Each of the four

military levels. Despite the obvious need to streamline the chain, it was not
done until a few days before the Marines were withdrawn.
services was represented in that chain of command to Lebanon.

The United States has a Strategic Air Command, but no Strategic Command. The Air Force and Navy cannot agree on the arrangements for such a unified command and the JCS is structurally unable to address the issue authoritatively. By the same token, there is a Military Airlift Command but no unified lift (or transportation) command encompassing air, land, and sea transport. Nor is there an adequate joint service command to deal with low intensity warfare, as our Special Operations Panel has pointed out repeatedly. It has been more than half a decade since the Iranian hostage rescue attempt graphically pointed to the need to improve special operations command arrangements.

No one can be sure that the United States should have new or reorganized joint commands. But I am sure that we need a joint structure that can examine the questions objectively. And we do not have it today.

The joint structure has repeatedly failed to ensure that the basic

requirements of joint military opertions are fulfilled.

Grenada after action reports cited "poor interservice cooperation

as a primary cause of major foul-ups." Army helicopters with wounded aboard were waved away from Navy carriers that could have provided medical assistance because the Army pilots were not trained in joint operations with the Navy. Air Force, Army, Marine, and Navy units could not communicate with each other. This possibly contributed to deaths from friendly fire and prohibited the Army from calling for naval gunfire support.

Military intelligence, supposedly under the overall supervision of

the JCS, has been faulted as a key component of operational shortcomings in the Pueblo incident, the Sontay raid, the Mayaguez incident, the Iranian hostage

rescue attempt, the Beirut Marine bombing, and the Grenada invasion.

Many missions that are important from a joint warfare

perspective are slighted by the services.

These include airlift and sealift.

Though these missions are not "glamorous", inadequate Air Force and Navy support for them may mean that the United States has an Army that stays home and does not show up in time to fight a future war. Similary slighted has been Army support for its mission of providing air defense of air bases. Also, the Navy until recent years has discouraged Air Force pursuit of its mission to

assist in sea control. Finally, the Air Force has historically slighted its mission of close air support for Army troops in combat. In fact, earlier this year the Air Force Secretary reportedly held the advanced tactical fighter, prized by

the Air Force, hostage in an attempt to force the Air Force to make progress

on a follow-on close air support aircraft.

The JCS chairman testified that it was not the job of the JCS to advise

either the President or the Congress on where to make cuts to meet the defense

budget ceilings approved by Congress. That, he said, is the job of the "service chiefs looking at the individual budgets." That is, on one of the most fundamental

military issues--allocation of resources to buy guns, tanks, airplanes, and
ships, and to support military personnel--the JCS passes, its chairman declaring
that it is not a JCS responsibility.

To bring the point home, the services are now going through the
exercise of cutting back on their budget projections for the next five years.
Traditionally, the services respond to cutbacks by stretching out programs
and slighting munitions and other readiness accounts that are crucial to joint
field commanders. True to form, the Army chief of staff last week announced
that $90 billion had been cut from Army five-year projections but no major
program was terminated. Instead, programs were stretched out and munitions

stocks in Europe were cut. That is, joint readiness received its usual low priority. In 1984 a Pentagon report found that "today, the U. S. European Command (that is, a joint military command) has neither adequate medical readiness resources nor effective joint plans for the resources it has." Recently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs testified that far less than half the U. S. casualties in a war in Europe could be given adequate medical attention. Planning for medical readiness is in the first instance a joint responsibility.

Discussion of H. R. 3622 approach to correcting JCS problems

I think you will agree that the present JCS structure has problems that should be corrected. Let me turn now to an explanation of how H. R. 3622 would attempt to correct the problems I have outlined.

Military Advice.

The bill would alter the way joint military advice is developed and the responsibility for performing other joint funtions by strengthening the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The chairman would continue to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would benefit from the Chiefs' deliberations. The "essential linkage" between the input and output sides of the armed forces, emphasized by General Allen, would be maintained. But the chairman would correct the flaw in the established co-equal committee structure. He would formulate his advice and perform the other duties now assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from a national perspective.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is uniquely qualified to assume additional responsibilities as an adviser championing the unified military viewpoint. He is the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has no service responsibilities. Though chairmen continue to wear the uniforms of their services, experience has shown that they have traditionally assumed a joint or unified perspective in evaluating military issues, unbiased by former service ties.

H. R. 3622 would give the chairman control of the Joint Staff to assist him in developing his formal advice. In addition, the bill would create a deputy chairman who would act as chairman in the absence of the chairman and would beome the director of the Joint Staff. The chairman's term would be increased from two years to four years, making it the same as the other JCS members. Though the chairman's advisory responsibility would be all-inclusive, the subcommittee intends that the chairman give special attention to those issues that the corporate JCS has been unable to address effectively--programs and budgets, roles and missions, etc.

In strengthening the chairman, the subcommittee also intends to expand the sources of military advice, thereby correcting other shortcomings in the current structure. Notwithstanding the advantages afforded by an advisory body consisting of service chiefs, the present structure suffers from the absence of a corresponding mechanism for obtaining the advice of the unified

and specified commanders. The nation places on the CINCs the awesome responsibility of employing U. S. forces in wartime, and maintaining the peacetime preparedness of the combat forces for war. Yet they play a relatively small role as military advisors and their lack of influence in Washington is notorious. One way

to ensure the quality of military advice is to seek it from those who would be responsible for carrying it out. In the 1984 changes to the joint military structure, the JCS chairman was made the spokesman for the unified and specified commanders. H.R. 3622 would make the chairman their day to day supervisor, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, the bill directs, that, when it is appropriate, the Chairman will consult with the CINCS as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff in performing his legally assigined joint responsibilities. The subcommittee believes that the chairman should integrate the recommendations of the unified and specified commanders, establish priorities, and provide civilian authorities a coherent set of combatant command proposals.

Some Members have questioned whether H. R. 3622, in strengthening the chairman, would not exclude the Joint Chiefs from rendering advice to civilian authorities. It would not. But it would alter their role. At present the JCS system addresses approximately three thousand issues a year. Only a small fraction of those issues--perhaps as few as two hundred--involve major national security issues. Yet any service chief who wants his way on any issue can slow down the entire system, or bring it to a halt. That is one reason, apparently, for the repeated criticism heard during the hearings that the JCS is slow in rendering advice.

The subcommittee intends that the chairman assume sole responsibility for handling the second-order joint military issues, and that both the chairman and the full JCS address major joint issues. In strengthening the chairman, the subcommittee intends to create a counterpoise to, but not a substitute for, the corporate JCS body. The subcommittee believes that the advice of the the entire JCS, from whatever perspective it is derived, should be available to the President and Secretary of Defense on major issues. Consequently, the subcommittee has included provisions in H. R. 3622 that ensure that the President and Secretary of Defense will receive the advice of the full JCS when they request it. I

believe the Secretary should establish directives after this legislation is enacted that establish guidelines for the submission of advice by the full JCS. The bill also affords each chief the right to render his advice directly to the Secretary of Defense and then to the President if he disagrees with the advice rendered by the chairman or the other members of the JCS.

National security deliberations

Possibly as a result of the deterioration in the quality of joint military advice, the influence of the military in deliberations at the highest levels concerning issues of the utmost concern to the survival of the nation has diminished. The Subcommittee believes that political leaders should avail themselves of the advice of the chairman and, when they deem it necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, on all issues in which the military component is significant. Moreover, the Subcommittee believes that advice rendered by these most senior military officers should receive careful consideration when decisions are made. If shortcomings in the quality or timeliness of joint military advice have rendered it inadequate in the past, H.R. 3622 should correct these faults.

Consequently, the Subcommittee has included a provision in the bill that requires that the JCS chairman or his deputy shall attend all meetings of the National Security Council and shall participate fully in its deliberations.

Streamlining the Military Chain of Command

A number of witnesses during the hearings expressed concern that a committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been included in the military chain

These witnesses recommended

of command by Department of Defense directive. placing a single military individual in the chain. Secretary Weinberger in 1983 requested that this change be adopted by placing the JCS chairman in the chain of command. The 1983 bill complied with his request. However, the Subcommittee received a communication earlier in 1985 from Secretary Weinberger recommending that the national military chain of command not be specified in the law and consequently we have not placed the chairman in the chain