Permit me to make certain points: In working out the basic principles to govern the control of atomic energy, I make bold to suggest that I and my associates have carried out the primary orders given by you and the Secretary of State at the time of my appointment last April. I accompany this letter by the full report of the work of the Commission. From its text you will understand why I see encouragement as to the eventual outcome, for with four of the Great Powers, permanent members of the Security Council and six other nations in agreement, the difficulty of gaining unanimity has lessened. While unanimous action is important, it must not be gained at the expense of principle. To do that would be to lull the world into a false sense of security. As you and the Secretary of State are aware, in all of our insistences that "there shall be no legal right, by veto or otherwise, whereby a wilful violator of the terms of the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms" (the language of the report), we did not attack the general right of veto in the Security Council. We opposed the secondary veto upon enforcement or punishment, called for by a treaty, if the treaty were approved by the Security Council and ratified "by the several nations necessary to assure its success." Let me say a word as to the final vote: France, the United Kingdom and China together with the United States are the Four Great Powers approving the principles that were acted upon by the Commission. The six other nations were Australia, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, the Netherlands and Canada. Those countries, excepting Canada, plus the two abstainers (Russia and Poland) compose, as you know, the Security Council. (Since the first of the year, Mexico, the Netherlands and Egypt have been succeeded in the Council and the Commission by Belgium, Colombia and Syria.) As to the primary principles we have sought to enact, they are familiar to you, since they are definitely part of your instructions to us. I can find no better way of summarizing the work of the Commission than to invite your attention to the Findings and Recommendations found from pages 18 to 27 of the Commission's Report already referred to.1 1Ante, pp. 13–22. They include, among many others, these most important elements: (a) the creating of a comprehensive international system of control and inspection, under the direction of an agency within the framework of the United Nations, by means of an enforceable treaty, subject of course, to ratification by our Senate; (b) that the control should start with the production of uranium and thorium when they are severed from the ground and extend through the production of fissionable material, using safeguards at each step, including accounting, inspection, supervision, management and licensing, as may be appropriate; (c) that the powers of the agency should be commensurate with its responsibility, with no government possessing the right of veto over the day-to-day operations of the agency; (d) that the agency should have unimpeded right of ingress, egress, and access for the performance of its inspections and other duties; (e) prohibiting the manufacture, possession and use of atomic weapons by all nations and providing for the disposal of existing stocks of atomic weapons and fissionable materials; (f) specifying acts constituting international crimes, and establishing adequate measures of enforcement and punishment, subject to the condition that there shall be no legal right, by veto or otherwise, whereby a wilful violator shall be protected from the consequences of violating the treaty. The international control agency will require broad powers commensurate with its great responsibilities, so that it may possess the requisite flexibility to adapt safeguards to a rapidly developing technology. The safeguards that have been discussed are meant only to be indicative of the types of safeguards that must be erected, which should be strengthened and never weakened. There is one more theme that I must emphasize, namely that the Commission's recommendations constitute an integrated and indivisible whole, each part of which is related to, and dependent upon the others. This fact is stressed in the Commission's recommendations. It must never be lost sight of. No partial plan for the control of atomic energy can be effective, or should be accepted by this country. In the extended debates of the Atomic Commission, the original principles of the United States Delegation have been tested and the outcome shows them to be sound. We believe that this beginning, translated into action, may begin a broad program to govern weapons of mass destruction. In fact, it could even include other armaments. Were such a system employed effectively, it might lead us into a warless age. I know how near to your heart that objective is. I know the peoples of the world are yearning for the chance to live and work with dignity and without fear, in Peace and Security. To that end I shall hold myself ready to answer any call you may make. Let me add these final thoughts: I see no reason why this country should not continue the making of bombs, at least until the ratification of the treaty. I have drawn your attention before to the necessity of preserving the atomic secrets. Particularly is this wise as to our designs, know-how, engineering and equipment. The McMahon law carries authority for this protection. If this authority should be found to be inadequate, it should be broadened to meet any needs, until a treaty is ratified by our Senate. While science should be free, it should not be free to destroy mankind. Our gratitude goes to you for the opportunity of service you have given us. With warm regard, BERNARD M. BARUCH The President's Reply to Mr. Baruch's Letter of Resignation DEAR MR. BARUCH: The Secretary of State has handed me your letter of resignation as the Representative of the United States on the Atomic Energy Commission. At first I was reluctant to accept the resignation. However, upon reflection, I have to agree with the correctness of the conclusions stated in your letter. The recent action of the General Assembly of the United Nations placed the responsibility for the consideration of disarmament proposals primarily upon the Security Council, where Senator Austin will represent the United States. I am impressed by the fact that, with one exception. the governments represented on the Security Council have the same representatives on the Atomic Energy Commission. I know how tremendously interested you have been in the accomplishment of the task assigned you, and when you tell me that you believe your task is completed and that the work should now be taken over by Senator Austin, I accept your decision. I wish to congratulate you most heartily on having secured the acceptance by the Commission of the United States proposal. It is inevitable that members of the Commission representing many governments should have differences of opinion as to the best approach to a solution of this problem. That our proposal should finally be accepted by a vote of ten to nothing, with two states abstaining, is a tribute to the fairness of our proposal. At the same time, it is convincing evidence of your skill and patience in presenting the proposal. I wish you would extend to those who have been associated with you in this most important service my sincere appreciation of their efforts. Your own efforts in this matter only furnish additional evidence of your unselfish devotion to your country. Very sincerely yours, HARRY S. TRUMAN The White House January 4, 1947 100 Secretary of State Byrnes to Mr. Baruch DEAR B. M.: January 4, 1947 Referring to your note enclosing copy of your letter of resignation, I have today handed your letter to the President. When I urged you to accept the appointment to the Atomic Energy Commission, I realized the difficulties of the task. At the same time, I realized that with your service in two wars you were deeply and sincerely interested in any proposal affecting the security of our country and any proposal to promote peace. The intelligent and courageous manner in which you have represented the United States on the Commission is responsible for the general acceptance of the United States proposal. Now that you have completed this phase of the work, I must agree that you are right in concluding that in as much as the subject of disarmament will hereafter be the primary duty of Senator Austin on the Security Council, it is wise that he should also serve on the Atomic Energy Commission. You and the gentlemen associated with you, who have followed your example of serving the Government without compensation, are entitled to and I am sure will receive the thanks of a grateful people. Sincerely yours, JAMES F. BYRNES 101 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947 |