A. Yes. He only looked at it like that, and if Hitler had discovered before that such a connection, between the subordinates of Mikhailovic on one side and German officers on the other side, was going on, he would have prevented it. It may be of some interest to you, General, that Hitler's respect for Tito was very high and that in the last stages of the war he said several times that Tito should be an example to every German general. That is specially interesting for us as General Staff officers because Hitler wanted to demonstrate by this means the difference between the rough field general, as he thought Tito to be, and the thinking European generals, as we saw ourselves to be. Q. Do you mean by that, that he preferred the Rommel type of soldier rather than the intellectual type of general? A. Yes. Q. And he compared Tito to Rommel? A. No, more like Schoerner. Q. What did the German Generals think of Tito? A. He certainly was a strong man who came through all difficulties and lost a great number of his men, and in spite of that, always was there again, but politically he was entirely opposed to our kind of thinking. Balkan Collaboration with the Germans Q. I show you here a photostatic copy dated the 8th of DeIcember 1940 from the Fuehrer's Headquarters, and ask if you recognize your signature on it, and if it refreshes your recollection as to the circumstances surrounding it. You will find a translation attached.* A. It is a document issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operations Staff, Division for National Defense, and it is signed by me. It says that, in preparation for the campaign in the Balkans, several officers will be sent to Bulgaria. Q. Does that recall to your mind anything that would be of help in looking at the paper, or understanding it? A. Yes. It is certainly in connection with the preparations for the campaigns which started some time later, but I couldn't say any more than is in the paper itself. It says that those four officers of the Air Force were sent to Bulgaria for reconnoitering purposes, reconnoitering of air fields and so on, I suppose, and O that the Navy sent two officers and one employee in order to assist the Bulgarians in the defense of the coast. *Document referred to did not form part of prosecution case as finally prepared and hence is not published in this series. Q. Also at that time, didn't you send down officers to organize watches on the hills in Bulgaria against the British coming in on raids? A. Yes. That is true. That was during the winter of 1941 because of the care Hitler always took against air raids on Rumanian oil fields. That was the reason.* Q. How many German soldiers in civilian clothing did you have in Bulgaria at that time? A. It is funny, but I believe the number was about 200. I think it was restricted to a number of that kind. Q. Was the King aware of that? Was it by arrangement with the King? A. Yes. I think so. I don't know exactly. Everything was done by arrangement with the King, much more than with the gov ernment in Bulgaria. Q. Although Filoff was a friend of Germany at that time, was he not? A. He was estimated to be a friend. Q. When did you feel that your arrangement was solid with Boris for his help in Bulgaria? A. Was solid? Q. Was fixed so that you could rely upon it. A. I don't know when it really had been established, but I know that we had no difficulties at that time to make him consent to all the measures we wanted from him. I only saw him some time later, when everything was much more firmly established. Q. When did you have Paul of Yugoslavia with you? A. In May or June '39. Q. So from May or June of '39 all the way through he was in working arrangement with you? A. I don't know. I only saw him at parades and at the theater. I had nothing to do with such arrangements. I didn't hear about it, but I believe so. Q. Do you know that at the same time he was pretending to the British that he was with them? A. Yes. He was. *See document C-53, Vol. VI, p. 877. Excerpts from Testimony of Adolf Westhoff taken at The Murder of RAF Prisoners of War at Sagan Q. Now, General, during the month of March 1944 you were in charge of the Allgemeine Abteilung; is that right? A. Yes, beginning with the 1st of March. Q. During the month of March there was an incident which occurred at Sagan which I want to call to your attention and ask you to tell me in detail how that incident was handled by you, by Keitel, and by Hitler himself. There were eighty Allied fliers, citizens of England, who had escaped from one of the Luftwaffe camps just previous to this date, March 1944, and they were later captured and some of them were executed. Now, I want to know from you what camp they escaped from. Will you answer that? A. It was called Luft III, Sagan. Q. Now, this camp belonged to the air forces, didn't it? A. Yes, but I don't know it personally; I have never been there. This was a Luftwaffe camp and the commandant was a Luftwaffe officer. His name was Col. von Lindeiner. Q. Now, after these prisoners had escaped Keitel was criticized in the presence of Hitler by Himmler and Goering, wasn't he? A. Well, I don't know whether it would be right to say that he was criticized. May I tell the story as I heard it? Q. Yes, but we will interrupt you so that we can bring out the points which are of the most interest to us. A. Up to that time I did not know Field Marshal Keitel personally. I hadn't been presented to him, but I knew him by sight. For some reason which I can not remember, Keitel sent for General von Graevenitz. On that occasion he gave the order that I should accompany General von Graevenitz so as to be introduced as his successor. When we arrived at the HQ the Field Marshal stated the following. He was considerably excited about the escape of these eighty people, due probably to the fact that he had been reproached *General Adolf Westhoff was Chief of, the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. by the Reichsfuehrer and the Reichsmarshal. He said that it was incredible that this sort of thing should have occurred, and it must not be allowed to continue. He explained that a conference had taken place with Hitler that same morning in the presence of Himmler and Goering, and it had been decided that, in the future, those of the eighty who would be recaptured must be shot. And he added, "Gentlemen, I can tell you that at this moment most of them have already been shot." Q. Now, you state that Field Marshal Keitel, in the presence of Graevenitz and yourself, stated to you that the eighty British officers who had escaped from Sagan would be shot when recaptured, and many of those who had already been captured had been shot; is that right? A. He said, "I can tell you, gentlemen, that the bulk of the people are already dead now." Q. Did he tell you who had shot them? A. I am just going to tell you about that. Q. Just a minute; answer that question: Did Field Marshal Keitel tell you who had shot them? A. Yes, the Gestapo. Q. Through whose orders did Field Marshal Keitel say, and under whose authority, were these persons shot by the Gestapo? A. In my opinion, General Graevenitz raised opposition immediately, but Keitel said, "These things can not go on; we have to make an example and these people must be shot," etc., etc. etc. Q. But what I am trying to find out from you, General, is through whose authority were these persons shot? A. I presume that you are aiming at finding out whether they were shot on the authority of Hitler or Keitel, but I am afraid I can't tell you; I can only tell you what Keitel has been saying. Q. Well, didn't Keitel tell you that he had ordered them shot? A. No. He said, "It was decided in a conference with Hitler and in the presence of the Reichsmarshal and Himmler that these people were to be shot." That is what he told me, and I can't tell you any more. The Field Marshal had given personal instruction on how this whole matter was to be dealt with, and he also said that no written documents were to be compiled on this subject. Q. What instructions had he given to you that he refused to put in writing concerning this incident? A. He said that no correspondence should arise on this mat ter. Q. Well, if in the other orders, General, issued by Field Marshal Keitel, there are paragraphs which refer to turning over certain prisoners of war to the Gestapo, what would you say those paragraphs, worded as such, meant? A. Gentlemen, in that connection I must go into detail regarding the position of the Chief of the Department of POW Affairs. The position of the Chief of POW Affairs has always been that of trying to maintain that the Geneva Convention was observed. Q. Yes, we know that, General, but my question is: If I showed you an order issued by Field Marshal Keitel, and in it a paragraph said that all persons who had formerly been prisoners of war and had escaped and were recaptured, upon their recapture will be turned over to the Gestapo, what would be your interpretation of that paragraph in Field Marshal Keitel's orders? A. Well, of course, you could find two interpretations for that. One was that the so-called bearers of state secrets, that is to say, persons who had knowledge of certain secrets vital for the war effort, were under certain circumstances to be handed over to the Gestapo for safe custody. You must remember in this connection, gentlemen, that at the time when I took up my office, all arrangements had been in existence for at least two years. And the second explanation, though one could never quite get to the bottom of that story because the Gestapo did not allow anybody any insight into these matters, was that these people were handed over to be liquidated. But this is a matter which I must explain in more detail. Whenever there was a case that any such people were surrendered to the Gestapo, the Gestapo would always maintain that these people were not shot but that they were used for some work. Efforts to Abide by Geneva Convention Thwarted by "Orders from Above" Q. Well, the fact of it was, General, that you in the Wehrmacht and in the prisoners section of the Wehrmacht were anxious to follow the rules laid down by the Geneva Convention,* and, as you have said before you had great apprehension when you turned over one of your prisoners to the Gestapo, as to what would actually happen to them after the Gestapo got them in their hands, didn't you? A. Gentlemen, on that I would like to make the following *See document 3738-PS, vol. VI, p. 599. |