from southern Germany to Franzburg in order to present me with this order. Q. How do you account for the fact that you escaped with your life if you were regarded as politically unstable? A. If I had been in the southern part of Germany, I wouldn't have considered my life worth much. In the northern part I only encountered the one danger on the 28th of April, when I had to present the refusal of the acceptance of the capitulation of Germany by the Western Powers, to Himmler. Q. Was this offer of capitulation to the Western Powers Himmler's offer? It was not an offer by the Reich Government as a whole? A. No. By Himmler is his really powerful position. Q. As Reichsfuehrer SS? A. Reichsfuehrer SS, Reichsminister, and so on. XXV. WALTER WARLIMONT* Excerpts from Testimony of Walter Warlimont, taken German Aid to Franco During Spanish Civil War A. *** In the summer of 1936 I got, surprisingly enough, a detail to go to Spain as a military plenipotentiary to General Franco. I went there through Italy and on an Italian man-of-war by way of Tangiers, and joined General Franco in Spain. My duties were administrative, administrator for the German troops there, and to advise General Franco whenever he had further wishes concerning the detailing of German troops. When I came there, there was only a squadron of transport planes and a wing of fighter planes, 9 or 12 planes. Later on a battalion of tanks, a battalion of anti-aircraft artillery and some 30 or 40 anti-tank weapons were added to this German detail, in the whole, about 800 to 1,200 men, but they all were under Spanish command. Q. This was in 1936? A. Yes, '36. That lasted until late in October or early November when the so-called Condor Legion was detailed to Spain. This *Major General Walter Warlimont was Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, and as such assistant to Jodl. was by far a bigger unit, under the command of General Sperrle. And then I was asked whether I wanted to join them or go home, and I asked to be permitted to leave Spain and go home. Before that was accomplished I was detailed to Ambassador General Faupel, who came there early in December 1936. I only stayed with him for 8 to 10 days and then was allowed to return home. Genesis of Hitler's Plan to Attack Russia Q. When was the first time that you heard of an intention to attack Russia? A. The 29th of July. Q. What year? A. 1940. Q. Why would that particular date stick in your memory? A. On the 19th of July, Hitler made his speech before the Reichstag concluding the French campaign and promoting all the generals to field marshals and so on. It is only natural that a man in my position was awaiting a reward of some kind too, and so I heard shortly afterwards that I should be promoted from colonel to brigadier general probably on the first of August. And when Jodl announced that he would come to a conference of his staff, which seldom up to that time ever happened, I thought that it had something to do with me and this promotion. I don't know whether it was the 28th, 29th, or 30th. And against all my expectations, he made the announcement that Hitler had decided to war against Russia. Q. What was the statement that he made? A. I can't exactly say the words he used, but he made the impression on me and on the other officers of the Wehrmacht' Fuehrungsstab who were present, that Hitler had taken the resolution to go to war with Russia, that is, that Hitler expressed if not his decision, at least his intention to wage war on ' Russia. Q. What else did he say besides that? A. He may have noticed the consternation in all of us when he announced this because we lived in a mood of peace after concluding this French campaign. And so perhaps for this reason, he added that this war would have to come sometime anyway, and that it would be better to conclude it in this war instead of taking up the weapons again some years later. Q. Do you know whether the statement that Jodl made about taking up arms now instead of a few years later was Jodl's thought or was it Hitler's thought, or was it expressed in such a manner that you couldn't tell whose thought it was? A. I can't recall it exactly, but I suppose Hitler's, as he at this time always did use the expressions of Hitler when he gave us such statements like that. Q. What else was said at this conference? A. He gave us a special task. Q. Jodl did? A. Yes. And this task consisted of preparing an order to concentrate the troops on the new German-Russian border, and neither the railways nor the communications nor the accommodations for troops and so on were sufficient to prepare a big concentration of troops. And so he gave a directive of the OKW, which had actually been released on the 9th of August under the designation "Aufbau Ost," and this order contained all the different preparations which had to be made in order to make it possible to concentrate troops at the border.* Q. In the course of this statement, did Jodl indicate that he had told Hitler that it was his, Jodl's, opinion that an operation against Russia that fall was impossible? A. I only remember that I have read, whether at this conference or sometime later, a written statement by Keitel against this policy. Q. You don't remember whether Jodl told you at that conference about what I just said? A. No. He may have said that the date was fixed for the next spring, but whether he spoke of Hitler's intention, I couldn't recall. But I know. that Hitler had mentioned his intention to Keitel and that Keitel contested it, based on a written memorandum. Q. You saw the memorandum, didn't you? A. I saw it some time, either on this day or some other day. Q. Was it during the year 1940 that you saw it? A. I certainly think that it was about this time. Q. Now, did your office, starting in early August 1940, devote most of its energies to the preparation of the plans against Russia? A. No, on the contrary. We prepared this order I spoke of, "Aufbau Ost," and the only task in connection with those plans of Hitler assigned to us was to prepare a study of how to conduct the operations against Russia. But Jodl wanted to have that only for his own information. Q. Well, as a matter of fact, hadn't the OKH prepared a pro*See document 1229-PS, vol. III, p. 849. You emits qu posed plan for the conduct of the Russian operation, and wasn't the plan that you have just referred to, really a study of the problem with reference to OKH's plan? Do you remember that? A. No. The study I referred to was entirely independent from the task which the OKH had, and the OKH had to prepare it for official purposes, and had to report about it to Hitler some time later. This study, which was carried through by Lt. Col. Von. Losberg, a name I mentioned earlier, was just to give Jodl a date for his own purpose, that he might not be dependent on that plan, the tentative plan which the OKH would report to Hitler. Q. As a matter of fact, did it not happen that the two plans more or less coincided? A. Yes. They coincided in the main lines. Excerpts of Testimony of Walter Warlimont, taken at Mikhailovic's Collaboration with the Germans mi Q. I show you a paper dated the 25th of January '43,* and ask if you can identify it; if your initial is on it; and if you can inform us of any matters relating to this that do not appear in the document itself? A. It is a telegram set up and sent off by subsection four of the Division for National Defense, which does not bear my signature. The signature which appears at the bottom on the right side, is that of a Captain who was with this section, but whose name I cannot recall at this moment. Q. You just note that down and let us know when it occurs to you. A. Yes. I know the other signature too, but I cannot say whom it belongs to, this blue one. I know the signature. The telegram is directed to the German Foreign Office and repeats the conthan For tents of another telegram which the commanding general of Serbia had sent to the OKW. This telegram of the commanding general of Serbia reads: That the President of the Serbian Cabinet on his own initiative has proposed to arrest six hundred former Serbian officers and to transport them, as prisoners of war, to Germany. Those officers are undesirable, as followers of Tito, Mikhailovic, and as supporters of rumor propaganda and · unrest in the country. The telegram further reads that it is *Document referred to did not form part of prosecution case as finally prepared and hence is not published in this series. 768060-48-104 intended to carry through the undertaking as soon as possible. The proposition of the President of the Council complies with the intentions of the German commanding general. Q. I would like to ask you a question on that paper. Do you know of your own knowledge or, if not of your own knowledge, has it even been reported to you that Mikhailovic was working with the local German commanders in the field? A. Yes. That was known. Q. For how long a period did he do that? A. I have to think of that to give you an exact answer, but I am certain that it started several times and was discontinued several times; taken up again and lasted at least for several months each time. Q. Did he do that in order to obtain aid in fighting the Tito partisans? A. We never knew why he did it. Hitler always believed that he only did it because he was short of ammunition and tried to persuade the German officers, who always were inclined to believe in a nationalist like him, that he was going to support them, but Hitler said, "He will always remain a friend of England and a foe of Germany, so it is entirely wrong to go with him." He didn't want it. Q. What was your opinion about it? A. I couldn't form any opinion of my own, in spite of being two or three times in Serbia. I always got the opinion of the officers down there who believed in the things and wanted to continue with it. Q. Had Tito ever given assistance to the Germans? A. So far as I know, no. Q. Do you know whether or not Tito had ever fought Mikhailovic? A. Fought him? Q. Yes; had he had battles with Mikhailovic? A. It was hard to recognize who fought who in that country, but I am convinced that parts of both parties fought each other several times. Q. It was Hitler's considered opinion that on any occasion when Mikhailovic sought the assistance of the Germans, it was as a temporary expedient? A. As a temporary expedient? Q. As a temporary means of getting over a moment when he didn't have ammunition. |