Does he not realize there that innocent people are affected by these raids? He still says that they must use all means available against the partisans. A. It is unavoidable in any kind of war and, of course, in a war against bands of partisans, that from time to time, innocent bystanders are affected. Q. I want now to read to you a letter, which was addressed by Ambassador Rahn to all the officers of the Propaganda Section of every Regiment on the Italian front, during the month of December 1944; and ask you if you did not, as Commander-in-Chief of the Police in Italy, receive a copy of this letter and what action or what comment did you make thereon? A. May I ask this question? Are you speaking about the National Socialist Party representatives in the regiments? Q. I am speaking of a letter, which was addressed by Ambassador Rahn to all the officers of the propaganda section of every regiment on the Italian front. A. May I ask you to tell me what the contents of this letter is? Q. Yes; I am going to read it to you now.* "I am perfectly conscious of the sentiment of violent aversion nourished by the German soldiers against the Italians, including those Italians who, for one reason or another, continue to fight on our side. This negative attitude damages our war effort. It is an emotional impulse, which must be better hidden. I shall thereby be very grateful to the officers, to whom this letter is addressed, if they would pay more attention to this and if they would see to the attitude of their men. It is necessary to organize some lectures in which it is explained what benefits Germany has received from the false political reconstruction of Fascist Italy. They must be reminded that the first objective is to mobilize all the strength and productive potentialities of the part of Italy occupied by us in order to lighten German needs. Everything in occupied Italy must be exploited by us for our war effort. This is our opportunity, for we can avail ourselves of the advantage of the concentrated hate that almost all Italians have for their Republican Fascist Government. By using our intelligence we can turn this hate to our favor. "During the first months after 8 September '44, the German armed forces succeeded in representing the only legal authority in occupied Italy; therefore, many Italians turned to us in their difficulties. This political good luck has facilitated our work but lately our position, among other things also the Italians; has become worse owing to the acts of violence and reprisals committed by our soldiers against the civilian population. Field Marshall Kesselring's order, dated the 2d of August, 1944, specifies clearly that the indiscriminate reprisals against the civilian population, *Document referred to did not form part of prosecution case as finally prepared and hence is not published in this series. rather than against the patriots, diminishes the trust of the population in the German armed forces, and furnishes excellent propaganda for the enemy. These acts on the part of the German troops, even if justifiable, must diminish. It is very urgent to change our behaviour, not for humanitarian considerations, but in cold calculation that this is the best way to take care of the interests of the German war effort in Italy. "Therefore, the German soldiers' attitude toward the Italian population is decidedly important. Whether we hate the Italians or not is of no importance. The important thing is that we must obtain from Italy everything possible for our war effort. After five years of war, we cannot give ourselves to the luxury of spoiling favorable situations, just to satisfy our emotions. Our sentiments must be held in check, at least for the moment. It is better to satisfy our hate and aversion at the right moment, taking into account particular circumstances of military nature. We must pretend the greatest friendship possible and act without mercy once it is no longer necessary to hide our real sentiments." A. I do not remember this letter. Q. Do you know if these were the true sentiments of Ambassador Rahn in December of 1944? A. I can't answer this question with just yes or no. It is necessary for me to describe Rahn in order to clarify this matter. Q. Go ahead. A. Rahn is a career diplomat and one of the new brand, very gifted with a lot of ideas and imagination. He takes great delight occasionally in reaching his objectives with the help of Jesuitic means. I have observed on many occasions that whenever he wanted to get Hitler, or the Army chiefs, or Mussolini, or Ribbentrop, or anybody else to agree to a certain measure, he would deliberately represent himself as worse than he was. He would assume the position of a Jesuit, whose only consideration is the goal, and who does not care what means are used. The Colonel asked me whether I knew whether this was Rahn's opinion. As the Political Plenipotentiary of the Great German Reich, Rahn was in those days the recipient of a great many complaints from the Duce and other Italian dignitaries about excesses and incidents. For that reason he felt that he had to do something about the education of our troops in this respect. I know that considerable difficulties resulted for Rahn in his dealings with the Duce and the Italian Government from the existing mutual dislike of the Germans for the Italians and of the Italians for the Germans. As Rahn considered himself responsible for making the best of war production in Italy, he thought that he had to consider that matter in connection with this task of his. I would like to mention that whenever Rahn felt that he had to use one of these immoral Jesuitic tricks, he would say to himself: "I have to act as the advocatus diaboli-the devil's advocate." Q. Do you remember on July the 10th 1944 that you received an order from Dr. Lokotsch, who was Oberstrichter, and which read as follows:* "The Fuehrer has ordered that with immediate effect, no further proceedings will be taken by military courts against the civilian population in occupied countries on account of acts of terrorism and sabotage against the German occupational forces. Accordingly, no cases already under consideration will be brought to trial. New orders for troops and courts will follow. The judge is to be informed that any necessary order should be issued to subordinate units." A. No; at that time I was not the Plenipotentiary General so that I would not have been on the distribution list of this order. Q. On January the 12th, 1945, what position did Tensfeld hold in your command? A. He was the SS and Police Chief in Upper Italy, in the Western part of Upper Italy. His territory included the provinces of Lombardy, Liguria, and Piedmont. In other words, it included the triangle Milan, Torin, and Genoa. Q. Would a copy of the orders that were issued by Tensfeld be sent to your headquarters, as a part of his normal distribution? A. No; unless it was something of prime importance and meant a fundamental decision, in which case I, as the Supreme SS and Police Fuehrer, had to be informed; otherwise, he took his decisions and issued his orders independently. Q. SS Brigadefuehrer Tensfeld on the 12th of January 1945 issued an order, and paragraph 9 of that order reads as follows, with the heading of "Tribunals of Security Commanders":" "I have reason again to draw your attention to the following: "Any execution through shooting of persons as a reprisal, must be preceded by a judgment of a tribunal, which has been formed by order of the local Security Commander. I don't think it is necessary to emphasize that only such persons will be picked, who at any rate, would have lost their lives according to battle rulings. The persons will best be picked by the local Police Commander in collaboration with the Security Police. It is in such a way that the outside appearance of a lawful condemnation is being kept up. The population will be notified by posters that the execution has taken place as a reprisal. It has to be said that the respective people have been condemned to death." *Document referred to did not form part of prosecution case as finally prepared and hence is not published in this series. Did you ever receive a copy of the order containing this paragraph; and if you did, what was the meaning of it? A. No. Q. You know that the Security Police ordered the formation of all the local courts, don't you? A. Yes. Q. And that all persons who were captured as commandos, or as partisans, were to be turned over to the Security Police, weren't they? A. Yes. Q. Do you know the action that the Security Police took in connection with all commandos that were captured? A. Yes. Q. What was that action? A. Each case was investigated thoroughly and wherever any guilt could be proven, the case would be submitted to an SS and Police Court, or to a military tribunal. Q. You are now talking about commandos. Was that the action that was required concerning them? A. This procedure applied to everybody. Q. I show you an order from the OKW, dated the 18th of October 1942 and ask you if you ever saw that order, and if you did not operate under the authority contained therein in Italy, in 1944? A. No. In 1942* I had not been in Italy and in any case, we never had an occasion in Italy to comply with such an order. Q. I will ask you in that connection if you ever heard of 13 American soldiers, 11 enlisted men and two officers, being executed under the direct authority contained in this order in Italy, which execution took place in the year of 1944 and was ordered and carried out by General Dostler?** A. I hadn't heard about it at the time when it happened. I was informed of it while I was a prisoner. Q. Do you know under what authority General Dostler alleged that he executed those thirteen American commandos in 1944, near La Spezia, Italy? A. He claimed to have consulted the army group, through the army, and I believe the question was passed on to the OKW and eventually the execution took place on the basis of this order of the 18th of October 1942. *See document 498-PS, vol. III, p. 416. A |