FOREIGN AND IMPERIAL HISTORY.

CHAPTER I.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

LITTLE need be said concerning the constitutional development of the League of Nations during 1924 except that there has been a marked tendency during the year for Governments to send to meetings of the organs of the League their responsible Ministers of State. At the Fifth Assembly, for example, there were no fewer than seven Prime Ministers, including the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France, and sixteen Foreign Secretaries, apart from a considerable number of other Cabinet Ministers in office. The year was also notable for the fact that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the first time acted as British Member of the Council.

Largely as a result of this tendency, there has been a great increase in the authority and prestige of both the Assembly and the Council. There has also been increasing efficiency in the work of the various technical and expert commissions, whose co-operation with the national administrations of the various Members of the League becomes continually more effective.

Of the general work accomplished by the Members of the League through its machinery during 1924, undoubtedly the most important is the "Geneva Protocol" prepared by the Fifth Assembly. [For the text of the Protocol, see under Public Documents in Part II.] For four years the League through two technical commissions had been endeavouring to work out a practical policy to fulfil the obligations of Article 8 of the Covenant by which all League Members undertook to reduce their national armaments. These efforts had led to no practical result. The first approach towards agreement was made at the Third Assembly in 1922 when resolutions were adopted laying down the principle that disarmament and guarantees for security must go together. In the succeeding year the Temporary Mixed Commission prepared a draft treaty known as the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance-for the purpose of giving practical effect to this principle. During 1924 the British Government came to the conclusion that the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was not acceptable, though the French Government made it plain that they would regard it as

a satisfactory guarantee for French security. Moreover, the French Government were not prepared to take the measures necessary to bring about the reconstruction of Germany until they had some assurance that a revived Germany would not be free to embark on a war of revenge against France at an early date. At the London Conference on Reparations, therefore, M. Herriot accepted a very liberal policy towards Germany on the basis of an assurance from the British Prime Minister that the question of French security would be considered and dealt with at the Fifth Assembly of the League. It was accordingly with this undertaking/from the British Government towards France, and with warm French support for the general scheme of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, that the Assembly began its consideration of disarmament.

The work of the Fifth Assembly on this subject was embodied in the Geneva Protocol. It consists of three parts which relate respectively to Arbitration, Security and Disarmament. The reason why security and disarmament are linked together has been explained already. Arbitration was a third necessary part, because a number of states were unwilling to agree to the creation of a system of international military guarantees unless they had assurance that these guarantees would only be used against a state which was genuinely guilty of aggression. They believed that such guarantees could be found in a general system for the pacific settlement, by compulsory means, of all international disputes, or, as it was loosely called in Geneva, by a general system of compulsory arbitration." To secure the unanimity which was required, therefore, any scheme for disarmament had to embody the three elements which have been mentioned.

The most important provisions of the Protocol relate to "arbitration," that is to say, to the compulsory and pacific settlement of all international disputes. It provides that all disputes which are capable of settlement by the application of legal rules-disputes which are commonly known as "justiciable "-shall be referred on the demand of any one party to the Permanent Court of International Justice. If there is any difference of opinion as to whether there are legal rules which cover a given dispute this difference shall also be decided by the Permanent Court itself. It was expected by the authors of the Protocol that a great number of international disputes would thus be dealt with by judicial process; the more so since international law is at present being developed with great rapidity. For such disputes as are not dealt with in this way, that is to say, for "non-justiciable" disputes, the Protocol provides that in the first place the Council shall fulfil the same functions which it at present fulfils under Article 15 of the Covenant. Its duty under this Article is to seek by all the means in its power to effect a settlement of non-justiciable disputes by common agreement between the parties, and to this end it is empowered to

make any inquiries which it thinks desirable, to conduct negotiations between the parties, and to propose compromise solutions which in its view would provide a just settlement of the dispute. If, however, it fails to secure agreement among the parties by its conciliation, each of the parties is, under the Protocol, given a right to demand a compulsory arbitration, the result of which is binding upon all the parties to the dispute. In this respect the Protocol goes considerably beyond the provisions of the Covenant, and criticisms have been made on the ground that compulsory arbitration is not a suitable means for the settlement of non-justiciable disputes. In reply to these criticisms it is usually said by supporters of the Protocol that the right of compulsory arbitration is not a normal method of procedure, but is merely a safety-valve when all other means of averting war have failed. They add that since there is an almost universal desire for the acceptance of compulsory arbitration, arbitral awards rendered under the Protocol would carry great weight with the parties and with international opinion in general. It was also believed by those who drafted this part of the Protocol that it would go very far towards removing many of the causes which in the past have led to

war.

With regard to security the provisions of the Protocol are in some respects even more drastic. Under the Covenant an ultimate right of war is in certain narrowly restricted cases still allowed. Under the Protocol this right of war is in every case abolished, and the signatories undertake in no case to go to war unless they are called upon to do so by the Council of the League in order to repress an act of aggression committed by a recalcitrant state. The signatories also agree in case of any such aggression to apply against the aggressor state all the measures which are provided for under Article 16 of the Covenant, i.e., economic and financial pressure, and if it be required action by means of land, naval, and aerial forces. It is sometimes said that the Protocol goes far beyond the Covenant in imposing specific obligations in respect of sanctions upon its signatories. This does not appear to be the case. Every signatory of the Protocol merely undertakes that it will "loyally and effectively" carry out the undertakings it has already given by accepting Article 16. No one disputes that the Covenant involves an obligation to use both economic and military means for the repression of a state which goes to war in breach of its terms. The Protocol does no more than define more precisely the circumstances in which these measures shall be co-operatively applied. It leaves each individual signatory state free to decide at the moment what assistance it can give in order loyally and effectively to carry out its promise. It is plain therefore that the Council of the League would have no right to dispose of the British Fleet, as has sometimes been suggested.

On the other hand, the Protocol would greatly increase the

restraining power of the Covenant against potential aggressors in various ways. It would make plain to the Government of any state contemplating aggressive war that if necessary the rest of the world would co-operate in military action in defence of its intended victim. It also provides for the preparation in advance of plans to facilitate the immediate and effective carrying out of the economic blockade for which Article 16 provides. In addition, the Protocol secures effective control of the existing military alliances which have been made by various states in Europe, since it provides that no state may take military action in pursuance of such an alliance until the Council of the League has called upon it to do so. This provision that the Council must determine, in accordance with certain quasi-automatic tests, which the Protocol provides, when aggression has occurred, and that it must summon the various members of the League to take part in measures of repression which may be needed, removes the greatest defect in the system of the Covenant.

With regard to disarmament the Protocol provides that a Conference shall be held at an early date; the actual date which it mentions is June 15, 1925, but it is, of course, certain that it will not meet then. For this Conference the Council is instructed to prepare a general programme which is to include a definite plan for the reduction of armaments by all the states which take part in it, and for the preparation of this general programme the Council is to set up a special committee of experts. It was intended that this committee should be set up by the Council at its last meeting in December, 1924. This proved impossible for the reason that the British Government asked for a postponement of the question.

Even if the Protocol were not finally adopted by the Governments of the Members of the League, its mere preparation would constitute a great international event. Its ultimate fate is still uncertain owing to the hesitancy of the new British Government which came into power shortly after the end of the Fifth Assembly. It still seems probable that even if the Protocol has to be amended to meet the views of Great Britain, something on the same general lines will ultimately be adopted. It is, of course, natural that other Governments should hesitate before they accept such serious obligations as it involves until they know what is the attitude of the British Empire, which includes more than a quarter of the human race. In spite of this important consideration, however, seventeen Governments had already signed the Protocol up to the end of 1924, and one of the Governments had actually ratified its signature.

Apart from the Protocol the League did a considerable amount of important political work during the course of 1924. The Council had to consider the legal questions which had been raised in connexion with the Corfu dispute between Italy and Greece in the preceding year. These questions affected the

interpretation of the Covenant on points to which many Governments attached importance, since they held that the Italian contentions during the Corfu crisis had constituted a definite challenge to the authority and competence of the League to deal with international disputes. In order to advise it on the proper answers to be given to these legal questions the Council appointed a sub-committee of Jurists, on which Lord Buckmaster, an ex-Lord Chancellor, served as representative of the British Government. The Jurists' Committee drew up a unanimous report which the Council in due course adopted. This report will serve to strengthen the Covenant, and will, it is hoped, suffice to prevent any similar challenge to the competence of the League in the future.

The Council had to deal with two frontier disputes arising out of the peace settlement made at Paris in 1919. The first related to the district of Javorina on the frontier between Poland and Czechoslovakia (see ANNUAL REGISTER, 1923, p. 147). During 1923 the Council had consulted the Permanent Court of International Justice as to the proper settlement to be made, and during 1924 it was able to make a final arrangement to which both parties gave their willing adhesion. A question which had seriously disturbed the relations of Poland and Czechoslovakia was thus disposed of.

The second frontier question related to the dispute between Yugoslavia and Albania as to the possession of the Monastery of St. Naoum. In connexion with this again the Council took the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and on the basis of their advice it awarded the Monastery to Albania, a decision which Yugoslavia readily accepted.

Another dispute of importance related to the port of Memel. The genesis of this question was described in the ANNUAL REGISTER for 1923 (p. 146). The expert Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Council in December, 1923, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Norman Davis, late Under-Secretary of State in the United States administration, duly proceeded to Memel and investigated the whole question on the spot. As the result of its inquiries it was able to produce a unanimous report in which it put forward a draft Convention for the acceptance of Lithuania and the Allies. Under this Convention the economic interests of the outside world, and in particular of Poland and Russia, were adequately protected, while the very complicated system of government proposed for the town of Memel by the Allied Powers was replaced by something much simpler and more effective. At a meeting of the Council in March, 1924, the Lithuanian Government accepted this Convention and the Allied Governments shortly after gave it their adhesion. A question which the Allies had failed to settle during four years of difficult negotiations was thus solved.

The work done by the Council of the League for the economic restoration of Europe was continued during 1924. The