To bring the point home, the services are now going through the exercise of cutting back on their budget projections for the next 5 years. Traditionally, the services respond to cutbacks by stretching out programs and slighting munitions and other readiness accounts that are crucial to joint field commanders. True to form, the Army Chief of Staff last week announced that $90 billion had been cut from Army five year projections but no major program had been terminated. Instead, programs were stretched out and munitions stocks in Europe were cut. That is, joint readiness received a low priority.

In 1984, a Pentagon report found that "today, the U.S. European Command (that is, a joint military command) has neither adequate medical readiness resources nor effective joint plans for the resources it has." Recently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs testified that far less than half the U.S. casualties in a war in Europe could be given adequate medical attention. Planning for medical readiness is in the first instance a joint responsibility.

I think you will agree that the present Joint Chiefs of Staff structure has problems that should be corrected. Let me turn now to an explanation of how H.R. 3622 would attempt to correct the problems I have outlined.

MILITARY ADVICE

The bill would alter the way joint military advice is developed and the responsibility for performing other joint functions by strengthening the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

The chairman would continue to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would benefit from the Chiefs' deliberations. The essential linkage between the input and output sides of the Armed Forces, emphasized by General Allen, would be maintained. But the chairman would correct the flaw in the established co-equal committee structure. He would formulate his advice, and perform the other duties now assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from a national perspective.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely qualified to assume additional responsibilities as an advisor championing the unified military viewpoint. He is the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has no service responsibilities. Though chairmen continue to wear the uniforms of their services, experience has shown that they have traditionally asssumed a joint or unified perspective in evaluating military issues, unbiased by former serv

ice ties.

H.R. 3622 would give the chairman control of the Joint Staff to assist him in developing his formal advice. In addition, the bill would create a deputy chairman who would act as chairman in the absence of the chairman and would become the director of the Joint Staff.

The chairman's term would be increased from 2 years to 4 years, making it the same as the other Joint Chiefs of Staff members. Though the chairman's advisory responsibility would be all inclu

sive, the subcommittee intends that the chairman give special attention to those issues that the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff has been unable to address effectively-programs and budgets, roles and missions, et cetera.

In strengthening the chairman, the subcommittee also intends to expand the sources of military advice, thereby correcting other shortcomings in the current structure. Notwithstanding the advantages afforded by an advisory body consisting of service chiefs, the present structure suffers from the absence of a corresponding mechanism for obtaining the advice of the unified and specified commanders. The nation places on the CINC's the awesome responsibility of employing U.S. forces in wartime, and maintaining the peacetime preparedness of the combat forces for war. Yet, they play a relatively small role as military advisors and their lack of influence in Washington is notorious.

One way to ensure the quality of military advice is to seek it from those who would be responsible for carrying it out. In the 1984 changes to the joint military structure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman was made the spokesman for the unified and specified commanders. H.R. 3622 would make the chairman their day-today supervisor, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

Furthermore, the bill directs that, when it is appropriate, the chairman will consult with the CINC's as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff in performing his legally assigned joint responsibilities. The subcommittee believes that the chairman should integrate the recommendations of the unified and specified commanders, establish priorities, and provide civilian authorities a coherent set of combatant command proposals.

Some members have questioned whether H.R. 3622, in strengthening the chairman, would not exclude the Joint Chiefs of Staff from rendering advice to civilian authorities. It would not. But it would alter their role. At present, the Joint Chiefs of Staff system addresses approximately 3,000 issues a year. Only a small fraction of those issues-perhaps as few as 200-involve major national security issues. Yet any service chief who wants his way on any issue can slow down the entire system, or bring it to a halt. That is the reason, apparently, for the repeated criticism heard during the hearings that the Joint Chiefs of Staff is slow in rendering advice.

The subcommittee intends that the chairman assume sole responsibility for handling the second order joint military issues, and that both the chairman and the full Joint Chiefs of Staff address major joint issues. In strengthening the chairman, the subcommittee intends to create a counterpoise to, but not a substitute for, the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff body. The subcommittee believes that the advice of the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, from whatever perspective it is derived, should be available to the President and Secretary of Defense on major issues. Consequently, the subcommittee has included provisions in H.R. 3622 that ensure that the President and Secretary of Defense will receive the advice of the full Joint Chiefs of Staff when they request it.

I believe the Secretary should establish directives after this legislation is enacted that establish guidelines for the submission of advice by the full Joint Chiefs of Staff. The bill also affords each chief the right to render his advice directly to the Secretary of De

fense and then to the President, if he disagrees with the advice rendered by the chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NATIONAL SECURITY DELIBERATIONS

Possibly as a result of the deterioration in the quality of joint military advice, the influence of the military in deliberations at the highest levels concerning issues of the utmost concern to the survival of the nation has diminished. The subcommittee believes that political leaders should avail themselves of the advice of the chairman and, when they deem it necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, on all issues in which the military component is significant.

Moreover, the subcommittee believes that advice rendered by those most senior military officers should receive careful consideration when decisions are made. If shortcoming in the quality or timeliness of the joint mlitary advice have rendered it inadequate in the past, H.R. 3622 should correct these faults.

Consequently, the subcommittee has included a provision in the bill that requires that the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman or his deputy "shall attend all meetings of the National Security Council and shall participate fully in its deliberations."

STREAMLINING THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND

A number of witnesses during the hearings expressed concern that a committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been included in the military chain of command by Department of Defense directive. These witnesses recommended placing a single military individual in the chain. Secretary Weinberger in 1983 requested that this change be adopted by placing the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman in the chain of command. The 1983 bill complied with his request. However, the subcommittee received a communication earlier in 1985 from Secretary Weinberger recommending that the national military chain of command not be specified in the law and, consequently, we have not placed the chairman in the chain of command. Secretary Weinberger now believes that such a provision would "breach the principle of civilian control."

Secretary Weinberger suggested that, if he were given the authority in statute, he would change Pentagon directives to provide that the military chain of command below the President and Secretary of Defense be routed through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

H.R. 3622 incorporates the requisite provision requested by Secretary Weinberger concerning the military chain of command. It specifies that the "President or Secretary of Defense may direct that the national military chain of command runs to the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands through the chairman."

IMPROVING THE JOINT STAFF

H.R. 3622 contains a number of provisions to improve the Joint Staff. The subcommittee believes the Joint Staff is the most important U.S. military staff. Yet testimony revealed a number of disin

centives that have had the effect of discouraging officers from seeking Joint Staff assignments. In the Navy, for example, such an assignment has at times been considered the "kiss of death" to a career. Last year some of the provisions the subcommittee believes are necessary to improve the personnel and organizational structure of the Joint Staff were enacted. With the exception of the provisions relating to the chairman's control, which I have already discussed, the Joint Staff provisions in H.R. 3622 are the same as those contained in the 1983 Joint Chiefs of Staff legislation.

REPORTING REQUIREMENT

Finally, H.R. 3622 contains a requirement that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress on a number of matters that hold promise for further improvements in the joint military structure.

That concludes my discussion of H.R. 3622. I would now like to invite the ranking minority member of the Investigations Subcommittee, Mr. Hopkins, to make any comments he may have about the legislation.

[The complete text of Mr. Nichols' prepared statement, H.R. 3622, and a committee print on changes in existing law made by the bill as reported by the subcommittee follow:]

Statement

Chairman Bill Nichols

Investigations Subcommittee Report

Full Committee Consideration of JCS Legislation

October 29, 1985

Mr. Chairman, it is my privilege to report to the Committee on Armed Services today H.R. 3622, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985. The first thing that should be said about this bill is that it is third-generation JCS legislation. This Committee reported, and the House passed, JCS reorganization legislation in both the 97th and 98th Congresses. I believe we are now about to do it again. And we will continue to do so, I hope, until we achieve meaningful legislative reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Background

Representative White's role

First, the

I mentioned the history of the JCS bill for two reasons. original author of JCS legislation was a distinguished former member of the Committee, the Honorable Richard C. White of Texas. His contribution should be recognized today. He, like most of us, I suspect, was not familiar with the intricacies and complexities of the U.S. military structure when two of the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sounded an alarm in 1982, warning that the present structure is seriously flawed and could lead to disaster if tested in wartime.

Chairman White was, however, very familiar with the Constitution. knew that it makes Congress solely responsible "to raise and support armies...provide and maintain a navy... make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."

He

Congressman Dick White knew that the Constitution assigns Congress the responsibility for the organization of the national defense establishment, and, because the Investigations Subcommittee has jurisdition over organizational matters, he realized that he was responsible in the first instance to the House for carrying out this constitutional mandate.

Chairman White proceeded to hold a historic series of hearings, receiving testimony from more than 40 witnesses. The witness list included names like