statement. I will have to be somewhat explicit. The Service Department of the Chief of POW affairs considered it as its task to see to it that the rules of the Geneva Convention were observed, and whenever breaches of the Convention occurred, then we were the people who did our utmost, as far as we could as soldiers, to prevent such breaches. It would have been unnatural for us to act differently. The Protecting Powers had the responsibility of visiting the camps, and in each case of a breach of the Convention they could reproach us for it; that is to say, that whenever such breaches occurred it was for my Service Department to put matters right, and that is obviously the reason why we were against any such breaches. Repeatedly during conferences in the ministry, when somebody would say that we didn't have to bother about the Geneva Convention, I would get up and I would say, "Gentlemen, the Geneva Convention has been signed by the Fuehrer, [sic] and we are therefore a party to it. In my opinion, until I get specific orders from the Fuehrer that the Geneva Convention can be disregarded, it is therefore my duty to abide by the rules and act so that the rules of the Geneva Convention will be observed." And I should like to add that I do not believe that you will be able to prove a single case against the Service Department of the Chief of Prisoner of War Affairs where the Geneva Convention was disregarded unless specific orders to that effect were received from above. Q. That brings me to this question. How many times were you ordered by the Fuehrer or Keitel or Himmler to disregard the Geneva Convention when the matter concerned prisoners of war? A. That, gentlemen, is a very difficult question to answer. I shall try to tell you what I remember, but I suggest that I be given time to think that matter over. It is extremely difficult for me to answer that question in detail on the spot. Q. Well, you certainly were told to disregard it in this instance, weren't you? A. Not only was the order given, but we were put before completed facts. On that particular occasion, the fact that these people had been shot was put before us as an accomplished fact. So was the fact that they had already been handed over to the Gestapo. And to try and oppose the Gestapo was quite an impossible task for the Chief of the Service Department for Prisoner of War Affairs. The Gestapo was much too powerful a body for that, and we were much too small. I knew that it was Passe's opinion that the Geneva Convention was merely a piece of paper, just as you must realize, gentlemen, that the opposi tion to the Geneva Convention was entirely caused by the Party. If ever there were difficulties in connection with breaches of the Geneva Convention into which we made investigations, then these difficulties were due to these Party developments. The Geneva Convention "A Piece of Paper" Q. Did you ever discuss with Martin Bormann's deputy the rules of the Geneva Convention outlined therein which were to be accorded to the PW's? A. There was a big meeting in Berlin between representatives from the various ministries, and that meeting was attended by Friedrichs and Passe. The reason for the meeting was to draft new rules for prisoners of war. Before I go any further, you must realize that the OKW and we were always accused that we were not strict enough with prisoners of war. We used to reply that we were treating prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and that we were also considering the position of our own prisoners of war in enemy hands, for whom we were equally responsible. During this meeting, if I remember rightly, the question of parcels from the International Red Cross cropped up. The Party Chancellery demanded that prisoners of war should not get as much as they did at the time. They claimed that the German population was getting angry because prisoners were being fed better than the population. I got up, thereupon, and told Friedrichs that the Chief of the Prisoner of War Affairs was responsible that the Geneva Convention was observed, and that it was my opinion, as far as these parcels were concerned, that the more the prisoners were getting, the better, since that would keep them satisfied. I also quoted that the Reichsmarshall and the Ministry of Propaganda had made clear-cut statements according to which these prisoners of war were to have their parcels, whereupon Friedrichs replied he didn't care what these -people had said, that one could treat prisoners of war as one liked; that in fact the Geneva Convention was just a piece of paper. Needless to say, alterations of any kind were not made, at least not as long as I could help it. But the result of this con ference was a decree dealing with the treatment of prisoners, which was in turn sent to all the ministries and the Party Chancellery which vetoed it. That is the only occasion on which I have met Friedrichs or had any personal contact with him. The Shackling of Prisoners of War Q. Now, when prisoners were transported from one camp to another, Field Marshal Keitel, knowing that many escapes had taken place while prisoners were being transported, ordered that some of these prisoners be shackled. Do you remember that order? A. It started at the time of General Graevenitz, but I can put you in the picture. During a certain transport a number of officers-I think more than a hundred-had escaped. Just at that time we had succeeded, after efforts which lasted for nine months, to do away with the shackling of prisoners, which was then the custom, I believe, on both sides. Just as we were very pleased to have succeeded in doing this, we were informed that this new order, referring to shackling during transport, had now come out, which displeased us considerably. Q. And do you remember what incident brought about the issuance of this new order? A. Some Dutch officers who were in a camp at Czenstochau had to be taken away from there when the Russians arrived. They were transferred to the camp at Neu Brandenburg. From that transport something like 103-it may have been 130Dutch officers escaped. That mass escape of officers caused considerable excitement, of course, and that led to this order. But please, may I add that this is as far as my recollection takes me. Q. Well, you remember that Field Marshal Keitel did order the shackling of officer prisoners, don't you? A. The order stated that stricter guarding of the prisoners was necessary, and shackling was to take place. It also said that the prisoners were to be informed when they arrived at the station that this treatment was not to be regarded as dishonorable and that it was merely necessary because of previous mass escapes. They were also told that they would be unshackled after arrival. Q. But it was against the Geneva Convention, wasn't it? A. Gentlemen, this story was extremely unpleasant for us, as I told you. On the other hand, I can imagine that the Field Marshal had a certain statement by the British Government in mind which stated that no assurance would be given that there was going to be no shackling. I don't know whether it was like that, but it is a possibility. Apart from that, he never had shackling of British or American prisoners carried out at any time. Every transport of American or British personnel had to be reported to the Field Marshal by teleprint, and he made his own personal decision, not only whether and when the transport was to be dispatched, but also whether there was going to be shackling. But to the best of my recollection, he never ordered shackling in any single case of transport of American or British personnel. Q. But on the other hand, he always ordered the shackling of Russian officers, didn't he? A. The exact position is that he ordered von Graevenitz that all transports, with the exception of American and British transports, were to be shackled. If ever, therefore, any other transport was dispatched without shackling, then this was done on the responsibility of the commander who was responsible for that transport. Incidentally, French prisoners weren't shackled either. But if such a transport of Russian or Serbian officers was dispatched without shackles and a single one escaped, then this would cost the general's head. I don't want to say it could cost his head; I would say that he was responsible. XXVII. SIEGFRIED WESTPHAL* Excerpts from Testimony of Siegfried Westphal, taken OKW Orders for Brutal Treatment of Italian Partisans Q. I will just ask you if you, in the Army, did not receive an order from OKW which outlined the treatment that would be accorded to partisans in the territory of Italy? If I read you that order, do you think that it would refresh your memory and cause you to remember whether or not you did receive it? A. Yes, surely. Q. I then will read you an order which is purported to have been issued by Field Marshal Keitel, entitled "Combatting of Partisans." A. What is the date of this order? Q. This order was issued several different times; one was in Russia in 1941; another was issued in the Balkans in 1942; another in Italy in 1944. Copies of this order are purported to have been found in the Headquarters of Field Marshal Kesselring, *Brigadier General Siegfried Westphal, after serving with Rommel in Africa, became Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Kesselring in Italy. After the Army purge which followed the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life, Westphal was appointed Chief of Staff to Field Marshal von Rundstedt. who was succeeded by Vietinghoff in Italy, and was in the file from 1942 to 1945. I shall read you that order and ask if you saw a copy of it. The order reads:* "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces Armed Forces Operations Staff; Chief Operations Office; SUBJECT: Combatting of Partisans. TOP SECRET Reports have been submitted to the Fuehrer that individual members of the armed forces participating in the fighting against partisans have subsequently had to account for their actions in combat. The Fuehrer has therefore ordered: 1. The enemy employs in partisan warfare communist-trained fanatics who do not hestitate to commit any atrocity. It is more than ever a question of life and death. This fight has nothing to do with soldierly gallantry or the principles of the Geneva Convention. If the fight against the partisans in the East, as well as in the Balkans, is not waged with the most brutal means, we will surely reach a point where the available forces are insufficient to control this pest. It is therefore not only justified, but it is the duty of the troops to use all means, without restriction, even against women and children, as long as it ensures success. Any consideration for partisans is a crime against the German people and the soldier at the front, who will have to bear the consequences of partisan plots and who can see no reason whatever for showing the partisans and their followers any leniency. 2. No German employed against the partisans will be held accountable for his actions in fighting against them or their followers, either by disciplinary action or by court-martial. All commanders of troops employed in fighting partisans will be responsible that: First, the contents of this order are strongly impressed on all officers of subordinate units; their legal advisers are informed of this order immediately; no judgments will be confirmed which oppose this order. (Signed) Keitel. Did you, in Italy, see a copy or know of the order? A. I am not sure of it. It may be that I did see it, but I cannot say so for sure. Q. You know such an order was issued, don't you? A. Yes, I believe so, but I am not sure that I have seen it. There is one sentence in the beginning which sounds familiar to me. Q. What sentence is that? *See document UK-66, vol. VIII, p. 572-582. |