who shut their eyes to plain defects, and the wreckers, who, for various reasons, prefer disorder to order in the national forces. The reasons given for their attitude by extremists on both sides are seldom candid; but unguarded statements sometimes betray an inkling of the truth, and the respective points of view may be worth some analysis.

First and most extreme among the enthusiasts come undoubtedly those who stand in deadly fear of a compulsory system. For them the Territorial force is the last bulwark against conscription. In this view they are possibly correct; it has the authority of Mr Haldane, although some of his predecessors in office have intimated that they have still a scheme or two which could be framed, or resuscitated, as a further defence. Correct or not, the view is comprehensible, and the issue is clear. There is only one point to argue, apart from the possible civil advantages of compulsory training; and that point is the sufficiency of the Territorial force for the national requirements.

If it be assumed that the ranks of the force will be successfully filled (the actual outlook in this respect will be discussed later), there is no great difficulty in stating a case for consideration. The numerical sufficiency of the establishment must first be discussed. Fourteen divisions, fourteen mounted brigades, and some army troops, form a force of no small importance, and in respect of numbers, would, for home defence, put us almost on an equality with a second-class Power. Such an army, properly equipped and organised, and with a prospect of receiving some training before its services were required, would have a very sensible influence on any invasion schemes which might be based on the temporary or permanent overthrow of our sea-power. The exact force of that influence, however, is not easy to estimate. The existence of this organised land-force will certainly, for one thing, effectually discourage the despatch of small raiding expeditions to inflict damage or create alarm, unless such enterprises are only minor details of a simultaneous and more ambitious scheme of invasion. It has been too readily assumed by a section of the public that, so long as the navy keeps command of the sea, no invading force of greater strength than some five or ten thousand

men could possibly be disembarked on our shores. If by command of the sea' we are to understand 'permanent command of home waters,' then the assumption would be sound enough; but it is to be hoped that our naval strategists will not consent to any such limitation. The proper strategic position for the navy in time of war is on the enemy's coast, not on our own. But if there has ever been any possibility that a foreign government would, for inadequate objectives, sacrifice five or ten thousand men by landing them, unsupported, in this country, we may be satisfied that, in view of the opposition to be expected from an efficient Territorial force, the despatch of such an expedition would not be considered a rational operation of war by the military advisers of any government in the world.

The possible strength of a force which might be landed on our coasts, while our navy is still supreme, is a question on which there is much difference of opinion. There are some who talk of 'the crew of a dinghy' as the maximum ; there are others who think that an army can be put on shore as quickly as the passengers from a penny steamer. The truth is that there is very great difficulty in arriving at any accurate estimate; reasonable probability is the only safe basis for discussion. The grave risks of any such expedition must be considered; the risk of its being intercepted by the superior navy while at sea; the risk of disembarkation being interrupted by the superior navy, even if that has been successfully evaded during the voyage; the risk of leaving a force in a hostile country with no communications and no prospect of further support; the risks of wind and weather. Then there are difficulties-the secret collection and embarkation of a sufficient force; the provision of tonnage; the landing of the force, and especially of its equipment, which is always a slow process. It is impossible, within the limits of this article, to discuss these points in detail; their mere enumeration is sufficient to show that both risks and difficulties increase with the size of the expedition, and that an invasion on a scale sufficient to ensure success against 300,000 moderately efficient second-line troops is not a reasonable possibility so long as our navy is available in superior strength to oppose the invader.

This last proviso, however, is of some importance. If

the British fleets should be, at any moment, so distributed that superior force could not be brought against the ships of an invader, then, in so far as invasion is concerned, the command of the sea is temporarily lost. And if we admit any possibility of the loss, temporary or permanent, of naval supremacy, whether by surprise or mismanagement, or by the invention of new weapons, or by defeat in fair battle, the sufficiency of the Territorial force must be judged by a new standard. If the period of our inferiority at sea should be only temporary, the possible strength of an invading force will be limited as much by tonnage as by time; and it is impossible for us to calculate beforehand the amount of tonnage which an enemy might concentrate for a well-planned effort.

It is important to note that the time required to land an army does not necessarily increase in proportion to the numbers landed; it is influenced also by the suitability and convenience of landing-places, and by the distance between them. It is most probable that an invading army would be divided into bodies of convenient size, each of such strength as would enable it to maintain itself until concentration could be effected. If, therefore, it should be asserted that three days would be required to land a force of 100,000 men in Essex, it must be borne in mind that in the same three days another force of the same strength could be landed in Suffolk, provided the men and the transports were ready. If sufficient time and tonnage are available, invasion by the forces of a Great Power, with which we were fighting single-handed, need be limited only by the strength of the enemy's army; and a Great Power musters its men by millions. Fourteen divisions of second-line troops, whatever be their valour and devotion, cannot be counted as sufficient to stem the tide of a great invasion. In this we stand as we did; if command of the sea be lost for any serious interval, then, barring miracles, the land is lost also.

Nevertheless, even in considering the possibility of a great invasion, it must not be assumed that the Territorial force is useless. For it would fight, however desperate the case of that there can be little doubt; and the very existence of an organised and resolute force, even if weak in numbers and in training, is a factor to be considered by an invader. Formerly we had, except the regular army,

no organised force with which to meet an invasion. Now we have such a force; and, though it would be insufficient to repel an invasion in force, if actually attempted, yet it may be sufficient to deter an enemy from making the attempt-not, indeed, if he should have defeated our navy, but so long as our navy is undefeated. For, assuming that the navy may possibly be defeated or evaded, yet the attempt to defeat or evade it would be a hazardous venture to begin with, and would hardly be undertaken without a clear prospect of further advantage. So long as we had only our unorganised Volunteers to count on for defence, the prospect was attractive; any invasion, in the absence of our regular army, would succeed. Now the prospect is not so clear. Invasion must be deliberate; the first landing must be in great strength; the effects of mistakes or accidents are increased in magnitude and intensity. With the best arrangements the preliminary precautions rendered necessary by the presence of the organised defensive force must cost a certain amount of time; and, in war, time is of the first importance. In such a case as this it is especially so, for this time-factor makes it almost indispensable that the invader's command of the sea shall be not merely a local and momentary superiority but one definitely assured for a sufficient period.

The case, therefore, seems to stand thus. The Territorial force may be considered likely to serve as a deterrent to any hostile Power which may have planned a scheme of invasion, for such temporary or limited naval superiority as might have formerly allowed of a successful invasion cannot now be considered sufficient. In addition, the difficulties of invasion, even if the enemy has complete control of the sea, have been multiplied. The reorganisation of our auxiliary forces will, in effect, give additional security to the country. But the security is still limited; it rests on the navy only. If the navy cannot prevent a great invasion, the Territorial force is numerically insufficient to resist it successfully.

It was at one time suggested by the most ardent supporters of the new scheme that the Territorial force might, in some degree, provide for the expansion of the regular army in war abroad. There is nothing however in the Territorial system which gives authority for any

such desirable arrangement. It is probable that in time of war individuals may voluntarily offer themselves for service with the regular army, but there is nothing new in this. The Volunteer force performed exactly the same function; and a modest proportion of its members took the field in South Africa and acquitted themselves well. This, of course, is not really expansion at all. There is no machinery for providing an organised reinforcement for an oversea war; and no reinforcement on a large scale can be expected.

There are certain enthusiasts of another type, who, although not very articulate, hold very pronounced views. These firmly believe that training is almost unnecessary for a soldier; that the irregular is a better fighter than the regular; and that untrained Territorials, if only they are organised, will be more than a match for an equal number of continental 'conscripts.' They rely on the natural intelligence of the Territorial, on his ardour when fighting to defend his home, on his skill with the rifle (to prove which the statistics of 'pot-hunting' riflemeetings are quoted), on his freedom from red tape. They point to the protracted resistance of the Boers against superior numbers of trained troops, and to the high praise meted out to irregulars who fought on our side during the South African war, as proofs of the superiority of the irregular. The levies of revolutionary France, the guerrillas of Spain, the riflemen who fought under Washington, are quoted as examples.

There is just enough reason in these arguments to make them attractive to those who are optimistic by nature, and especially to those who are subject to intermittent attacks of emotional patriotism. It is not to be denied that, in certain circumstances, irregular troops have in past times secured advantages over regulars in war; but the circumstances have been exceptional, and the advantages usually only temporary. The Boers had evolved a system of fighting which was exactly adapted to the country in which they fought, and in the application of this system they individually excelled; yet, owing to their inability to assume a determined offensive, due to lack of training, they were unable to reap the fruit of their defensive successes. The public eulogies of British irregulars in the same war, although