The construction of such plants involves a large-scale industrial effort and many tributary activities of unusual character. On the other hand, it might be possible to break up such plants into a number of smaller units and thus make detection more difficult. It would be difficult to carry on clandestine mining or concentrating of uranium or thorium ores if adequate knowledge of their geological occurrence were available. This is due to the large quantities of material which must be processed and the difficulty of concealing mining operations in general. The maintenance and strengthening of the international community of scientists, the free exchange of scientific information and an increasing awareness among all scientists of one another's research activities would assist in making less likely the application of research talent to clandestine activities. It is clear that the major assurance against clandestine activities would lie in the existence of effective safeguards applied to known peaceful activities. Chapter 5: Future Developments Both laymen and scientists are apt to believe that in the future scientific discoveries and technical inventions will be made which will bring further development of the activities in the domain of atomic energy. This raises a new question regarding control. For example, the possibility has been considered, in our discussions, that some day a method might be devised by which the separation of U-235 from natural uranium could be realized by methods less elaborate and costly than those actually used in the United States. It is clear that production of atomic weapons would thereby become easier. There is also the possibility that some day raw materials other than uranium and thorium might be found suitable for the production of nuclear fuel. At the moment, such a possibility is highly speculative. Whatever the future may bring, those charged with responsibility for maintaining safeguards on atomic energy will best be able to make necessary adaptations in these safeguards if they are intimately associated with and participating in new developments in the entire field. Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions The substances uranium and thorium play a unique role in the domain of atomic energy, since as far as we know these are the only raw materials from which the nuclear fuel required for the development of atomic energy can be obtained. There is an intimate relation between the activities required for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of atomic weapons; most of the stages which are needed for the former are also needed for the latter. The character of the different stages of the activities has been discussed in order to explore at each stage the elements of danger and to some extent the problem of safeguards against these dangers. With respect to mining operations, which are of special significance as the first step in these activities, it appears hopeful that safeguards are not too difficult. Particular attention should be paid to the installations in which concentrated nuclear fuel is produced since the product lends itself immediately to the production of bombs. Unless appropriate safeguards are taken at each of these stages, it will be difficult to insure that no diversion of material or installations will take place. With regard to the question posed by Committee 2, "whether effective control of atomic energy is possible," we do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible. Whether or not it is politically feasible is not discussed or implied in this report, nor is there any recommendation of the particular system or systems by which effective control can be achieved. 729816-474 PICTORIAL CHART OF THE PROCESSES USING URANIUM TO PRODUCE ATOMIC ENERGY Appendix I Note-Waste products from the various stages in the processes may be reprocessed to recover the uranium or plutonium which they contain. For simplicity, such operations have not been shown. Appendix II Appendix III SOME RELEVANT DATA ON COST AND SIZE OF U. S. ATOMIC BOMB B. Major Construction Costs and Indications of Size of Installations 3 1 Press release by Secretary of War Stimson, Aug. 6, 1945. 2 Press release by President Truman, Aug. 6, 1945. 'Taken from the following publications: "Hearings before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy," United States Senate, Nov. 29, 1945. (Government Printing Office.) Articles in Engineering News-Record, Dec. 13, 1945. 44 |