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Government of Northern Ireland that under the Irish Free State Agreement Act of 1922 the opportunity to contract out of the Irish Treaty was given it by the same article as provided for the appointment of the Boundary Commission, so that it was claiming to accept the advantage of that article without the burden imposed by it. Ominous cries arose from the Conservative benches at this home-thrust, and to prevent a tumult the Speaker judged it advisable to disallow all further questions.

On the resolution of the Vote for the Admiralty Office being taken on July 31, Mr. Amery made a strong appeal to the Government to reconsider its decision with regard to Singapore on the ground that this was not a well-considered means of making a "moral gesture" to the world on disarmament. Conversely Liberal members again accused the Government of setting the pace in another race of armaments by proceeding with the building of new cruisers. Mr. Ammon replied that the question of Singapore was precisely where it had been left when last discussed in the House, and the Government saw no reason for reversing their decision. He refused to take seriously the Liberal charge, pointing out that, in view of the large number of cruisers which had recently gone and were soon going out of commission, the five cruisers laid down by the Government were a replacement not at all commensurate with the decrease.

Concurrently with the Session, the Anglo-Russian Conference which had opened in April also drew to a close. It had on various occasions formed the subject of questions in Parliament, chiefly from Unionist members who were afraid that the Government might be too complaisant to Russian demands. One of these questions, on June 18, elicited from the Prime Minister a declaration, of which much was heard subsequently, that on no account would Britain guarantee a loan to the Russian Government. On July 7, just before the Prime Minister made his statement on the approaching Conference on reparations, Unionist members had expressed their impatience at the long-drawn negotiations, and had pressed the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who had been conducting them, for some definite information. Mr. Ponsonby complained that the debate came at a very awkward moment, as negotiations had just reached the critical stage. He admitted that proceedings at the Conference had not gone so rapidly as he would have liked, owing partly to the dilatory methods of the other side, and he gave a brief account of the meetings of the Soviet delegates with a Committee of bondholders during June, which had aroused considerable public interest. This, he said, had been his own idea, but after there had been two meetings, he discovered that the Committee did not really represent the bondholders, and could not promise or accept anything on their behalf, so the discussion had proved abortive. Apart from this, the Conference had had a certain number of plenary sittings,

but had proceeded more by way of conversations than formal conference; and he hoped to be able to lay certain agreements before the House before the Summer recess. The way in which he eventually fulfilled this promise created a political sensation which formed a turning-point in the career of the Labour Government.

On August 5 the Anglo-Soviet Conference, at a protracted sitting of twenty hours, had finally come to an agreement on all points at issue but one-the compensation of owners of property nationalised by the Soviet Government. Despairing of being able to reconcile the British with the Russian view on this matter, and considering that a Treaty which left this point unsettled would be futile, the Government issued an official announcement that the Conference had broken down. Before, however, any statement could be made in Parliament, four Labour members with pronounced Russian sympathies-Messrs. Purcell, Wallhead, Morel, and Lansbury-brought the delegates together again, and with their assistance a formula was found which satisfied both parties. The Conference was in this way saved, and to the general astonishment Mr. Ponsonby on August 6 announced to the Commons that a Treaty had been drafted between England and Russia, and would be signed the next day.

The Treaty, as described by Mr. Ponsonby, was as extraordinary as the circumstances in which it was framed. It consisted of two parts, a commercial Treaty and a general Treaty. The commercial Treaty followed the normal lines, securing for English goods most-favoured-nation treatment. It contained one new departure in stipulating diplomatic immunity for a certain number of the Soviet Union's trade delegations and their offices. The general Treaty renewed a number of treaties made with the old Russian Government, and drew up a Fisheries Agreement. With regard to the question of debts and claims, on which interest chiefly centred, England had obtained an admission of liability from the Soviet Government, and an assurance on their part that they would negotiate with the bondholders. With regard to the miscellaneous claims and disputed properties, further investigations would be made. Only one more point was added by Mr. Ponsonby, but it was the point which gave the Treaty its peculiar character and one which by its nature could not fail to arouse heated controversy. When half at least of the bondholders were satisfied with the terms, and when the Government was satisfied with the lump sum reached in the settlement of the miscellaneous claims, then these agreements would be embodied in a subsequent Treaty, arising out of which the Government would submit to Parliament a proposal guaranteeing a loan to the Soviet Government.

The Treaty thus outlined was immediately, as was to be expected, denounced uncompromisingly by the Conservative Party,

led by Mr. Ronald McNeill, who said the proposal to guarantee a loan contradicted express assurances given by the Prime Minister. Mr. Lloyd George joined in the attack on the Treaty, characterising it as a "fake," and as being dangerous not so much in itself as in what it might subsequently involve. the debate being continued next day Sir R. Horne asked the Prime Minister if, in view of the strong opposition to the Treaty manifested in the debate, he would refrain from signing it till empowered to do so by Parliament. Mr. MacDonald emphatically refused to take so unprecedented a course, and duly signed the Treaty on August 7. Yet, apart from its contents, the form of the Treaty might have been held to justify a departure from ordinary practice. As the Soviet Union of Republics had no titular head, it was not thought fitting that on the British side the King's name should be introduced into the Treaty, and the document was signed simply in the name of the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland-a procedure which was held by some. authorities to render it invalid.

This last act of the Government was the most open exhibition it had yet given of its Socialist proclivities. Up to this point it had adhered with striking fidelity to the path marked out for it by Mr. Asquith in the speech which put it in office, of "pursuing in common with other parties the ideals which progressive thought had grasped." Now for the first time it showed an intention to kick over the traces, and follow its own bent. Hitherto, as its critics constantly pointed out with scorn, it had been Socialist only in name. Its legislation had been largely moulded by the Liberal party, and had been of the stamp commonly known as Liberal, though, in the irony of the situation, no Liberal administration could have been trusted to carry out such a programme. If Labour government had made a difference, it was rather in the social than in the political sphere. But the Russian treaty was taken by the other parties as a sign that Labour desired power as well as office; and from that moment the Government's days. were numbered.

The rise of Parliament left Mr. MacDonald free to devote his whole attention to the Reparations Conference, but owing to the new turn which it had taken, he was for some days unable to take any active part in shaping its course. When the German delegates arrived on August 5, they at once addressed themselves not to him but to the French and Belgian representatives, taking up the thread of Mr. MacDonald's unofficial but highly important conversations with M. Herriot on the subject of security.

Brushing aside questions of future provision against a problematical default, they came at once to the issue on which depended both Germany's willingness to accept the Allied scheme and the success of the loan-how soon could the French

troops be got out of the Ruhr? For some days the Conference stood aside while the German and French delegates tried to come to an agreement on this knotty point. Their discussions. proved more fruitful than the most sanguine could have dared to hope a short time previously. M. Herriot, having at his elbow not M. Poincaré but Mr. MacDonald, showed himself willing and even eager to liquidate the Ruhr adventure at the earliest possible moment. In less than a week, and after a hurried visit to Paris to consult with his colleagues, he was able to propose the evacuation of the Ruhr within a year, provided Germany fulfilled her obligations under the Dawes scheme. On the Germans hesitating, he added an offer to evacuate Dortmund and raise the customs barrier at Mannheim and other places immediately. With this proposal the Germans, though far from satisfied, closed (August 16), under strong pressure from Mr. MacDonald and the American representatives.

With this problem solved, the Conference was wound up with extraordinary rapidity, as agreement had already been reached on all points involved in the Dawes scheme proper. The final meeting was held on the very day on which the Germans and French came to their arrangement. Its chief business was to agree to a protocol registering the agreement of all the parties represented to the Dawes plan, and stating that certain agreements (which were attached to the protocol as annexes) had been drawn up and signed, which were necessary to enable the plan to be brought into operation. The protocol further stated that representatives of the contracting parties would meet in London on August 30 for the formal signature of the documents, which were for the present only initialled provisionally.

Speeches were made by Mr. MacDonald, who presided, M. Herriot, Mr. Kellogg (the American Ambassador), Herr Marx (the German Chancellor), and other representatives of the Powers interested. Mr. MacDonald, who addressed the delegates as "my friends," began by congratulating them on the success of their labours. It was now their duty to make the work accomplished fruitful for good. The agreement reached must be taken as a whole, and those who were critical of this or that detail should ask themselves what was the alternative. What had been accomplished was the first really negotiated agreement since the war; it was not the result of an ultimatum, and every party represented was morally bound to do its best to carry it out. The agreement might be regarded as the first Peace Treaty; it had been signed with the feeling that they had turned their backs on the terrible years of war and war mentality. Referring to the agreement reached between France, Belgium, and Germany for the evacuation of the Ruhr, he said he wished to impress on the German people-who might not be too happy at the results obtained-that they had created a system which enabled them to watch the working of the Dawes plan, and to

come together to rectify mistakes as soon as they were discovered. The time of national isolation was, in short, ended. If their work restored some confidence and hope so that they faced the future in the spirit of co-operation, it would lead to far greater solutions than the document they had signed. They had a long way to go before the goal of European peace and security was reached. The all-important thing to-day," he concluded, "is that we should be sure we are on the right road. I think that in our deliberations here we have found it.'

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This was not quite Mr. MacDonald's last word on the work of the Conference. A day or two later he made public a letter which he had addressed to the French and Belgian Premiers after their exchange of letters with the German Chancellor on the evacuation of the Ruhr, in order to make clear the position of the British Government on the matter. In spite of his having urged the German delegates to accept the French offer, he affirmed once more that the British Government had never recognised the legality of the occupation of the Ruhr. They had hoped that the occupation would be ended as soon as the Dawes Report was put in operation. An arrangement, however, having been made by which the occupation might be extended for another twelve months, the British Government, without prejudice to the position which they and their predecessors had taken up, noted the agreement, and urged most strongly that the Governments concerned should take every possible step to hasten the evacuation, as, in the opinion of the British Government, the continued occupation might jeopardise the arrangements agreed to at the London Conference. This letter, as was natural, was strongly resented by the Opposition party in France; nevertheless it did not prevent M. Herriot from obtaining a decisive majority both in the Chamber and the Senate for ratifying the London Agreement. Shortly afterwards Mr. MacDonald had the satisfaction of seeing the Agreement accepted by a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag, so that his labours in connection with the Conference were crowned with complete success.

From the British point of view the chief value of the Conference was that it re-established complete amity between England and France. This new amity was based not, like that of five years previously, on comradeship in arms, but on a common desire to heal the wounds of the war and to prevent the outbreak of fresh wars. It required therefore to be cemented by a policy of disarmament; and the British and French Premiers were but continuing the work they had done at the Conference when a few weeks later they made a joint proposal on this subject to the Council of the League of Nations.

The prospect of the Dawes scheme being realised, while welcomed by the greater part of the British public, aroused serious misgivings in certain commercial and industrial circles which feared an intensification of German competition as a

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