LECTURE XXIV. Sixth Commandment. HAVING set before you, under the Fifth Commandment, the particular duties, which inferiors and superiors owe each to the other; I proceed now to those remaining precepts, which express the general duties of all men to all men. Amongst these, as life is the foundation of every thing valuable to us, the preservation of it is justly entitled to the first place. And accordingly the Sixth Commandment is, "Thou shalt do "no murder." Murder is taking away a person's life, with design, and without authority. Unless both concur, it doth not deserve that name. 1. It is not murder, unless it be with design. He who is duly careful to avoid doing harm, and unhappily, notwithstanding that, kills another, though he hath cause to be extremely sorry for it, yet is entirely void of guilt on account of it. For his will having no share in the action, it is not, in a moral sense, his. But if he doth the mischief through heedlessness, or levity of mind, or inconsiderate vehemence, here is a fault. If the likelihood of mischief could be foreseen, the fault is greater; and the highest degree of such negligence, or impetuous rashness, comes near to bad intention. 2. It is not murder, unless it be without authority. Now, a person hath authority from the law both of God and man, to defend his own life, if he cannot do it otherwise, by the death of whoever attacks it unjustly; whose destruction in that case, is of his own seeking, and "his blood is on "his own head.”1 But nothing, short of the most imminent danger, ought ever to carry us to such an extremity; and a good person will spare ever so bad a one, as far as he can with any pros pect of safety. Again, proper magistrates have authority to sentence offenders to death, on sufficient proof of such crimes as the welfare of the community requires to be thus punished; and to employ others in the execution of that sentence. And private persons have authority, and in proper circumstances are obliged, to seize and prosecute such offenders; for all this is only another sort of self-defence; defending the public from what else would be pernicious to it.. And the Scripture hath said, that the sovereign power "beareth not the sword in vain.”2 But in whatever cases gentler punishments would sufficiently answer the ends of government, surely capital ones are forbidden by this Commandment. Selfdefence, in the last place, authorizes whole nations to make war upon other nations, when it is the only way to obtain redress of injuries, which cannot be supported; or security against impending ruin. To determine, whether the state is indeed in these unhappy circumstances, belongs to the supreme jurisdiction; and the question ought to be considered very conscientiously. For wars, begun cr continued without necessity, are unchristian and inhuman; as many murders are committed, as lives are lost in them; besides the innumerable sins and miseries of other sorts, with which they are always attended. But subjects, in their private capacity, are incompetent judges of what is requisite for the public weal; nor can the guardians of it permit them to act upon their judgment, were they to make one. Therefore (1) 2 Sam. i. 16. 1 Kings ii. 37. Ezek. xxxiii. 4. (2) Rom. xiii. 4. they may lawfully serve in wars which their superiors have unlawfully undertaken, excepting perhaps such offensive wars as are notoriously unjust. In others, it is no more the business of the soldiery to consider the grounds of their sovereign's taking up arms, than it is the business of the executioner to examine whether the magistrate hath passed a right sentence. You see, then, in what cases killing is not murder in all, but these, it is. And you cannot fail of seeing the guilt of this crime to be singularly great and heinous. It brings designedly upon one of our brethren, without cause, what human nature abhors and dreads most. It cuts him off from all the enjoyments of this life at once, and sends him into another, for which possibly he was not yet prepared. It defaces the image, and defeats the design of God. It overturns the great purpose of government and laws, mutual safety. It robs society of a member, and consequently of part of its strength. It robs the relations, friends, and dependants, of the person destroyed, of every benefit and pleasure, which else they might have had from him. And the injury done, in all these respects, hath the terrible aggravation, that it cannot be recalled. Most wisely therefore hath our Creator surrounded murder with a peculiar horror; that nature, as well as reason, may deter it from every one, who is not utterly abandoned to the worst of wickedness; and most justly hath he appointed the sons of Noah, that is, all mankind, to punish death with death. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his "blood be shed; for in the image of God made "he man." 993 And that nothing might protect so daring an offender, he enjoined the Jews, in the chapter which follows the Ten Commandmenst; (3) Gen. ix. 6. "If a man come presumptuously upon his neigh"bour to slay him with guile, thou shalt take him "from mine altar, that he may die."4 But supposing, what seldom happens, that the murderer may escape judicial vengeance; yet what piercing reflections, what continued terrors and alarms must he carry about with him! And could he be hardened against these, it would only subject him the more inevitably to that future condemnation, from which nothing but the deepest repentance can possibly exempt him. For no murderer "hath eternal life;"5 but they "shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death."6 66 66 But shocking, and deserving of punishment here and hereafter, as this crime always is; yet there are circumstances which may augment it greatly. If the persons, whom any one deprives of life, be placed in lawful authority over him ; or united in relationship or friendship to him; or have done him kindnesses; or only never have done him harm; or be, in a peculiar degree, good, useful, or pitiable; each of these things considerably increases the sin, though some indeed more than others. Again, if the horrid fact is formally contrived, and perhaps the design carried on through a length of time; this argues a much more steady and inflexible depravity of heart, than the commission of it in a sudden rage. But still, even the last, though it hath, in the law of this country, a different name, of man-slaughter, given it, and a different punishment prescribed for the first offence; yet in the sight of God is as truly murder as the former, though free from aggravation. The mischief done is done purposely; and neither passion, nor provocation, gives authority for doing it, or even (4) Exod. xxi. 14. (5) I John iii. 15. (6) Rev. xxi. 8. any great excuse. For as God hath required us, he hath certainly enabled us to restrain the hastiest sallies of our anger, especially from such enormities as this. Nor doth it materially alter the nature, or lessen at all the degree, of the sin, if, whilst we attack another, we give him an opportunity to defend himself, and attack us; as in duelling. Still taking away his life is murder; exposing our own is so likewise; as I shall quickly show you. And an appointment of two persons to meet for this purpose, under pretence of being bound to it by their honour, is an agreement in form to commit, for the sake of an absurd notion, or rather an unmeaning word, the most capital offence against each other, and their Maker; of which, if their intention succeed, they cannot have time to repent. As to the manner in which murder is committed; whether a person do it directly himself, or employ another; whether he do it by force, or fraud, or colour of justice; accusing falsely, or taking any unfair advantage; these things make little further difference in the guilt, than that the most artful and studied way is generally the worst. And though a design of murder should not take effect; yet whoever hath done all that he could. towards it, is plainly as much a sinner, as if it had. Nay, doing any thing towards it, or so much as once intending it, or assisting or encouraging any other who intends it, is the same sort of wickedness. And if a person doth not directly design the death of another; yet if he designedly doeth what he knows or suspects may probably occasion it; he is, in proportion to his knowledge, or suspicion, guilty. Nay, if he is only negligent in matters which may affect human life; or meddles with them, when he hath cause to think he |