countries because one never knows with whom one will have to conduct a war. It is the intention of all navies to build ever stronger units. These matters were candidly discussed in the special magazines, and from that point of view you can consider any naval officer as a war criminal. Because Hitler told me that England would, under no circumstances, be considered as a war opponent, we organized our navy according to France, which had the second strongest navy; and the first two ships, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, were modeled after the French Navy, although not so strong but at a slightly higher speed, had nine 28centimeter guns, and, because of our speed, could easily get away from the French ships. When we received the news about the Richelieu Class of the French Navy we built our ships also with 38-centimeter guns. Q. That was the Tirpitz? A. Yes, and the Bismarck. In 1935 the Naval Agreement provided for a ratio of 35-100 in order to show that we would not aspire to the same strength as the English Navy, and in 1937 a second Naval Agreement was concluded with England concerning the quality of the navy, that is, its size and lifetime. In 1938 the mood in England toward Germany became more unfavorable. I believe that Ribbentrop bears responsibility for that because he was very unwise in his whole behavior. Therefore, in the fall of 1938 Hitler came to the conclusion that we ought to direct our strength in ships along the lines of the British Navy because it may be that his plan not to conduct war against England might not be capable of realization; that is, not the strength of the navy altogether but the strength of the type of ships. For us to attain the size of the British Navy was impossible. Therefore, Hitler ordered me in the fall of 1938 that plans be made according to which our navy would obtain within 7 or 8 years a certain strength with naval units able to withstand the British Navy guns. Q. Ship for ship? A. Yes, ship for ship. This plan was called the "Z" plan; possibly this was the last plan we put in effect, and it was intended to consummate this program by either 1945 or 1946. And, as this document shows, which is dated December 1938 (Hela),* it seemed that Carls, then Admiral and Chief of the Fleet was asked to submit his opinion in connection with the plan "Z", and here he says, we will need six battleships, and he expresses himself about the individual type of ships which he thought were necessary, and, in case that England would lead a war against us, economic *Document referred to did not form part of prosecution case as finally prepared and hence is not published in this series. war would be the proper means. One could not conduct such an economic war exclusively with submarines but it would be necessary to conduct it with large ships, cruisers, and auxiliary cruisers. Q. What were the circumstances under which this study was prepared by Carls? A. It seems as if such a request came from me to the commander-in-charge. I pointed out that in contrast to Hitler's former conception of our relationship to England and their present attitude that it was conceivable that a war may occur between England and Germany, and, consequently, the formation of our navy would have to be adapted to theirs. The objective in such a war would be to secure ocean communications and free access to the sea. Such a fight would essentially be a defensive action because we were not strong enough to act otherwise, but we had to contemplate this by means of the economic war since we could not hope to defeat the British Navy, as such. Q. The indication is in the first paragraph that the colonial matters would not need be settled by peaceful means, is it not? A. No. It seems here that if Germany, according to the will of the Fuehrer expected to secure world power it needed, besides certain colonial positions, to secure sea communications Q. (Interrupting) It is there (indicating in the document) in the second paragraph-the second sentence A. (Interrupting) Yes, Carls says that if Hitler would pursue his objectives it was probable the war would come with England -the war which up to then Hitler did not think probable. The Navy in its original plan had oriented itself not toward England because it was not deemed likely that a war would occur between England and Germany. Now this approach had to be corrected because such a war was a real possibility. Q. Up until that time the orientation of Hitler and the navy excluded the possibility of a conflict with England? A. Yes, and their ship types were not our model. Q. And in September, 1938, it was contemplated that the policy of Hitler would result in the possibility of a conflict with England? A. Yes. Hitler himself did not believe in that. Hitler had, on the 23d of August 1938, in an important speech, enumerated all the reasons why he did not think such a conflict would be probable between England and Germany. The Navy was shocked by the idea that war would occur between England and Germany because it was clear to them that as and when such a war would break out we would be much inferior to the British Navy. Q. Did you request your subordinate officers, such as Carls, to prepare a study such as this concerning what action they would recommend for the purposes of such a war-or-how did Carls happen to prepare this? A. I am certain that I had requested this of Admiral Carls because he was Chief of the Fleet. Q. And similar studies would undoubtedly have been prepared by the Operations Division, I suppose? A. Certainly this came through us to the High Command and served for the basis of our "Z" program later on. Carls said that quite likely if such a war would ever break out it would be launched by England against us because of our political attitude. That in such a case, also, the entire Empire, as well as France, probably also Russia and a number of foreign nations would join England, so that it would become again a world war. May I add something to this: In the contest of the development of the European navies, to which I have referred recently, I wanted to add here that the British Navy, quite apart from tonnage, strength, and speed, claimed a 2 to 1 standard ratio; that is, the British Navy was to be twice as strong as the two next strongest navies together, for example, France and the United States, maybe at times also the Russian Navy, and at times the British Navy even claimed a 3 to 1 ratio. I mention this only in order to point out the strong armament contest, and also that the Navy in its construction program had to take an example from other navies according to their political aims. I also point this out in order to make it understood how this was a very large competitive armament program. XI. FRITZ SAUCKEL* Excerpts from Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, taken at Hitler Legalizes the Slave Labor Program. A. I was then [1942] told by the Fuehrer and by various Government agencies that the use of foreign workers within the occupied territories would not go counter to the conventions of The Hague. The Fuehrer set forth that those countries had *See also Document 3721-PS, Vol. VI, p. 428; 3722-PS, Vol. VI, p. 459. surrendered unconditionally and had governments which had been shaped according to his desire. I then received a definite order to mobilize workers in those countries and, inasmuch as this could not be carried out through voluntary methods, to use the same methods of compulsory conscription which was enforced in Germany. The Fuehrer added that Soviet Russia was not a party at all to the Hague Convention; furthermore, that in the countries which had surrendered he had left millions of war prisoners who had been immediately released. If too great difficulties were created for him he (Hitler) would be compelled to take back again those prisoners of war. I had to satisfy myself with those explanations of the Fuehrer and to carry out my task. I then received the necessary powers and was placed under the authority of Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering, in his capacity as the head of the Four-Year Plan. To carry out the prescribed task, I received from the Labor Ministry two departments: namely, Abteilung 3, which was the department of salaries; and Abteilung 5, which was the department of manpower. I was not entitled to set up any new agencies, but was to be in touch with and to apply to those new government departments which were already in existence in the various ministries and in the Wehrmacht. I could be assisted by various other organizations. This could only be possible in communicating with them, not in issuing to them any orders, as I had no right to do so. The first principle was that the foreign workers were to be treated and paid in the same manner as the German workers. The second principle was fair, just, and humane treatment. This I have been able to carry out with all the people from the West, South, and Southeast. These people were treated and nourished and dealt with in the same manner as the German working people. Restrictions, however, were placed on me with regard to the Russian workers and partly the Polish workers. The Russian workers by virtue of orders from the Reichsfuehrer SS, which were approved by the Fuehrer and by the Party itself, received, up to 1940, less than the other foreign workers. This was justified on the following grounds: The so-called Ostarbeiter (workers from the East) contrary to what was the case with the foreign workers from the West and South, and so on, had to pay no taxes and no fees, no insurance, and no contributions to the DAF.* Upon my representation and those of other persons, we were told that if the Eastern workers, which actually meant only the Russian workers, were paid at the same rate as the other workers, they would actually enjoy better treatment as *Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front), headed by Dr. Robert Ley. they had less expense. With regard to food, they were placed (the Eastern workers) on the same level as the German civilians. Excerpts from Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, taken at Economics of the German Wage Problem Q. You may continue with whatever country you select. A. Since it always concerns some country, I would like to start talking about the German wage problem. In 1942, I was also charged with the department of wages of the Reich Labor Ministry under Ministerialdirektor Kimig. Before he took it over, it was Dr. Wiesil who was in charge of the office of Reichstreuhaender. I only want to make a few explanations about the regulations I received concerning the wages in occupied areas. The Fuehrer ordered that the stabilization of prices and wages must become the basic law of the German defense economy. He has mentioned it again and again. The German people's confidence was held as long as these prices remained stable and no inflationary measures appeared, as they did in 1923. A Commissar for prices was appointed at the beginning of the war, Dr. Fischboeck. Dr. Fischboeck was the successor to Wagner. While I was in charge, Fischboeck was in office. Just as Dr. Fischboeck was charged to keep prices stable in Germany and occupied territories, I was charged with keeping wages stable in those areas. Special attention was called to that by me when I took over the office. This was rather difficult because ever since the rise to power in 1933 they were unable to introduce an ideal wage policy. Several attempts had been made but no satisfactory agreement had been reached. We, as National Socialists, would have liked it. The wages for agricultural workers were unsatisfactory; that was generally recognized. Since a rise in agricultural wages would have resulted in a rise in prices of bread, it was postponed until after the war. The intensity of the defense effort, especially of the airplane industry, resulted in the fact that in various places this wage stabilization was breached and not adhered to. In the airplane industry especially, the various section chiefs concerned, by determining our wage bracket, found they could achieve more quantitative work. Thus it happened at times that people who were less skilled and less qualified actually earned more wages than skilled workers. Thus the workers who worked on the assembly line also earned more money than the man who did |