sion of this very agitated conference. I heard from other sources, but no details. Other words which followed in this conference were as follows: Other people to whom such territories are handed, would ask: "What would you construct? I will ask the opposite." Q. In other words, I, Hitler, will ask "What did you destroy?" A. Yes, precisely. I must state that I did not hear these words myself; I only remember them because of the special impression they made on me. And the executive for all these things was the Governor General, and later in other territories, also the SS. Q. Were you an eye-witness to any of the destruction wrought by the SS? A. Not in Poland. Q. In any other place? A. No. I have only the impression of the enormous destruction which the Russians did. Q. How about the destruction done by the SS? You mentioned that you learned of the plan to destroy, which was to be executed by the SS. A. I must state that I did not hear any details, I only heard in the course of conversations from Canaris that this order that Frank got was directed against the intelligentsia, against the priests and the Jews. The later developments in Poland, which we heard about only partly because we had no direct influence, gave me the impression that they were the issue of this conference. Q. Did you see any of these later developments in Poland? A. No. I never saw anything. I know of two groups of reports which came in, one a collection of isolated instances those Brauchitsch discussed personally with Hitler, immediately after the Polish campaign; and the second group was a stack of reports that General Blaskowitz submitted to General Brauchitsch in the short time he had office there. And these reports Brauchitsch submitted to the OKW through channels. Q. What did these reports show? A. Shooting of people and mistreatment of the population. Q. On a wide spread basis? A. I can remember cases which took place in Northern Poland and another in Lublin, but this is only a superficial recollection. Q. What happened to the report submitted by von Brauchitsch? A. Brauchitsch never heard anything of it. The first group Brauchitsch discussed with Himmler. Q. What did Himmler say? A. After that Brauchitsch told me, I was not present at this conference, that after a long discussion, Himmler promised he would investigate these cases. Brauchitsch inquired from an officer, whom I know personally, who was with Himmler or rather with Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, as to what had happened to those things. He got the answer that after investigation the case showed quite another picture. That means nothing ever happened. Q. And on the second report? A. This went to Keitel through channels. Whether Brauchitsch discussed this with Keitel, I do not know. XXI. HANS RICHARD HEMMEN* Excerpts from Testimony of Hans Richard Hemmen, Occupation Costs Imposed on France by Germany Q. [In English] Who determined the economic policy with respect to occupied countries? A. [In English] The Foreign Office and the HPA [Heerespersonalamt-Army Personnel Office]. Q. And there again was the general policy formulated by a group representing the Finance Ministry and the other ministries you mentioned? A. Yes, the OKW and all of them. Q. What were the standards governing the amount of occupation cost they were going to ask the French to pay? A. Under Article 18 of the Armistice Treaty, France paid the cost of occupation. Soon after my delegation was set up the question arose and was discussed in Berlin, and I was invited to take part at the meeting of the HPA. That was in July 1940. Anyway, the question arose and OKW said we should calculate the sum on the basis of such and such an amount of soldiers of our army which we kept in France, the average cost of so and so much, and that came up to twenty million Reichsmarks per day. *Hans Richard Hemmen was a professional diplomat specializing in economics from 1918 on. His main function was handling negotiations of trade agreements between Germany and other countries. He was German Charge d'Affaires in Argentina in 1932-33. After the German occupation of France he handled economic matters as a representative of the Foreign Ministry. Q. Can you remember how many soldiers it was estimated would be in France? A. Some three millions. Q. And that three million figure was the basis for determining seven marks per day for each soldier? A. Yes. Q. Were those three million soldiers all to be put on occupation duties? A. Well, I know nothing about that. I do not know even how many soldiers were in France. Q. Was there any discussion as to considering not only soldiers who were engaged in occupation duties but also those who were there for the defense of France against the Allies? A. This question was put up by General Huntziger, a French general who had been in Compiegne when the Armistice was signed. Later he was killed in an airplane accident. When I later on had the note from the Foreign Office, General Huntziger said to me he could not give any judgment on the amount because he was a military man and had no means to judge whether it was insufficient, but there was one thing he objected to at once, and that was the rate of exchange, one mark to 20 francs, because he said he was advised that this rate of exchange introduced by the German army was too high, and he asked it to be reconsidered. As to the amount he did consult his government; but he did remark that in Compiegne he had received favorable assurances on signing the Armistice that only the cost of an army of occupation would be charged, and that the cost of an army of operation was distinct. I learned this from him because we were still at war with England, and it was sure that the war would have to be fought on French soil. At Berlin at this meeting nothing was mentioned about that, although of course the OKW was represented. At Compiegne only military people were there with the exception of Hitler, and I referred both questions in writing to Berlin, the rate of exchange, etc. With regard to the rate of exchange, that is a long story because I agreed that it was too high. I have tried my very best to change it; but as to the difference between an operation and an occupation army, I could only refer this question to my Government. Q. What was the answer? A. The Foreign Office consulted Keitel and Keitel said he could refer this question to Col. Boehme who was present at Compiegne, and who was then the Chief of Staff of the Military Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden. I went to them and showed them General Huntzinger's question. "I have asked the Foreign Office and Keitel refers the question to you and you will also find his reply there," and Boehme said that he had been in Compiegne and he had been present at whatever was said, and that no difference was mentioned. So I informed General Huntzinger of my action and of the reply I had received, and he said he would leave it to me. Q. Was there any question raised by Keitel as to whether the three million occupation forces did include the so-called operational forces? A. I do not know. I have not spoken to Keitel. Q. Now, did the expenses of occupation vary from year to year, or did they tend to remain constant? A. Now I must point out one question which is important and that is the condition OKW made. They said that since we were carrying on the war on French territory, the cost must not betray the numerical strength of our armies in France. In consequence, we must ask for a fixed amount over a long period. Now, as to the expense, I have a general judgment from the account. I had no idea how the money was drawn or expended; that was done in Berlin by the Finance Minister, but we had asked that the money be put into an account with the Banque de France in the name of the "Militaerverwaltung" [Military Administration] every 10 days in advance, at the exchange rate of 20-1. They accepted that, as you will see from my memorandum, and started the payments. The French knew always, of course, the amount which stood to their credit, and I also, of course. Q. You say that military authorities did not want the amount of occupation cost to betray the size of the army. Now the size of the operational army would, of course, vary depending on the military situation. Accordingly, it would seem that the cost of the operational army was considered a legitimate cost by your military authorities to be imposed on the French Government. Have I made myself clear? A. Yes. Q. Your occupation army did tend to remain constant subject to redeployment depending on outbreaks and local situations, but most changes that did occur were on the operational side. Am I correct in understanding the policy to be a policy of levying a charge sufficient to cover the costs of the entire army, including both the operational and the occupation army? A. That is for me a very difficult question. First of all I had no military knowledge at all, as I have never been a military man 1 and had no connections with the military people. Secondly, I had no knowledge of how they in Berlin expended the money paid by the French. I could not calculate for myself whether the amount was in any way correct as to the number of soldiers, and then from the military point of view I really do not know whether one could in fact draw a dividing line between the occupation and operational army. I am not a military man, but I doubt it very much, because from what I observed later on divisions which had been in occupation for a long time were taken into operation. Q. General Huntziger thought that that division could be made? A. He thought it could be made. From the French point of view it was natural to draw this distinction, because the French having lost the war had the German army on their soil to fight England. Q. Was there any attempt made to establish a division of cost based on this distinction? A. No, never. So far as I know, an attempt was never made, and the question never arose after I told General Huntziger the results of my interviews. Q. Did the French ever raise with you as a diplomatic representative of the German government the question of international law involved, based on the Hague Convention, which restricts the amount? A. No. I do not think so. We may inspect the notes which the French wrote on the cost of occupation, but I do not think we will discover a single argument there because, as I was going to say, General Huntziger, after the meeting we had in his hotel, sent his adjutant to me to inform me that the same afternoon he would fly to Vichy and discuss this question with Marshal Petain, and would recommend accepting this amount. Two days afterward he returned and told me it had been agreed. Q. After the Italian defeat did the German Government demand additional payments based on the former Italian occupation cost which the Italian government had imposed on France? A. That is something I forgot to mention in my report. The general course of events was this. Soon after we had agreed on twenty millions, Hitler wanted to meet Petain at Montoire. The French Finance Minister, who was a very clever man, saw his chance to reduce the cost of occupation, and he tried to reduce the payments, and he instructed his delegation to write my delegation a note to say that the French Government would stop payments pending a new system which he expected from the meeting |