and the other way is, certainly in my mind, not less courageous, for all I had to stand in these years. Really, living in Switzerland would have been much more comfortable to me. Q. By the way, do you know what the repercussions were of Thyssen's departure? Did it create quite a sensation in the higher circles in Germany? A. Yes. I remember that all his property was seized then by Goering. Q. Yes. I know that. Goering even went down and took the little paintings and things out of his house, as I remember it. That is in his book. I haven't read it in some time, but I did read it, and I recall that he complained in there that Goering took some of the paintings. A. Ribbentrop took the house of his son-in-law. Q. I think so. I think his son-in-law was killed, was he not? Isn't that the one who died in Dachau? A. No, but he died in a concentration camp. Papen's Opinion of Hess's Mental Condition Q. Another thing. It isn't very important for the purposes here, but I think you saw Hess the other day.* A. Yes. I was asked whether he could recognize me. Q. What do you think? Do you think his mind is really gone? A. It seems to be. I found him very much changed, and his face too. I haven't known him intimately. I have seen him several times in my life; but that he didn't recognize any one of these people, and the way he spoke must have been a matter of, insanity, I think. Q. You know what naturally occurs to us-is he pretending or not? A. Why should he? Q. I don't know. A. As I understand his story, he was convinced that the war was a crime and he tried to get a peace, to negotiate a peace, so he shouldn't have any reason to play the idiot now. Papen's View of His Responsibility for the War Q. You have told me that, in your opinion, Hitler was the greatest crooks in history. A. After all that turned out, yes. Q. I mean your present opinion? A. Yes. Q. I wonder what you think, or if you care to express the *The reference is to Hess's confrontation and questioning by former associates, including von Papen. See pp. 1160-1170 of this volume. thought-Don't you feel that there are men now living, whoever they are, who were responsible to some extent for not only the war but the events which led up to it, and some of the things that took place during it? Do you understand what I mean? Do you think there are such men? A. I am one of them, certainly, in the big sense of your question. I had a part in his rising to power. I had a part in creating his government, and certainly I have a responsibility about all the historical developments thereafter. Q. I understand what you said about that, but do you feel that you are responsible to an extent that justifies your being declared to be responsible? What would you say to that? I don't want to mislead you in any respect. I am not trying to frame a cautious question. A. I know, but it should be to history to decide, to weigh the motives and the acts. Certainly, in human life, there is a saying, "Nothing succeeds like success," and in that way I certainly had a great failure. I think, in the judgment of God, the motives have a better place and the ideas one had, and He doesn't judge so much of the success or of the effect of it, but the ideas or the motives. Q. Well, as between men, knowing the history of your own career better than anyone else, and knowing the part, whatever it was, that you may have played, and knowing the results of all the play, what is your judgment on yourself? A. I don't think, Mr. Dodd, that from the human point of view, you could say, or could the German people say that I am guilty of all this disaster. Q. I don't say guilty of all of it, but I mean, guilty of some of it, or a part of it. A. If you say responsible for it, I must say responsible for all of it, because when I stepped in with the Hitler government, then I had the responsibility. When I stepped out later on, the second, third acts in my life being in Vienna and Turkey, it was only done, as I explained to you in the will to do some good, and to get Germany out of this mess, to help her; and I am quite sure that in the opinion of most of the Germans, this is recognized. Q. Well, as I see it, from having talked with you and having given some thought to it, I should suppose that the question of your responsibility would first center in whatever you feel you had to do with the helping of Hitler and his people to power, if that is the right terminology; is that a fair statement? A. I mean, not the Hitler people. It has never been my design to have National Socialism in Germany. I wanted to have a normal life for Germany. I saw good points of the National Socialist program, the social points, the getting away from class hatred. One of the serious things in Germany was the growing of class hatred, as it was then, and getting away from that was a great relief to all of us, and it resulted in a great progress; so we were certain that we could fight Bolshevism. That has ever been his idea, his words. He fascinated the people with those words. Now, that was worthwhile to do, and I think it was legitimate and I was entitled to do it at that moment. Q. All right. Then we come to the second phase, or I will call it the "second phase" for want of a better term, and I consider the time, dating from approximately June 30th 1934, to, let's say March of 1938. What do you say was your responsibility for what happened in that period? Do you feel you have any responsibility for anything that happened then? A. No responsibility, Mr. Dodd, for the government of Hitler, because I was burdened with a special duty and a special task about Austria. Q. But I consider Austria was a part of the A. Program. Q.-program during that period of time. A. Absolutely, and I was of the idea of Mr. Henderson, when he said there couldn't be peace in Germany, if Germany wasn't again united and prosperous again, and that is absolutely true, and in this way I took this job and I acted. Q. Would you say that you feel any responsibility for assisting in the carrying-out of that part of the program, whatever the real value of it is? A. Certainly, it was always my endeavor to assist in the reuniting of Germany and to give her, say, her equal sovereign rights and prosperity, and all that I strived for my life long. That certainly was part of my program. Q. And besides the Austrian incident as a part of that program, do you feel that you have any responsibility for the-for example, for the cessation of civil rights? A. No. Q. You do not? A. No, not one. iw ob ps bet Q. Or the enactment of the Nurnberg laws, or any of the others? A. No, certainly not. Excerpts from Testimony of Artur Seyss-Inquart, taken Seyss-Inquart's views on Von Papen and His Part Q. How did you get along with von Papen, by the way? Q. He is a good politician, isn't he? A capable one? A. I think he is a capable politician but within the Nazi system he could not carry out he had no good name with the real Nazis. Q. What do you mean by that? A. He was not considered as a real Nazi, a 100 percent Nazi. Q. How do you know that? A. I was told that by the Nazis themselves. They always had a certain reserve with regard to him. Q. I am interested to know how he was able to continue as ambassador first to Austria and then to Turkey if these big men in the Nazi Party had very grave doubts about him. A. Probably Hitler thought that such a capable man as von Papen could render quite some service, whereas a good Nazi might spill much milk. Q. What was von Papen's attitude towards the Nazis? A. He was very reticent, but one could sense that he was not a real Nazi. Q. He apparently was willing to work in their interests? A. I think and believe that all he wished for was to work in the interests of the Reich. Q. Or in the interests of von Papen? (The witness shrugged.) Q. What do you say to that? A. Well, there are people who are ambitious and I can say very little about that. Q. What is your judgment from your association with him? A. I think that he had a sort of intuition to serve the Reich, coupled with a desire to play a personal part, in spite of the fact that he was so badly treated by the Nazis. Q. When and where was he badly treated? A. Well, those are simply surmises from their general attitude. They simply didn't take him in. *See Document 3732-PS, Vol. VI, p. 539. Q. He had to be in pretty close when he was in Austria as the ambassador in those days before the Anschluss? A. They used him a great deal. I don't know whether they thought much of him. Q. I understand you to say they never let him in and I understood you to mean by that, into their confidence? A. Entire confidence, no. Q. What I ask now is whether or not it is a fact that he had to be very much in their confidence during the days he was in Austria and the National Socialists were attempting to achieve an Anschluss? A. Well, they didn't give it. I believe that the primary object of von Papen in Austria was not the Anschluss but the lessening of the tension which subsequently would have the result of bringing about the Anschluss. Q. I don't understand that, because you know as well as I do, that one of the prime objectives of Hitler's policy was Anschluss with Germany at the time he sent von Papen to Austria as his Ambassador. A. Well, I don't think that Hitler had any intention of Anschluss as far as von Papen was concerned. He had sent him to Austria with the chief objective of relaxing the terrible strain which was existing. Well, I would like you to understand that I am of the opinion-I was of the opinion and still am of the opinion that if the tension between Germany and Austria could have been relaxed, then the Anschluss would have resulted by itself. This I do believe still today. I have made an outline about the question of the Anschluss, about 30 pages.* XIV. CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH Excerpts from Testimony of Constantin von Neurath, The Disarmament Question Q. [In English] What was the problem in the disarmament treaty? What was to be accomplished by that? A. [Principally in English] That was in the Versailles Treaty. Germany was obliged to disarm. We had disarmed. There was a * Document 3254-PS "Seyss-Inquart, The Austrian Question 1934-1938" (Vol. V, pp. 961-992). |