me. Being a man of his position, I thought it only polite to return the call. I confirmed that the necessity was still there but that one had to wait for another chance, and he may have gathered from this discussion that military circles were not unsympathetic to such a plan. Q. Did Schacht indicate that he was still interested in getting rid of Hitler? A. Yes, he expressed it very openly and without mincing words. We parted on the understanding that if there should be any necessity, we would seek each other out. Q. And did you subsequently seek each other out? A. No. Q. Did you have any contact with him after that? A. No, not until seeing him again in jail and in the concentration camp. Q. Did you ever seek advice of any sort from Schacht? A. No, not in questions of politics. I only remember that my Quartermaster General, Wagner, before the Western campaign, asked if he might seek advice from Schacht in currency questions. Q. When was this? A. It might have been in April 1940. Q. In advance of the invasion of Belgium? A. Yes. In such preparations, the question of currency plays a certain role. We had had a rather disagreeable experience in Poland with the OKW and therefore I tried to get the advice of experts on this. Such things, of course, were not treated by officers but by civilians-we had administrative workers. We had all sorts of experts, but no currency expert. Therefore Wagner wanted to ask Schacht if he might rely upon his advice. I permitted this request. But Schacht declined his cooperation right away and with a sharp refusal. Q. On what grounds? A. Because he did not want to have anything to do with the whole thing which he considered madness. Q. What do you mean by "the whole thing"? A. The whole western campaign. Q. Is that what Wagner reported to you? A. Yes. Q. Did you personally contact Schacht on this occasion? Q. Did anyone else, von Witzleben, Oster, Beck, etc., refer to Schacht in any subsequent discussions you had with them? A. Not von Witzleben. I had presumed this relationship was kept up, and it was indicated to me that General Wagner kert in touch with Schacht and that the communications with Oste were not interrupted. I only remember that in 1942 Wagner gave me Schacht's regards. At any rate, in the years 1939 and 19 I had no contact with Schacht in this active group. During 1989 and 1940 there was still activity to avoid the western campaig Excerpts from Testimony of General Franz Halder, at Reasons for Failure to Carry Out Plot Before Invasion of Polars Q. I should like to resume where we left off yesterday. A. I have talked once more to General Warlimont, who was present at the conference held by General Beck, about the question of the time. Q. You mean you talked to Warlimont last night? A. Yes, and Warlimont recollects that this conference took place only in June. I think it is necessary for me to communicate this to you but I cannot explain this difference in time. Q. Do you still think it was earlier than June? A. I had the recollection that it was in spring, but I cannot recollect the date. Q. Did Warlimont participate in plans for the overthrow of the Hitler Government? A. No. Q. At any time? A. No. May I say Warlimont, in opposition to the other peo ple of the OKW, was a man who, in his thoughts, was abou parallel to the people of the OKH. He was not an activist and not a man in whom we could confide; he was not a member ci our circle. Naturally you would only bring into your inner circle people of whom you were quite sure, if necessary, ve could stake your life. Of course we strictly avoided conversa tions with other people. Q. And you did not fully trust Warlimont? A. I had personal trust in him, but according to his whole character I did not consider him a fighter. Furthermore he was in contact with Jodl and Keitel, and therefore the danger that an unwilling allusion could come from him was too great. Q. Did you trust Keitel and Jodl? A. No. Both were absolutely willing tools of Hitler, even though for quite different personal reasons. Q. What do you mean by that? A. With Keitel I think the reason for his unlimited allegiance to Hitler was his lack of talent and his feeble character. Q. And Jodl? A. Jodl believed in Hitler as a saviour, and Jodl always was very ambitious and he hoped to get a personal position for himself. Jodl, at a very early moment in the year 1936 or 1937, once told me that his military ideal was Napoleon and his marshals. He said, it is not a question as to whether the marshals should go up military ranks from the bottom, but that the right thing was to pick talent in people and put them in their jobs. And the Napoleon whom he thought of as his ideal was Adolf Hitler. Q. You mentioned yesterday that you were visited by Schacht and Gisevius? A. Yes. Q. Can you describe Gisevius? A. I saw Gisevius only once; my impression of him therefore is no final one. My recollection is of a highly talented, very fluent in his speech, and well educated young man. Q. I want to pass to a new topic. Prior to the attack on Poland, were any plans laid for the elimination of Hitler? A. No. At that time there was no possibility. Q. Why not? A. After the Czech crisis, the leader of the whole military movement had been transferred to Berlin from Wiesbaden. His successor was a certain General Hase. This is not General von Hassell who was put to death after 20 July, but a General who had the command of an Army in the West, and who died in 1943 or 1944. This General Hase could not be used for the tasks in question here. Q. How about the Chief of Police? A. I had no direct contact with the Chief of Police. This contact had been through Witzleben and when Witzleben had gone away I had no contact with Helldorf. I emphasized yesterday a leading role, or rather an executive role, can only be filled by a man who is in command of troops and who can give orders to his commanders whom he knows precisely. Q. Which of the 3 conditions you outlined yesterday for a successful revolution were lacking before the attack on Poland? A. The executive military force had been lacking. Q. How about the support of the people? A. This is the second point. The conference of Munich had given Adolf Hitler such a rise in prestige, not only with the masses but also with military circles. May I add that Chamberlain when he returned from the Conference to London had been applauded by the people although he did not report success. Adolf Hitler was even more applauded as he had scored a suc cess. Q. As I understood your statement yesterday, the possible opposition to Hitler from the people arose from the fact that they feared and hated war above everything else. A. That is right. Q. Well, if Hitler were irrevocably committed to war, why couldn't you count on the support of the people before the invasion of Poland? A. You must excuse me if I smile. If I hear the word "irrev ocably" connected with Hitler, I must say that nothing was irrevocable, and whoever knew him did not believe one of his strong words. Q. You believed him on August 22, 1939, didn't you? A. Not yet. For this, one must know the history of all this development. May I add that not even the people who were present at the speeches or conferences believed in his intention actually to wage war, even less the people who did not know that: and after all there had not been any mobilization and they did not know anything about it. Whoever did not know Adolf Hitler cannot imagine what a master of deception and camouflage this man was. Q. Do I understand you to say that even on August 22, after the conference at Obersalzberg, which I believe you attended. you and others still believed that Hitler did not intend to at tack Poland ?* A. No, because at this conference Hitler said expressly that negotiations with Poland were continuing. On the 26 August when he gave an order to be ready on the 27th, on the very same day he rescinded the order and told the Commander in Chief of the Army, at that time von Brauchitsch, that there were still negotiations with Poland. Q. Let me read a statement which you recently made to Gereral Miller Hildebrandt which bears upon your last two answers. It says: "I am not letting any charge be made against our *See documents L-3, vol. VII, p. 752; 798-PS, vol. III, p. 581; 1014-PS, vol III, p. 665. General Staff. I recall that I had to say rather more about Brauchitsch than was strictly necessary. Brauchitsch was just too relenting, too fastidious. I have often felt terribly sorry for him." Your last few answers lend particular emphasis to your stated desire not to let any charge be made against the General Staff. A. No, I cannot understand this. I recollect this conversation. because it had a special reason. Q. What was that? A. The reason was this: I had asked General Miller Hildebrandt, who had been my aide, to read my memorandum on the relation, or rather attitude, between OKW and OKH. This memorandum, as far as I know, is here. In this memorandum once, or rather twice, I criticised Brauchitsch. Once in November 1939, in the discussions, or rather arguments, with Hitler, and the second time on his attitude vis-a-vis our aims for revolution in the beginning of 1940. These expressions concerning Brauchitsch of course raised Hildebrandt's interest. They were astonishing to Hildebrandt and in order to explain them, I talked it over with him. Q. The sentence I was particularly interested in is, "I am not letting any charge be made against our General Staff." A. You would reproach me for shielding, as former Chief of the General Staff, the officers of whom about 50 ended on the gallows. These officers have no guilt. Q. They have no guilt now, but there might be some difference of opinion as to their guilt before they reached the gallows. A. The difference of opinion rises only from lack of knowledge. You reproached me that in spite of my responsibility I tried to overthrow Hitler and that I was ready to overthrow him. Q. Please be assured that if I were to reproach you, it would be for not overthrowing Hitler. A. May I make a personal remark. I am the last male member of a family which for 300 years were soldiers. What the duty of a soldier is I know too. I know that in the dictionary of a German soldier the term treason and plot against the State does not exist. I was in the awful dilemma of one, the duty of a soldier, and another, the duty which I considered higher. Innumerable of my old comrades were in the same dilemma. I chose the solution for the duties I deemed higher. The majority of my comrades deemed the duty to the flag higher and essential. You may be assured that this is the worst dilemma that a soldier may be faced with. That is what I wanted to explain. |