not long afterwards the answer to the Soviet government arrived, which did not reject in principle the idea of placing GermanRussian relations on a new basis, but stated that before the start of direct negotiations, longer examination and diplomatic preparation were required. Very quickly after, a second message was sent to Moscow in which the urgent German desire for the immediate start of negotiations was expressed. I also did not learn who was the author of this second German message. In this second message, but maybe already in the first one, the early sending of the Reich Foreign Minister to Moscow was offered for the purpose of starting political discussions. After that I believe it was on 21 August-the content of the Soviet government arrived which, as I was able to observe personally by chance, caused great joy to Hitler and his entourage. If my memory does not deceive me, the two German messages had the outward form of a direct personal communication from Hitler to Stalin, and the preparatory correspondence was limited to the two exchanges of these messages.

3. On 23 August toward noon, the plane of the Reich Foreign Minister whom I had to accompany as legal advisor because of the planned treaty negotiations, arrived in Moscow. In the afternoon of the same day, the first conversation between Herr von Ribbentrop and Stalin took place in which on the German side besides the Reich Foreign Minister, only Botschaftsrat Hilger as interpreter and perhaps also ambassador Count Schulenburg participated. I myself, however, did not. The Reich Foreign Minister returned from this lengthy conversation very satisfied and said in effect that it was as good as certain that the agreements, which the Germans had endeavored to obtain, would be concluded. The continuation of the discussions, during which the documents to be signed were to be thoroughly discussed and completed, was contemplated for the later evening. I participated in this second conversation personally, also the ambassador Count Schulenburg and Botschaftsrat Hilger. On the part of the Russians, the negotiations were led by Messrs. Stalin and Molotov who were assisted by Mr. Pavlov as interpreter. Rapidly and without difficulty the text of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was agreed upon. Herr von Ribbentrop had personally added to the preamble of the draft of the treaty drawn up by me a rather extensive change concerning the friendly form of German-Russian relations, which Mr. Stalin objected to with the remark that the Soviet government, after having had "buckets of swipes" thrown over it by the National Socialist Reich Government for 6 years, could not all of a sudden come out into the open with German-Russian assurances of friendship. The passage of the preamble concerned was then deleted or

intention." In this connection, Herr von Ribbentrop mentioned also that a short time ago Hitler had a motion picture shown to him which had been taken during one of the larger public celebrations in Moscow, and that he, Hitler found this film with the Soviet personalities appearing therein to be "very congenial". In addition, it deserves to be mentioned, since I have been asked about it, that during those conversations as well as during the actual negotiations, the Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with Poland appear not as a matter already finally decided on, but only as an imminent possibility. No statements which could have included the approval or encouragement for such a conflict, were made by the Soviet statesmen on this point. Rather, the Soviet representatives limited themselves in this respect simply to taking cognizance of the explanations of the German representatives.

5. During the negotiations concerning the second German-Soviet political treaty, which took place about a month later, the secret document, mentioned above under No. 3, in accordance with a suggestion already previously communicated to Berlin by the Soviet government was altered to the extent that Lithuania as well, with the exception of a small "corner" bordering on East Prussia, was taken out of the German sphere of interest, but in place of that, however, the demarcation line on Polish territory was placed further to the East. In later negotiations carried on through diplomatic channels, as far as I remember during the end of 1940 or the beginning of 1941, this "Lithuanian corner" was also subsequently relinquished on the part of Germany. Nurnberg 15 March 1946 RU/3

[s] FRIEDRICH GAUS

Secret Additional Protocol-Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact On the occasion of the signing of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR the signatory delegates of the two parties have discussed in a strictly confidential meeting the question of the limits of each party's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. This discussion has led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial political change in the area of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) the northern border of Lithuania forms at the same time the demarcation of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR. At the same time Lithuania's right to the area of Vilna is hereby recognized by both parties.

2. In the event of a territorial political change in the territory belonging to the Polish state the spheres of interest of Germany

and the USSR shall be divided roughly by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question, whether the interest of the two parties desires the maintaining of an independent Polish state and what the borders of this state would be can only be cleared up as a result of further political developments.

In any case the two governments will solve these problems by way of friendly negotiation.

3. Regarding South East Europe the USSR stresses her interest in Besserabia. Complete political disinterest regarding this area is stated on the part of Germany.

4. This protocol will be treated by both parties as strictly secret. MOSCOW, 23rd August 1939

For the German Government

[signed] RIBBENTROP

Plenipotentiary of the government of the USSR

[signed] V. MOLOTOV

V. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP

1. FINAL ARGUMENT by Dr. Martin Horn, Defense Counsel

Introduction

"All great repercussions of history of the world and especially in modern Europe have at the same time been wars and revolutions."

We are standing in the midst of such a repercussion. It absolutely is not concluded as yet. To select single events in order to render judicial judgment is not only almost impossible, but entails the danger of too early a verdict. Make no mistake about it.

Here we do not judge a local crisis whose causes are limited to a certain part of Europe. We have to form a judgment about a catastrophe which touches the deepest roots of our civilization. The prosecution has laid down strict measures in judging certain national and international events. Germany is much interested in the development of the idea of the law if its use leads to a betterment of international morals. This court has the high task, not only to decide about certain defendants and uncover the causes of the present catastrophe, but at the same time it will create norms which are expected to be adopted universally.

No law should be created that is only applied to the weak. Otherwise we should risk the danger that again all political ef