rubber stamp, bearing my signature, was used. I cannot recall a letter of such contents, signed by myself. Q. Would it be any more convincing to you if you saw the original letter, signed in ink? A. I could be more convinced but it would still not prove that I signed in ink. Q. There was only one Dr. Kaltenbrunner on 23 January 1945 who was chief of the Sicherheitspolizei? A. But maybe this certain Ernst Kaltenbrunner was not in Berlin just at the time. Q. Just answer my question first. Is that true? A. Certainly. Q. And you were the man? A. No. I did not have the function which you imply this man had. Q. I do not imply anything. I ask you if you are the man who held this position? A. No. Q. You are not the man? A. There was no other Ernst Kaltenbrunner who was Chief of the Security Police. But this Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who sits opposite you and whom you call Chief of the Security Police and SD on January 23, did not write this letter. (To the Interpreter) I did not say this. I said this Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who sits opposite you, did not have the function of Chief of Security Police and SD on January 23, 1945. Q. What was your function at that time? A. As I described to you frequently, I was in charge of the Intelligence Service. Q. You have, of course, denied responsibility for anything that was done in AmT IV and AmT V and AmT VI, except in a minor way in the latter case. A. I denied any responsibility as to AmT VI, as far as AmT MIL was concerned. The reports on foreign policy, made by AmT VI, I partly used in my reports. Q. The testimony of other witnesses, who served many years in the RSHA, is that you were, in fact, the Chief of the RSHA and that you exercised and executed control throughout the organization as you would have been expected to do. A. That testimony is incorrect. Q. And further, that during the period between Heydrich's death and your appointment to the Chief of RSHA, Amt Chiefs did deal directly with Himmler and that thereafter, everything cleared through you, with a few exceptions. id A. That testimony is also incorrect but I think it is also incorrect to use me for elaborating on the prosecutor's case against me. Q. Well, this is for your benefit, unless you find this boring. A. It is not boring to me. I have had the feeling in all my previous interrogations, that you are always looking for evidence of my guilt and that you are not taking into consideration any points which would be in my favor. I find myself now in the state of preparation for my defense and I do not find it appropriate that you continue to look for material which would incriminate me. Q. Is your statement made in the form of an objection to further questioning? A. In that sense as I stated it right now. If there is a possibility to be confronted with witnesses and do something about testimony in my favor, I would be very glad to continue. But even there, I have the feeling that it would be better to do this during the evidence at the trial itself. I believe I should discuss this first with my defense attorney. Q. If there is any question in your mind about whether you should go further in any interrogation by the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, I think you should talk to your counsel too. You have never been under any compulsion to answer either before or since this indictment was served. I think you will agree your treatment has been fair in all the circumstances. A. Yes. Q. Do you now desire to see your defense counsel and then send a message through your guard, if you are willing to submit to further questioning? A. Yes. I will do so. Q. In view of a doubt in your mind as to whether you should go forward any further with these interrogations, we will suspend. I do want to point out, however, that confrontation with documentary evidence has, of course, worked both ways. It is to put you on notice of things that are evidence against you and at the same time, to give you an opportunity to explain, if there is any explanation. That will be all for now. A. And after I have talked to my defense counsel on Monday I should report the result here, is that right? Q. Only if you desire or are willing to be interrogated further by the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel. VI. ALFRED ROSENBERG* Excerpts from Testimony of Alfred Rosenberg taken Nazi Dealings With Quisling Q. What part did Quisling play in the military plans designed and carried out by this special staff? A. When Quisling came to me in 1939 he came to me with his troubles dealing with the Norwegian situation. I, as a German citizen, believed it my duty to inform the Fuehrer about it. So did Raeder. Also, I seemed to think that the Fuehrer made it a point not to let Quisling know about the operation in advance.** Q. From what did you gather that? A. Because the Fuehrer at the time told me that this question was being dealt with by the OKW and he also told me not to contact anybody about this subject. Q. Was the appointment of Quisling, on 9 April 1940, and of his Government in Norway, a part of the military plan? A. Of course, Quisling made the political remarks that he would be the logical man to bring about the correct changes. With the beginning of the military operation, it was the Foreign Office which took charge of the political situation. I heard afterwards that Under-Secretary of State Habicht was in Oslo at the time and dealt with that question. Q. What job was Quisling promised after the proposed German occupation of Norway? A. As far as I know, Quisling himself felt to be the Prime Minister and I also believe that he felt himself able to bring about changes in Norway by himself. Q. I don't care what Quisling thought. I want to know what you and the Fuehrer planned about this matter. A. I do not believe that the Fuehrer made any sort of promises to Quisling. Q. What about you? *See also document 3719-PS, Vol. VI, p. 436. **See document 004-PS, Vol. III, p. 19. A. In this case, I of course thought that it would be the correct thing for him to be the Prime Minister. Q. Did you not indicate that to him? A. I believed that to be the case. I cannot, however, speak to him about any position which might be given out in the future. When Quisling was ousted, a new Reich Commissioner, Terboven, was put in. Q. I don't believe you have been telling the truth at all about the negotiations between yourself and Quisling and the Fuehrer concerning this Norway situation. It is impossible for you to have occupied the position which you had in the negotiations and still not know, for example, what Quisling was to get out of this arrangement. We don't want you to waste our time this way. You have already stated that you thought of Quisling as becoming Prime Minister. Is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Did you not convey that thought to Quisling? Yes or no. A. It is possible that it was talked about. Q. Anything is possible, and I don't want to hear about its being possible. I want to know whether actually you didn't convey that impression to Quisling. A. I conveyed that thought myself, and I of course accepted it as a fact. Q. In other words, you encouraged that thought, did you not? A. He did not need any help for that purpose. Q. Did you discourage it?. Yes or no. A. No. Q. Did you not also convey the same thought to the Fuehrer? A. As far as I can say now, I never talked to the Fuehrer about later possibilities in any stable form. Q. Is it not a fact that Quisling was led to believe that he was to become Prime Minister? A. To the best of my knowledge, Quisling was to bring about a change in Norway with more or less help from Germany. He conveyed the thought that he would be the Prime Minister of Norway. To my knowledge the Fuehrer could not have made him any promises because otherwise the newly formed Quisling cabinet in Norway would not have been ousted by the German Government. Q. But the Fuehrer could have been of some assistance in that respect, could he not? A. I believe in this case the Fuehrer was holding back very much. Q. Would it not be fair to say that Quisling, as a result of the conversations which he had with you and with the Fuehrer, believed that he was to receive a reward in the shape of becoming the Prime Minister? A. This seems believable to me. Q. It is apparent, is it not, that you were working out plans with Quisling for the taking over of Norway? A. The reason for Quisling's coming to Germany was brought about by a fear that in any event of change, the northern part of Norway might be occupied by Russia via Finland, and the southern part by the Western allies. This seemed to be sound reasoning to me, and therefore I hoped Germany would help him. I also will state that Quisling hoped to work together with the King. Q. But how about these people that you were planning to put into certain positions? A. Quisling was evidently thinking of putting his own men, men like Hagelin, into responsible government positions. Q. You knew that, didn't you? A. I did not know very many Norwegian people. Q. Were you trying to help Quisling in his effort to put his people into these positions before the operation had been completed? A. Quisling mentioned several names, but my knowledge of Norwegians was limited, until 1939, to. Quisling and several Norwegian writers. Q. Did you not report to the Fuehrer the plans which you were making with Quisling for the taking over of Norway? A. Quisling had a fantastic plan for the seizing of Norway. He was to bring Norwegians to Germany for training purposes and use these troops later on. It is possible that I told the Fuehrer and also Goering about these plans. Probably we listened attentively to these plans. If they were of consequence for the operation, I don't know. Q. It is not only possible, but it is a fact, is it not, that you discussed it with Hitler and Goering? A. The Fuehrer told me that he always had intended to keep a neutrality between Germany and the Scandinavian countries. After the facts disclosed by Quisling to me and transmitted by me to the Fuehrer were so evident and concrete, that the Fuehrer saw himself forced to act accordingly. After the Norwegian campaign the Fuehrer told me of German navy ships coming in contact with British naval craft at Trondheim. |