As you know, I served as U.S. Representative to the UN for almost three years. This gave me ample opportunity to observe its accomplishments and shortcomings. More than once I took strong exception to ill-considered resolutions of the General Assembly. I felt even more frustrated at times when the UN was unable to deal with world problems of vital importance affecting peace and security, such as the war in Vietnam.

But the real question is not whether the UN is always right or whether it can deal with all threats to peace and security that face the world. The real question is whether the world would be a safer place with or without the United Nations. Being painfully aware of the weaknesses of the UN, I am nevertheless convinced that the world would be a much more dangerous place if it did not exist. I can also affirm, on the basis of my own experience that in the absence of the United Nations our national interest would have suffered great damage in a number of important areas of the world.

Let me illustrate with just a few examples from my own experience. In the fall of 1967 there was an imminent threat of war between Turkey and Greece because of the dangerous situation on the island of Cyprus. War between these two NATO allies would have completely unhinged the alliance on its crucial eastern flank. The cost to the U.S. would have been enormous-in terms of the security of our country and of our allies. War between Greece and Turkey was averted mainly because there was a United Nations force on the island and UN support of American diplomatic efforts to avert what appeared at the time to be the certainty of armed conflict. Ambassador Vance, the President's special emissary to the area, would be the first to acknowledge that his efforts would have been unavailing were it not for the backstopping of the United States' Mission to the United Nations and the cooperation of the Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, and his principal deputy, Dr. Ralph Bunche. Of overriding importance, however, as a factor in "cooling" the situation was the presence of the UN peacekeeping force.

Currently we pay about $4.8 million a year toward maintaining the force on Cyprus. This, although a substantial sum of money, is but a mere drop in the bucket compared to what it would have cost the United States in political, and ultimately financial, terms if war had broken out between Greece and Turkey. I know it is aggravating that some countries do not contribute to the peacekeeping force on Cyprus. It should be noted, however, that some other countries contribute much more proportionately than the United States. Nine of the governments which provide the bulk of military and police contingents for the force on Cyprus have themselves absorbed a substantial share of the cost of those contingents. But that is not important. The important thing is that the national interest of the United States is served, and served well, by our support of the UN operation on Cyprus and its observer operation on the island. Another case in point is the Middle East. In May, 1967, I received instructions from the State Department to work toward a reduction of the United States' share in supporting the UNEF force between Egypt and Israel. I demurred and, in fact, refused to follow this directive. Two weeks passed, the force was removed at President Nasser's insistence and the Six Day War broke out. I have no hesitation in saying that, if the parties today would agree to a peace treaty involving a new United Nations peacekeeping force, the United States would gladly pay scores of times the amount that would have been involved in 1967-and it would be a bargain at that.

A third example is one that cannot be evaluated in money or financial terms. It was at the United Nations that I was advised by an Ambassador from an Eastern European country that the North Koreans were willing to negotiate the release of the prisoner crew of the Pueblo. My experience was reminiscent of Ambassador Jessup's being advised at the UN of the willingness to enter negotiations about the Berlin blockade.

I could multiply examples. The cease-fires in the 1965 war between India and Pakistan and in the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab States come immediately to mind. True, both of those wars probably would have come to an end ultimately by force of arms, but not as soon, and the importance of the saving of life and the lessening of big power involvement which resulted from UN intervention is not lessened by our inability to evaluate them in financial terms. On the economic side too, the United Nations has served the U.S. interest extremely well. The Committee has heard testimony on this subject by many knowledgeable spokesmen. I need not, therefore, go into detail. Let me simply

say that multilateral aid programs have, among other things, the following advantages:

(1) For every American dollar that goes into the United Nations Development Program, for example, there are at least two dollars from other donor countries and roughly the same amount from recipient countries;

(2) Developing countries sometimes are willing to accept controls by a multilateral agency that they might seem to resent in a bilateral situation; (3) Because it can draw expertise from all over the world, the UNDP can, on occasion, do a better job of providing the right persons for a particular situation.

Nor is it just a matter of assisting the developing countries with their economic growth in the most effective way. The UN is dealing with a number of problem areas which are of key interest to the United States and in which we have often provided the initiative. Such areas are, for example, population, narcotics control, the environment, air piracy, outer space, the safe return of astronauts, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the sea beds. International cooperation on these problems is vital to us and the UN has provided either the instruments for it or mobilized world opinion in support.

I would oppose any suggestion that we should support the UN, or pay more than our just share toward its support, out of charity. I am convinced that we should support it, and should pay our fair share, because of hard-headed national self-interest.

What is our fair share? Since the United Nations was established, it has followed the principle that capacity to pay should be a basic criterion for assessment. The scale of assessments for all countries is recommended by a group of 12 experts, including one American, after painstaking examination of all factors. Its recommendations have invariably been accepted by the General Assembly. Is the United States assessed more than its relative capacity to pay? Quite the contrary. Our national income is roughly 38 percent of the income of all members of the UN combined. Our present assessment is 31.52 percent. This is because the General Assembly, at the urging of the United States, has adopted the principle that the share of the largest contributor should be reduced to 30 percent.

There are those who advocate a ceiling for the United States of 25 percent. If we were to reduce our share to 25 percent, and other countries did not pick up the slack on the ground that many of them already pay more in proportion to the national incomes than the United States does-and many do-it would plunge the United Nations, already in grave trouble financially, into virtual bankruptcy. This would do irreparable harm to the national interest of the United States in an effective UN and a stable world.

Under certain circumstances, I can see the possibility of a further decline in the U.S. assesment below the accepted 30 percent ceiling. If the UN is made truly universal by bringing in both West and East Germany, South and North Korea, and North and South Vietnam, there will be additional contributions out of which the United States could legitimately claim its fair share. West and East Germany alone, on the basis of national income, would pay about 9 percent of the budget and we could legitimately claim about a third of that to bring down the United States contribution. Such a possibility was pointed out by the President's Commission on the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations under the chairmanship of Ambassador Lodge. I would energetically support that idea. But I am just as energetically opposed to any steps which might endanger our national interest by undermining the financial underpinnings of the UN.

Some, in indignation against the expulsion of the Republic of China from the UN, have urged a cut in our share of contributions to it. While I have advocated, and welcome, the admission of the Peoples' Republic of China to the UN, I have also consistently supported the retention of Taiwan in it, both as United States Representative to the United Nations and as a private citizen.

I deplore the expulsion of Nationalist China and I believe the UN loses by its absence. I also deplore the fact that there is no representation of the other divided states, since I believe in the principle of universality of the UN. But I do not believe that because we lost our fight to prevent the expulsion of Taiwan, we should in retribution take counter action contrary to our national interest by undermining the UN as an institution which needs strengthening rather than weakening.

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Senator Arthur Vandenberg said, near the end of World War II: "I do not believe that any nation hereafter can immunize itself by its own exclusive action." The basic fact of our world position in this generation is not isolationold or neo-but, to use a favorite word of President Kennedy, "interdependence.” When we reflect upon the many defects of the UN, it is well to recall Winston Churchill's realistic appraisal that it exists, "not to get us to heaven but to keep up from going to the other place."

And we would also do well to remember that, as Adlai Stevenson pointed out, when the nations criticize the UN they are criticizing themselves. We, the sovereign member nations, are the United Nations. It has no special magic apart from what its members bring to it; and if that magic is less than it should be, truly "the fault lies not in our stars but in ourselves"-in all the members. Mr. FRASER. I want to apologize, Mr. Ambassador. The House is starting an hour earlier than usual today.

Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. I don't have any questions, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to have the opportunity to have the Ambassador present on the record the worthiness of the U.N. in the interest of the United States, based on his personal experience and observation. That is the best kind of evidence, of course.

I have never had any doubt about it. I think we all recognize the pressures that the United States is under in the United Nations, as a practical matter. We are aware of the long struggle the United States has had to get the U.N. to abide by its own resolution of reducing the U.S. regular assessment to 30 percent. That, coupled with an unrealistic posture of the member states to face up to the financial crisis, requires us, both in the Congress and in the executive, to be absolutely candid and realistic in the current situation confonting the United Nations as we look to the next 25 years.

I think that these hearings and what will follow are extremely vital and important, notwithstanding the predicate on which they were started.

Mr. GOLDBERG. I agree with that. And I agree particularly with the comment that we have to place it in perspective.

I checked the figures, if I may say so, Mr. Chairman, to see what we were contributing. I have met a payroll and I am meeting one now, and I found that the total amount the United States is contributingvoluntary and the assessment-to the whole U.N. family annually is $321 million. If I am off, Secretary DePalma can provide a more accurate figure.

It is of interest that the New York Times reported that the one Amchitka bomb test cost us $200 million. I think these figures pretty well speak for themselves when we want to put in perspective what it is that we are talking about.

Again, I do not enter into the merits of the test. It is a question of priorities, as Congressman Frelinghuysen has very well said. Congress has the power of the purse, and it ought to stay here, by the way. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ambassador, as soon as we figure out how to exercise it, we will do something about it.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to compliment Ambassador Goldberg for his testimony. It has been helpful to us. As he spoke, I was reminded of the fact that I served under Ambassador Goldberg in 1965. It was an educa

tion for me to participate in the practical operations at the General Assembly.

I wish we had more time to discuss this. What is basically being suggested here is that a fair share concept needs to be developed. It has been suggested that population formula would constitute a fair share. As Mr. Sikes pointed out, that would result in a reduction of the U.S. contribution from roughly 30 percent to 6 percent of the total budget.

I can imagine no more effective way of unilaterally wrecking the United Nations. You point out what it would mean if there should be a reduction to 25 percent. We are talking in terms of millions, not billions.

When we vote on a $70-odd billion defense budget and then say we can't afford to do our share, or that our assessment is an unfair burden on us, I think we are being hypocritical. If it is in our interest, it seems to me there are places where we should be willing to provide more than 30 or 36 percent. In some voluntary programs we do just that, and I think we should.

I only regret we don't have more time to discuss this, because we do have a truncated hearing. There is a subject of great interest to our committee that is coming up right after the quorum call.

Mr. GOLDBERG. I could not agree with you more; it would wreck the U.N. I was looking at another figure which I think is relevant. There is a great deal of talk about our GNP, but let us put it on another level. When you consider the per capita income-that is the income to each American-the 1967 figure-it is much higher now, but 1967 is the last available to me-United States per capita income was $3.670 per person. The income of a small state in Africa, per capita, may be $75.

Now, is it conceivably fair to assimilate a $75 per capita income country, with the situation of the United States? It is not.

If there were refugees in East Pakistan, as there are, Congressmen, being humanitarian, would appropriate money in order to meet the needs of those refugees, as they have in the Middle East.

Finally, I would like before you adjourn to reinforce what Congressman Fraser has said. We are a Nation of law. We do have a treaty.

We live by law and we ought not to abrogate the U.N. Charter unilaterally.

Our obligation to the U.N. is a treaty obligation. I place a high premium on treaties that are ratified by our Constitutional processes. Mr. BINGHAM. On that point, if I might, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Justice Goldberg to comment on how he sees the impact. of the congressional decision on buying chrome from Rhodesia on our relations not only at the United Nations but throughout the world.

Mr. GOLDBERG. There, too, we have a treaty obligation, and that treaty obligation is to comply with the decisions of the Security Council; and putting every other consideration aside, the pros and cons of that controversy, the fact of the matter simply is that the United States is beginning to assume the posture of a country that does not honor its treaty commitments.

Mr. BINGHAM. I have often heard it said, Mr. Justice, "Why should we abide by those sanctions when so many other nations are violating them?"

What is your comment?

Mr. GOLDBERG. My comment on that is double. The first is, as the New York Times on this very morning indicates, that while the sanctions have not been foolproof, nevertheless they have had a substantial effect in that situation.

Second, a great part of our vote for that resolution was predicated on the view that Great Britain is the constitutional authority over Rhodesia. No country in the world-perhaps Portugal has, I may be out of date-but on the day we voted for sanctions, no country in the world had recognized Rhodesia as an independent country, no country at that time.

What we were saying, in effect, and we ought to apply it to ourselves, we were saying in effect that the constitutional responsibility of dealing with that situation was Great Britain's, and we were voting for a resolution proposed by the constitutional authority.

I can only personally express the hope that the President will draw upon other sources of chrome. We have an enormous stockpile, by the way, of chrome. We could release tomorrow enough chrome to meet our needs without importing any chrome from Russia, if that is the objection.

I also find our policy there to be very difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, we say we want to promote trade with the Eastern bloc. On the other hand, we say that the reason we vote to repudiate a treaty obligation is because it will involve trade with the Eastern bloc.

In any event, we don't have to do that. We have a tremendous amount of chrome in our stockpile. We could get American dollars from our companies if we released chrome from the stockpile. We would also diminish a very swollen stockpile.

I talk with some competence in this area. As Secretary of Labor, I sat on a committee of the Cabinet to try to take steps to reduce that stockpile. It derives from World War II. It is too big, not only in chrome but in many other areas. We ought to reduce it.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

I want to apologize to Mr. Crane. When these hearings reconvene on another day, we will schedule your appearance first, since we are anxious to have as many members as possible hear your testimony. Mr. DePalma, our apologies to you also. We look forward to hearing your statement next time.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)