Mr. PATTERSON. Yes. Senator GURNEY. Not before? Mr. PATTERSON. In the hospitals, I would. Senator GURNEY. You would not unify until the man was no longer fit for active duty, could not be made fit? Mr. PATTERSON. Well, if it is a temporary case, the measles or the mumps or something like that, he only goes to the post hospital. Senator GURNEY. I understand. Mr. PATTERSON. I would leave that right in charge of the service, the Army, Navy, Air Force, or whatever it was, with the post. Senator GURNEY. You wouldn't have one Surgeon GeneralMr. PATTERSON. If he had his leg amputated or something like that, that is a general hospital case, and that I would have under a unified system. Senator GURNEY. You would not have one Surgeon General? Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir; I would have one in each of the services. Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, I just do not see consistency in that. Why don't we, if we are going to really do this, have one Surgeon General? There is something we can consolidate without affecting the security of the country. Mr. PATTERSON. I would have consolidation of those services, unification of those services where it was feasible, as it would be in a general hospital. All TB cases, for example, could go to the Fitzsimons General Hospital. I submit that the color of a man's uniform does not matter in the treatment of that man as a TB patient. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Patterson, I have to interrupt you now, I am sorry to say. We have a call of the Senate, and it is to be followed by a call of the calendar and, unfortunately, there are about 10 or 12 military preparedness bills on it. I don't want to lose out on those. Thank you very much for coming down. We appreciate it greatly. Mr. PATTERSON. All right, sir. (Thereupon, at 12: 10 p. m., the committee stood in recess until the following day, Tuesday, April 12, 1949.) 89469-49- -11 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1949 TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 1949 UNITED STATES SENATE, Washington, D. C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10: 40 a. m., in the committee room, room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Millard E. Tydings (chairman) presiding. Present Senators Tydings (chairman), Johnson of Texas, Kefauver, Hunt, and Knowland. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. First of all, I would like to put in the record a very fine letter from Mr. John J. McCloy, who is identified, of course, with the War Department, and he has sent me a letter which is in the nature of a dissent to the Eberstadt report. Mr. McCloy is very emphatic in his espousal of his position based on his own experience. These letters ought to be very valuable to the committee, so I will pass them along to the stenographer. The letters referred to are as follows:) INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Hon. MILLARD E. TYDINGS, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Due to a sudden call to London I am unable to be present to testify before your committee on S. 1269, as planned. Because of my deep interest in the subject I would have been pleased to testify on the bill and respond to the questioning of the committee, but since I cannot, I take the liberty of sending you this letter summarizing my views. As a member of the so-called task force of the Hoover Commission headed by Mr. Eberstadt, I felt impelled to state my views on a matter which I consider as going to the heart of the case, namely the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff. On rereading the letter dated November 1, 1948, which I sent to the chairman of the committee, a copy of which I enclose, I believe that there is very little I can or would add to it now. If that letter were read to the committee I would be content to allow it to be considered as my statement. While still the Assistant Secretary of War in November 1945 I testified at considerable length on the issue of unification before the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, and that testimony I would also reassert, the more because I feel events since that time have supported the points then taken. The letter mentioned above stresses the matter of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because, if we are to be serious about achieving the type of military thinking in the broadest sense which the country desires, I think it is the kernel of the problem. Unless you base this thinking in the uniformed services you will not have it at all, and unless you give the highest reward to those in the armed services who are dedicated to think this way, you will not have it in those services. While there are good and sufficient reasons for the elevation to the highest rank of the Chief of Staff or Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, whatever you may call him, I feel it is worth reemphasizing the real need for such an individual as a protection against the possible aberrations of civilians who are vested, and properly so, with great military authority. Such an officer, even though he occupies the position of highest dignity in the services, is subordinate to both the President and the Secretary of Defense, and with all our checks he is in no position seriously to threaten our liberties. As I have said in my letter, history records as many cases where civilians became over adventuresome in the military field as where soldiers overplayed their part. It is perhaps sufficient to recall in our own history the Battle of Bladensburg where a Secretary of War (I believe he was then also the head of the Navy Department) personally intervened in the conduct of that battle, the only result of which was that immediately thereafter the White House stood in even more acute need of repairs than it does today. On the more general aspects of the bill, I would only say that I think it is obvious that the country wants greater unification and deserves it. Most of the people in the services want it, and this time I feel we should not be too tentative about advancing it. My strong advice is to say: Do it by striking at the roots of the problem or don't tamper further with the Defense Establishment at all. We are in a critical period of history, and we should not risk the time and loss involved in another tenative or half-hearted approach to the problem. On the issues which are mainly in the minds of the committee as I follow the testimony, I would express my views as follows: I am strongly in favor of establishing an executive department to administer the national defense as a whole. I am not particularly concerned over the title given to the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments. With their subordination to the Secretary of Defense made clear, the title may not be too important, and there is something in maintaining the name of Secretary in order to assist in obtaining high-class men. I would most certainly not specify a right of appeal to Congress on behalf of the Secretaries of the services. I feel this would be a heavy step backwards. I believe the Secretary of Defense should have a staff composed of top-notch men, whose job it is to think "across the board." The task force limitation of 200 men may have some merit, however, for this number ought to be ample, and it may moderate too rapid an expansion in this field. Finally, I would say that we should not be deflected by what I consider to be scare words such as Prussianism, Maginot-line complex and the like. Our liberties are not so tenuously held that one cannot afford to deal with this complex, difficult, and supremely important problem of defense in a modern and integrated manner. Words of the same character were used by the bureau chiefs when the cavalry was brought into proper perspective with the artillery and the infantry in the first part of the century. These views have necessarily had to be dictated in haste, but I trust that they may be of some use to your committee. Sincerely yours, JOHN J. MCCLOY. Hon. F. EBERSTADT, WASHINGTON, D. C., November 1, 1948. Chairman, Committee on the National Security Organization. Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The draft report of the Committee on the National Security Organization represents such a complete study of our Military Establishment and contains so much in the way of findings and recommendations with which I agree that I am prepared to sign it even though in one respect, which to me seems of real importance, the draft does not reach the conclusions which I feel it should. If my views do not appeal to my colleagues on the committee then I would ask that you append in whatever form you feel suitable this statement of my views on the issue of the so-called single Chief of Staff and the subject of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with which it is related. There are many who have had closer preoccupation with the operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than I have had. Some of these may differ from my views, but my experience, which is not inconsiderable, causes me to feel that it is in just this field that the most constructive reforms can now be accomplished. I do not agree with those who feel that nothing but disparity has been achieved by the passage and operation of the National Security Act. So many witnesses of position and discernment have testified that real progress has been made, that to deny it seems unreasonable. That there still persists, however, damaging rivalries and even controversies within the military establishments, many other witnesses have stated and events have proven. The country cannot afford to endure the wasteful character of these divergencies either in war or peace. It is my view that we shall not be able to avoid these controversies or achieve the best preparation for war if some drastic steps are not taken to elevate the thinking of the officers of our armed services to a plane beyond that of the interests of their respective services. Though the last war was handsomely won, victory was accomplished as much by the plenitude of our resources and energies as by good management. Those who know something of the inner conduct of the war are aware of the frustrations and compromises which marked some of its planning. Though the level of planning and decision was high it could have been better and in the next war it may well have to be better. The next war, if there be one, is so certain to demand all our capacities that we shall not be able to afford less than the best management as well as the best economy of our resources. It is for these fundamental reasons that I urge the establishment on the highest level of men in uniform whose sole duty it is to consider the problems and potentialities of the fullest and best utilization of all our armed forces without relation to the interest or alleged interest of the various services. The country needs and deserves to have something other than plans based on the desires of any particular service or on a compromise of the desires of all of the services. Just as certainly as it proved wise to have general officers thinking in terms of the best use of the forces which the cavalry, the arillery, and the infantry could deliver rather than a committee of the chiefs of those services determining our preparation for war so I believe it is now essential that we have officers whose ambitions and whose duties are to consider the best combined use of our air, sea and land reserves. There is no force so technical that its application cannot be considered, given good technical advice, by mature and intelligent men. I therefore feel that though this report gives some recognition to this concept in providing for what is called a military assistant to the Secretary of Defense it does not go far enough to be fully constructive in its recommendations regarding this officer and his relation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is my view that the position of highest rank and dignity in the armed forces should go to the man whose heavy responsibility it will be to give thought to the over all application of the Nation's force and to advise the Secretary of Defense accordingly. Just as our Committee felt it important to make the authority of Secretary of Defense unequivocal so I feel should raise those who think in terms of the over all defense of the country to what is clearly the highest position in our armed forces. I believe it would stimulate the younger officers to such type of thinking if they knew that the highest possible achievement of their careers would lead them to such a post rather than to the post of command of a particular service or to the office of chief advocate for their service's point of view in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The uniformed adviser to the Secretary of Defense should therefore in my judgment be indisputably senior to all other officers in the Armed Services. I would make no bones about calling him Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. I would not call him a military assistant or an adviser. His authority would be subordinate to that of the Secretary of Defense and, of course, to the President, but I would leave no doubt in anyone's mind that he occupied the post of highest distinction of all our men in uniform. I do not lay much emphasis on the "man on horseback" complex. It is frequently put forward by those who themselves seek unfettered power. I doubt whether we need fear the man in uniform in this regard any more than the man or men in civilian clothes to whom we have given far greater authority. Indeed, as many examples as there are of authority usurped by generals or admirals, I believe history records about as many instances of usurpation on the part of civilians with at least as disastrous results. Witness Hitler and Mussolini. I do not wish to labor this point but I would feel more comfortable if the Secretary of Defense had by him some one of high stature to assist him in reaching the most difficult judgments regarding military matters which, under our recommendations, as well as existing law, he has now to render. History, I may add, |