wished to come to an agreement with the powers about the number of troops, etc.

Q. But hadn't it been determined to expand the Wehrmacht for political and economic reasons at that time, in 1933? A. Please?

(The question was translated into German.)

No, not yet. We had 100,000 men at that time, and it was not yet agreed. I remember once that Hitler proposed that he would even be prepared to abolish the Army totally and only have police troops if the others would do so also.

Q. By whom was the decision made to leave the disarmament conference?

A. I don't understand.

(The question was translated into German.)

It was Hitler who decided it, but it was after I returned from Geneva in September-the end of September. I pointed out to him how things were going, and that no agreement could be reached there. Then he decided to leave the conference. He said it was of no use to talk in Geneva any more.

Q. What was the reason for Germany leaving the League of Nations?

A. Well, about the same. I can't remember what the discussion was at the time in Geneva.

Q. That was 19 October 1933?

A. Yes, but the reasons were the same, that we couldn't go on in the League of Nations. It was not a League of Nations at all any more, because the United States was not there, Russia was not there, and Japan had left. There was no League of Nations

any more.

That was the special reason why we left; it was not the League of Nations which was originally planned.

Q. And that was the reason why it was decided to leave?

A. Yes.

Q. The decision to leave the League had no relation to the disarmament problem?

A. The disarmament conference was a part of the League Nations, you know, so it was interconnected with it.

of

Q. Of course, the decision to leave the disarmament conference would not necessarily have required a decision to leave the League of Nations as well, would it?

A. Well, as I say, the real reason was that in the League of Nations the three big nations were no longer there, and we were alone with the rest.

1

Nazi Agitation in Austria

Q. Do you recall, on the 17th of January 1934, that Dollfuss addressed a note to Germany complaining about the activity ?* A. Oh yes. He did it several times and it was with reason. Q. Now this activity must have been, as you said, a source of considerable annoyance to you as Foreign Minister?

A. No. I mean, it was absolutely a Party affair, and it always made great difficulties for me.

Q. What did you do to attempt to alleviate the condition?
A. To stop it?

Q. Yes.

A. The only thing I could do was to complain to Hitler. They didn't follow him at that time, especially Habicht; he didn't follow his orders any more. So far as I remember, there was a clique of Austrian Nazis who collaborated with Habicht. That was a very strong clique; they were extremists. They endeavored, first to make Austria a Nazi state, to give it a Nazi Government, and then to have the Anschluss. However, I am not sure whether they intended to have the Anschluss as it followed in the end. I mean, I am not sure, because I had no relation with those matters.

Q. What, in your opinion, was the position of the German Nazi Party people with regard to the agitation and the ultimate assassination of Dollfuss?

A. I think they had nothing to do with the assassination. Maybe Mr. Habicht knew something, but I don't think the Party had anything to do with the murder of Dollfuss.

Q. It would be desirable, from the Party standpoint, to have had Dollfuss removed, would it not?

A. Disappear? No; Dollfuss was not an extremist, he was always for collaboration with Germany. Those extremists who murdered him were terrorists and not politicians.

Q. But the Party, in the Austrian activity, in your opinion, exceeded the intentions of Hitler?

A. Oh yes, certainly.

Q. Their agitation was done too soon?

A. Yes. In Vienna, at least at that time-but also later onthere were absolutely terroristic cliques of Nazis. They were, according to my opinion, Communists.

The German Part in the Spanish Civil War

Q. What was the part played by the German Government at the beginning of the Spanish civil war?

A. At the beginning?

*Document referred to did not form part of prosecution case as finally prepared and hence is not published in this series.

Q. Yes.

A. Well, in the beginning we had nothing to do with it, only afterwards. There were volunteers going down there, and we were assisting, but I don't know whether we did assist—yes, we did assist Franco with arms, but that was only after the civi war broke out.

Q. Do you recall the visit of the Franco general, Sanjurjo? A. No, I hadn't seen him.

Q. He came to Berlin in March of 1936.

A. No, I didn't see him. I don't think he came officially. That is why I didn't see him. He had, perhaps, seen Hitler, but I had not seen him.

Q. You know the name?

A. Yes, I know the name.

Q. Were you aware at all of the purpose of his visit?

A. Of what?

Q. Of the purpose of his visit.

A. No. Was that in 1936?

Q. Yes. Do you know what Hitler's views were towards the Spanish civil war?

A. His views?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes. It was in his mind to support Franco against a revolution, or the Reds, as we called them. That was the general view. Q. Was that based on ideological ideas, or was it on a political basis?

A. No, political basis-would you repeat that? (The question was translated into German.)

Yes, ideologically, naturally, because Spain was far away from us and politically we had nothing to do with it. It was ideologically, of course.

Q. What, in your opinion, was Hitler's view concerning the usefulness of the Spanish civil war in connection with the posi tion of France to Germany?

A. It may have been in his mind that a strong Franco would, in case of a conflict with France, be helpful to us. I mean, that may be. The first intention or reason why he supported Franco was an ideological one, the campaign against Bolshevism. That

was the reason.

Q. And it is quite possible that there would be some incidenta! benefits to Germany politically if Franco was victorious? A. You may consider that that was so. I mean, in the event of a conflict with France, a strong Franco could have been of help, at least morally.

Q. Yes.

A. But those considerations were in the bureaus, or in the chancelleries.

Q. I see. Do you recall the occasion of the naval bombardment of Almeria?

A. Yes, I remember a bombardment of Almeria.

A. I remember the bombardment, but I can't remember, at the moment, the reasons. Can you help me out?

Q. Apparently it resulted from some activity by Red aircraft on the ships, and in retaliation they bombarded the town.

A. Oh yes. I think that was the Navy cruiser Leipzig, which was bombarded by an airship or by an airplane, or something of that sort. I couldn't say for sure whether it was afterwards or not. I remember that fact, but I can't remember this.

Q. Was there any discussion about the event?

A. No, it was-I remember the bombardment of that cruiser, the German cruiser, by a Red airplane; there were several dead and wounded on it. I must say "probably," because I can't remember it. However, as a consequence, or as a reaction to that bombardment, Almeria was bombarded.

Q. The details, however, you don't recall now?

A. No; all those things are not in my memory right now. Perhaps you had better ask one of our naval men about that; I can't tell you.

Purpose of German-Austrian Agreement of 11 July 1936

Q. What was the purpose of the German-Austrian accord of 11 July 1936?*

A. That agreement?

Q. Yes.

A. 1936? At that time there was already a strong Nazi movement in Austria, and that movement had more or less excited Mussolini. To show that it was not the intention to occupy Austria, or to make the Anschluss, an agreement between Austria and us was again signed, which stipulated the acknowledgment of an Austria and of no intervention in Austrian affairs. That was the intention.

You see, Mussolini had threatened to occupy the whole south of Austria in case of the Anschluss, and from the Czech side it was said that they would occupy the north to Linz, so from our side

* See Document TC-22, Vol. VIII, p. 369.

we could only conclude again, or acknowledge again, that the Austrian State had an independent sovereignty. That was the reason for that, as far as I remember, and it was concluded wher the Austrian Minister of Foreign affairs came to Berlin.

Q. That was the one in which both parties, Germany and Austria, undertook not to intervene in the internal affairs of either country?

A. Yes, that was because the Nazi Party in Germany had made certain propaganda-I mean, to show that it was not so efficient a policy.

Q. And its purpose was to reassure Italy and the other powers that there was no intention to accomplish the Anschluss with Austria?

A. Yes; at that time it was not the intention. As I said, I think the description in the Indictment is quite wrong; the rea Anschluss question came up only in December 1937, and net before. Hitler himself had not the intention to make the Aschluss as it was made afterwards. He favored, naturally, a Naz Government in Austria, not the Anschluss or the disappearance of Austria. That came only in 1937.

Q. What, in your opinion, was the cause of Hitler's changing his views regarding the Anschluss?

A. In 1937?

Q. Yes.

A. In 1937 there were two or three reasons, I think. First of all, as I said, there was an enormous growing of the Nazi movement in Austria. There were at that time three-quarters of the population who were for the Anschluss. That was the first reason.

We, had, then, thousands and thousands of Austrians, especially in South Germany, who were immigrants, and they, naturally, always agitated and insisted with Hitler to free Austria from the Schuschnigg regime. That was the second reason.

The third was that we had no news from England, that the British Government did not any more mean that they were against the Anschluss. That was in December of 1937. So that was the last job for Hitler to decide.

Also in December of 1937, after what I just now told you happened, he asked me whether I thought he should make the Anschluss. I said, "No, don't; or at least speak first with Schuschnigg." The interview which took place in February was a conse quence of all those things which took place and I describe just now.

However, before, the question of the Anschluss was not at all

acute.