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revision even within a moderate frame. This guarantee declaration shows once more how much Great Britain drew conclusions, taking a sensible political view, out of the decline of the collective security system, and how small a confidence it had in the practical results of the moral condemnation of war through the Kellogg Pact.

Mr. v. Ribbentrop had, therefore, to draw the conclusion out of the behavior of Great Britain, that the attitude of the Polish Government from which Germany was entitled to expect some concession was bound to become rigidly inflexible. The development during the following months proved this provision to be right. The stepping-in of the Soviet Union into the conflict demonstrates in particular that the coming danger would take place within the compass of the usual principles of politics and the carrying through of the interests of one's own country. The Soviet Union too had, on her side, left the ground of the collective security system. She looked at the approaching conflict from the viewpoint of Russian interests exclusively. As things were, Mr. v. Ribbentrop took pains to, at least, localize the threatening conflict, if it could not be avoided. He could rightly hope to succeed in this endeavor, as both powers primarily interested in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Germany, concluded the non-aggression and friendship agreement previous to the outbreak of armed hostilities. At the same time, they came to terms by way of a secret agreement concerning the future fate of the territory of Poland and the Baltic countries. Nevertheless, the machinery of the assistance agreements was released and thereby the local Eastern European conflict became a world conflagration.

If one wants to apply a juridical standard to these facts, one cannot do so without taking into consideration the Soviet Union from the point of view of participation.

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The extension of the war and its causes

The conflict in Eastern Europe grew, through the participation of Great Britain and France, into a European one, necessarily followed by the universal conflict. The entry in the war of the powers mentioned took place according to the forms provided by the 3rd Hague Convention concerning opening of hostilities, i.e., an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.

At the session of March 19, 1946, Mr. Justice Jackson interpreting the indictment has stressed the point that the extension of the war brought about by the Western powers did not constitute a punishable aggression on the side of Germany. This interpretation is in keeping with his general argumentation concerning the

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emy information and the proposal for a German occupation of Scandinavia.

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg

In the case of Belgium and the Netherlands it has been proved by evidence that an unrestrained maintenance of the neutrality of the Belgian-Dutch territory by these countries could not be guaranteed. Previous to the war, there already existed between the general staffs of the Western powers and those of both neutral countries agreements and current exchanges of experiences concerning behavior and occupation in case of a conflict with Germany. Detailed deployment plans and fortification systems built under supervision of detached officers of the Western powers were meant to prepare the reception of allied forces. These projects comprehended not only a cooperation of the armies concerned, but also the assistance of certain civilian authorities, for the purpose of carrying out supplying and advance of the Allies. Important about these preparations is the fact that they were made not only for the case of defense, but also for the offensive. For this reason Belgium and the Netherlands also could not or would not prevent it that British bomber formations continued to fly over them, whose near aim was the destruction of the Ruhr district, the heel of Achilles of the German war industry. This area was also the main goal of the Allies in case of an offensive on land.

These intentions as well as the most intensive preparations for offensive measures by the Western Powers had been ascertained. beyond a doubt by sources of information. The grouping of the offensive forces showed that the Belgian-Netherland territory was included in the theater of operations. As has already been described in connection with preceding cases of conflict, such information was currently passed on to Herr v. Ribbentrop by Hitler or his deputies. Here too Herr v. Ribbentrop had to rely upon the accuracy of these informations without having the right and the duty of checking on them. In that way he, too, became convinced that in order to avert a deathly danger-namely an allied thrust into the Ruhr district-preventive countermeasures were necessary. On the basis of these considerations Luxemburg simply could not be spared because of the extensiveness of modern military operations.

In connection with this procedure the prosecution accuses, among others, the German Foreign Policy and thereby Herr von Ribbentrop to have made plans to march in, in contradiction to the 5th Hague Convention concerning the rights and duties of

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neutral powers and persons in case of war on land. (Convention concernant les droits et les devoirs des puissances et des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur terre.)

In this connection it was overlooked by the prosecution that this convention does not have reference to drawing a neutral into a war between other powers, but deals only with the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents as long as the neutrality status exists. The prosecution has made the mistake to apply its erroneous interpretation of the Kellogg Pact, as I have shown, to the pact which had been made 20 years earlier. There remains no doubt that, at the time of the 2d Hague peace conference, the law did not evaluate the outbreak of war as a legal but only as an historical fact. All conventions concerning laws of war, especially the Rules of Land Warfare and the Neutrality pact for Land and Sea Warfare, are built upon the basis of an existing state of war, hence do not regulate the jus ad bellum, but the jus in bello.

This fact disposes of the prosecution's references to the 5th Convention of the Hague in all cases of the spreading of the war to the neutrals which have ratified this convention.

It is, moreover, quite doubtful whether the Locarno Treaty can be mentioned, as it was done by the prosecution in connection with drawing Belgium into the war. With Germany's renunciation in 1935 the Locarno system had collapsed, as will be shown by the defense counsel of Freiherr v. Neurath. All attempts to effect a new union which was to take its place were guided by the fact that the actual situation created by Germany must be taken as the starting point for a new agreement. This may be seen especially from the British and French plans for the intended new agreement. The attempt to create a new agreement was not successful. However, the thorough and long drawn out negotiations show very distinctly that none of the signatories considered the treaties of Locarno valid any longer. On the contrary the Western Powers proceeded to consider among themselves the effects which their obligations of guaranteeing the Western borders still held after Germany's withdrawal.

Regardless of how one may judge Germany's attitude of 1935, it remains to be stated that with it the pact system had lost its validity. Hence in 1940 German commitments to the Western Pact of 1925 did no longer exist.

I shall, on a later occasion, discuss the arbitration conventions with Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in connection with the Locarno Treaty when discussing in general Germany's obligation for a peaceful settlement of disputes. As far as Luxemburg is

concerned, not even the prosecution referred to the neutralization of this country. Evidently it went on the assumption that Germany had been forced by the Treaty of Versailles to give up its rights given to her by the London agreement of 1867.

Jugoslavia

When, on 24 March 1941, the Jugoslav Government joined the Tripartite Pact, Herr v. Ribbentrop could not in the light of the available news assume that, a few days after the joining, a military intervention by Germany on the Balkans would be necessary for political reasons. This situation was caused by the forcible change of government in Belgrade. The reaction to the joining of the Tripartite Pact by the government Stojadinowitsch resulted in a new political change in Jugoslavia under the leadership of Simovitch which aimed at a close cooperation with the Western Powers counter to the idea of the Tripartite Pact.

In view of this uncertain situation in the interior of Jugoslavia which, because of the mobilization of the Jugoslav army and their deployment on the German frontier, became a danger for the Reich, Hitler suddenly decided on military operations on the Balkans. He made this decision without the knowledge of Herr v. Ribbentrop, with the idea in mind to eliminate an imminent grave danger for the Italian ally.

The testimony of the witness Colonel-General Jodl has shown beyond a doubt that Herr v. Ribbentrop, after Hitler's decision and after the Simovitch Putsch, seriously endeavored to be allowed to exhaust all diplomatic possibilities prior to the beginning of military operations. Colonel-General Jodl has confirmed there that H.v.Ribbentrop's endeavors were rejected in so rude a manner that, taking into consideration Hitler's nature and the prevailing methods, any influence on Hitler was practically out of question.

The fact that since March 4, 1941, strong British forces were pushing to the North from southern Greece made a further localization on the Italian-Greek conflict impossible. This war had begun in the autumn of 1940 against German wishes, but Hitler could, with a view to the general situation, certainly not tolerate the imminent defeat of his Italian ally.

When H.v.Ribbentrop on August 23, 1939, signed at Moscow the treaties between Germany and the Soviet Union, including a secret agreement concerning the Division of Poland and the surrender to Russia of the Baltic states, the ideological discussions, in part, of an extraordinarily vehement nature between National Socialism and Bolshevism were, for the time being, eliminated

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