well merited, were indiscriminate. On the one hand, their intelligence, their physique, their spirit, were admirable; the introduction of these mounted men filled a gap in our military organisation; they were indispensable for the successful prosecution of the war. But, on the other, no one who served with them will say that their value was due to their lack of training. On the contrary, they improved day by day; they got their training in the field, and they had to pay for it, too, more than once. Most of them enlisted for one year; and at the end of that year they were in the prime of their efficiency, never more valuable than at the moment their services were lost. Regiments, contingents, individuals, left the field, time-expired, and were replaced by units and men of the same type, but of far inferior value. Then training began again, in presence of the enemy; hard experience and careful guidance helped the stumbling new-comers along the road to efficiency, and the daily improvement was again apparent. Some colonial contingents consisted of men who were already fairly well trained; and these contingents were correspondingly more valuable. It was not because they were untrained that irregulars were so eagerly sought for; it was because there were not enough trained men available who had the necessary qualifications. We 'fawned on the younger nations for the men who could shoot and ride.'

Those who quote history to prove the superiority of the untrained over the trained soldier are usually adrift either in their facts or in their conclusions. The French soldiers of the Revolution were only for a short period untrained; but, till they were trained, they were consistently beaten. The guerrillas of Spain could not save a foot of their country from the invader. The American war was fought in peculiar circumstances. Lord George Germain, who administered colonial affairs at the time, was an ex-soldier who had been cashiered from the army for misconduct on the battle-field; and the British Government's mismanagement of the campaign was in itself sufficient to upset any military calculations. Moreover, we had heavy odds against us; France, Spain, and the United Netherlands took the opportunity of recovering the colonial supremacy of which we had deprived them; and in the struggle the command of the sea was lost.

The theatre of war in America was of great extent, and was by its nature suited to a desultory or guerrilla type of warfare. Nevertheless the Americans, untrained at first, were at first unsuccessful; but time was allowed them, and they did not waste it. The army which won independence for America was an army of trained soldiers. Except in discipline, there was little of the irregular about the old continental.'

Great Britain is not a theatre which would be suitable for irregular operations. The country is too small and too highly civilised; successful irregular warfare has usually demanded a large area and a somewhat primitive mode of life. The conditions of this country would seem rather to favour the most complete organisation and perfect military training. Without organisation it would be impossible to utilise fully the valuable artificial resources of the country, the railways, the telegraphs, the powers and possessions of local authorities; nor could there be any hope of a rapid concentration to make a bid for early success. Irregular warfare achieves success by wearing down, not by overthrowing, an enemy. If Great Britain were invaded we could not afford to delay; we must strike at once. The invader will not wait for us; he will have a prearranged and definite plan of action; and something more serious than the pin-pricks of irregular opposition will be required to impede his movement on the chosen objective. Swift concentration and immediate deployment are for us essential; and neither can be successfully achieved unless the troops on which we rely are both organised and trained.

If these arguments be applied to the Territorial force, it will be seen that something, at least, has been gained. The main advantage is, of course, organisation; it is possible to imagine the Territorial force acting as an army in the field. This could not have been said of the Volunteers. Had it been desired, on an emergency, to form an army from the old force, it would have been necessary to take in a hurry precisely those steps which are now being taken at leisure; and the complications and difficulties which have been, and have still to be, faced in the effort show how futile any hurried attempt would have been. The Volunteers were incapable of undertaking any serious military operations; being totally

without organisation, they could not have concentrated with any certainty; they could not have manoeuvred ; they could not have maintained themselves in the field. They had no staff, no mobile artillery, no communication service, no organised supply or transport arrangements. They were, in fact, irregulars, and capable only of taking part in minor operations. The alteration in system, if successfully completed, will effect, at any rate, one improvement; the Territorial force will be able to take the field as an army, and to try its strength in pitched battle. It may not be able to win, but at least it will be able to fight. Those persons, however, who decry the regular and professional soldier should, for one reason, be well content with the new force. For, however admirable its organisation, its training will not be so protracted or so severe as to destroy in the individual soldier any of the military advantages which, in their opinion, the untrained combatant enjoys.

Ranged in opposition to the enthusiasts are those who refuse to recognise, in the formation of the Territorial force, anything but a political manoeuvre and a military blunder. It is asserted that the scheme is a paper one; that this Government, at any rate, does not intend to carry it out in its entirety; that it is merely a cloak for extensive reductions in the personnel of both first and second lines. These assertions appear to be part of the ordinary amenities of party politics; they cannot at present be proved or disproved; and it is a waste of time for honest men to speculate on possible discrepancies between the promises and the performances of a party Government. Of more interest and importance are the accusations that a military blunder has been committed, and that we are really worse off as regards defence than we were before.

The main argument by which this view is supported is based on the loss of men under the new system. Not only is the establishment of the Territorial force much lower than that of the Volunteers, but even the reduced establishment is not filled. Information which Mr Haldane has affably supplied to the House of Commons has proved these facts beyond a doubt; the figures have been quoted in the press and gravely commented on. The reduction of establishment is certainly a serious matter,

Under the higher establishment of the Volunteers, the burden of home-defence was thrown on less than onetenth of the male population of suitable age; under the new system this proportion has been still further reduced. If it be admitted that a defence-force of any kind is necessary, such limitations cannot in theory be justified. Some practical excuses, however, have been put forward which, in the present political situation of the country, carry a certain weight. It is urged that no more money is available, and that the establishment was fixed at the extreme limit of the purse. It is also pointed out that the establishment is not fixed at too low a figure, since the strength is considerably below the establishment; and, lastly, it is argued that the establishment can be raised if necessary. These excuses have the effect of shifting the burden of responsibility, in some degree, from the Government to the nation; and, in some degree, such a shifting is justifiable. For there can be no doubt that the nation, through its representatives, demanded economy in military administration; while it is equally clear that the vast majority of the nation decline to take advantage of the training that is offered them.

This latter point, the deficiency of men, is really the difficulty. The exact figure at which the establishment is fixed assumes importance only when the actual strength approaches it. It is necessary, in judging the value of the Territorial force, to seek for the causes of this deficiency in strength, that we may know whether they are due to some inherent and incurable fault in the system or not. The term 'deficiency in strength' may for this purpose be taken to mean the loss of men since the introduction of the new system. This definition applies accurately to the arguments under discussion; and, if we adopt it, the conditions of both the old and the new force must be reviewed.

Now the Volunteers were formed in independent units, chiefly infantry, varying much in strength and efficiency. Their liability for service was slight, and was in a legal sense indefinite. The necessary standard of efficiency for individuals was very low. When the new scheme was introduced, these men were called on, without much warning, to join a force of an entirely different character. In all cases a definite liability for service and

a higher standard of training had to be accepted. In many cases units were merely transformed, and did not cease to exist; but in others the unit was wiped out, and perhaps replaced by another of a totally different character. The Volunteer who had selected Garrison Artillery as an arm suited to his particular military talents was invited to assume control of a pair of horses in a field gun-team. The field-engineer was to become a telegraphist; the disbanded infantrymen might join an ammunition or supply column, or a field ambulance. It is not surprising that there has been some hesitation in accepting the new conditions; it was not to be expected that even the alteration in the names and duties of units would be universally accepted.

Probably, however, the most potent influence which has discouraged recruiting is the additional stringency in standard of training and in liability for service. To the ordinary mind it would appear that the decrease in numbers is directly due to the endeavour to ensure increased efficiency. There is now a medical standard of fitness; annual camps are compulsory; necessary but, for the moment, unpopular arms, services, and departments have been introduced as integral parts of the force. It cannot be doubted that all these causes have tended to reduce numbers. Opponents of the system argue that the improvement in efficiency-if there be any improvement-will be but small, while the reduction in numbers is serious; and that therefore the balance of advantage is against the new scheme. That is a clear issue, if a somewhat narrow one. Is the Territorial force more or less valuable than the Volunteer force?

There are some, indeed, who say that it is easier to improvise troops than to improvise an organisation for them; and that the value of the organisation of the Territorial force, even if the force itself were only a skeleton, would outweigh the disadvantage of any deficiency in numbers in peace time, provided that men could be found for war. It is not, however, necessary for

us to consider such an extreme case; there is at present no reason to suppose that the strength of the force will not continue to increase slowly towards the figure at which the establishment has been fixed.

The peace training which is laid down for the Terri