Versailles Treaty. Q. The relation of that to the Franco-Soviet pact and Locarno. If the reoccupation of the Rhineland was justified as not a violation of the Locarno pact because of the Franco-Soviet pact, it still was a violation of the Versailles Treaty was it not? A. Yes. That was a violation of the Versailles Treaty but on the other hand the French did not fulfill their obligations with disarmament. These two points always come again. Q. The position then, as to Versailles, and its application to the reoccupation and the Locarno pact, is that France had not lived up to certain obligations regarding disarmament at Versailles. Therefore, it was proper for Germany not to live up to its obligations on re-entering the Rhineland. A. That was the only one left that question about France not fulfilling their duties as to disarmament. We thought the disarmed zone was also devoid of any effect and did not exist any more as a justified fact. Q. Actually, at that time, the most important things left of the Versailles Treaty which were matters of controversy at all, were the disarmament and the Rhineland occupation. A. Yes. Those two points-disarmament and the reoccupation on the other side. Excerpts from Testimony of Constantin von Neurath, Promises to Uphold the Versailles Treaty Q. [In English] I am going to talk again about that period in May 1935. A. [Principally in English] May 1935, yes. Q. We mentioned the meeting between you and the British Ambassador Phipps; do you recall that? A. Yes, I recall. Q. Well, the substance of the conversation with Mr. Phipps was that the the main thought of it, was the Hitler speech of the 21st, and the discussion went along about the second point in Hitler's speech, in which he outlined the 13-point policy. It was regarding the Articles of Versailles, which still were to be considered in effect, and the theory of Hitler as explained by you was, "Germany will respect all provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, including the territorial provisions, and any revisions which will be rendered necessary in the course of time will be put into effect only by the method of peaceful understanding." A. Yes, that was the line on which I always worked, but to be right, I couldn't remember. But I suppose it was so. Pre-Anschluss Pressure on Schuschnigg Q. Now, getting back again to your visit with Schuschnigg in Vienna A. Yes; I have thought about it since the last time. It came a little quick then. I have discussed with Schuschnigg the Anschluss question, and especially the position of Austria vis-a-vis its : neighbors; and I said to him, "All the neighboring states who had occupied former Austro-Hungarian territories are hostile to the recall of the Habsburgs." Benes had said so officially. The Hungarians said so, because he tried to come to Budapest and he I was refused. The Jugoslavian minister also said they would never allow a Habsburg to come back. And Mussolini had repeatedly said to me that at the moment a Habsburg would come back to Vienna, he would occupy the whole of Austria. And in that connection, I said, "Well, that would be a development through which Germany would be touched very much," with the Italians standing only 50 kilometers to Munich, probably to the Danube and in Innsbruck and Linz. So I said, "If it should develop that way, we also would march." That was the way I remembered it. But a very funny thing was that at the end of this discussion of the Habsburg question certainly, Schuschnigg said to me, "Well, I will tell you quite confidentially, and I beg you not to mention it to anybody, but I never thought to recall the Habsburgs, but I must play that game for political reasons." I said, "Well, if you had said this to me before, we would have saved much time," because then the question was not acute. As to the secrecy of what he told me, I said, "I must say that to Hitler to avoid any impulsive action on his side," and he agreed to that. After that meeting in Vienna, the Habsburg question was out of discussion. Q. Now, at that same meeting, wasn't there some discussion concerning the position of the Austrian Nazis in the cabinet? A. In the cabinet? Q. In the Austrian Cabinet. A. Not between myself and Schuschnigg. He always—he refused it, I know, but I think we didn't discuss it. Q. You and he didn't? A. I and Schuschnigg? Q. Yes. A. No; that was between the Party and Schuschnigg. Q. You don't recall ever having represented to Schuschnigg that the Austrian Nazis should have representation in the cabinet? A. To avoid any growing of the quarrel, to avoid it from becoming more acute, that was the standpoint. Hitler always asked that the Nazis should be represented in the Schuschnigg government more. I think at that time there was none, as far as I remember, outside of Seyss-Inquart. He was a Nazi, but I think he wasn't a member of the cabinet at that time. He became afterwards. Q. Yes. At that time apparently Schuschnigg had constantly refused to permit them to be in his Cabinet? A. Yes, he had refused it. Yes. Q. And it was your idea that it would be better from his standpoint, in order to prevent further difficulty, to give them some representation? A. Yes. It was dangerous from the standpoint of Schuschnigg at that time. That was also later on in 1938, after I had left office, I think; we mentioned it the last time Schuschnigg was invited to come to Berchtesgaden. That was a point of the discussion there. But only in 1938. Q. Do you remember telling Schuschnigg that it was not your intention to have Anschluss with Austria? A. Yes. I had discussed it especially with the Foreign Minister Schmidt. As I told you, my intentions were quite different, economically Anschluss, but politically not. Q. Did Hitler always entertain the idea of political Anschluss? A. Yes, he was against what I thought. He intended to have a full Anschluss. Q. Had he had that view all along? A. All along, from the beginning. Yes. Excerpts of Testimony of Constantin von Neurath, taken Germany's Reasons for Leaving Disarmament Conference and League of Nations Q. [In English] How was the decision made by the German Government to leave the disarmament conference in 1933? A. [Principally in English] Why it was done? Q. Yes. A. In the summer of 1933, there were discussions all the time in the disarmament conference in Geneva about the amount of the army, and especially with the French Government. You know that by the League of Nations-I don't know quite how to express it-it was asserted that the German Government had disarmed totally. Now the question was-according to one clause of the Versailles Treaty-that the other nations signatories to the Treaty should disarm too. In 1933, during the whole summer, there was a discussion in the disarmament conference about the number of contingents in the prospective armies, but it was impossible to come to an agreement. That was the reason why we left the disarmament conference. Q. You mean you felt that the talks which occurred in the summer of 1933 were not progressing to the conclusion that the other nations, as well as Germany, would disarm, so you therefore left the conference? A. Yes. I mean, because we expected to come to an agreement, but it was impossible because France refused to disarm to the satisfaction Q. You mean as to the number of troops? A. Yes, troops. I was myself, I think in September of 1933I had been in Geneva personally to try to see whether we couldn't come to an agreement. I discussed it especially with the United States representative, who was Mr. Davis, I think. Q. And had it not already been decided in 1933 to establish a program of rearmament for political and economic reasons in Germany? A. No. In 1933? Q. Yes. (The question was given in German by the Interpreter). A. No. As I say, we always tried to come to an agreement. In this case Hitler had not decided as yet to re-arm. We only |