f

B

rule the ruins around us were created, to a new code of world law, which takes shape but is as yet not morally and effectively consolidated. To judge and punish the acts which were committed by the former Foreign Minister Herr von Ribbentrop, his share in the happenings, the limits of his capability, and his own personal guilt is a difficult task, taxing human endurance almost beyond strength in this period of transgressions and development.

2. FINAL PLEA by Joachim von Ribbentrop

This trial is to serve the research of historical truth. As far as the point of view of German politics is concerned, I can say the following:

This trial will go down in history as a model example, relying upon legal formulae which up to now have not been known, to show how in all fairness one can circumvent the most pressing problem of twenty five years of human history and of our history, the Treaty of Versailles. Was it really expedient, then, to inhibit the conflict about an agreement which even those who had insight among the signers counted on to bring about evil? The wisest time already predicted from which of the faults of Versailles a new world war would arise.

More than twenty years of my life I devoted to the elimination of this evil, with the result that foreign statesmen who knew about this today write down in their affidavits that they had not believed me. They should have written that in the interests of their countries they could not believe me. I am held responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, a foreign policy which was determined by another. I knew only this much of it, that it never concerned itself with plans of a world domination, but rather with the doing away with of the consequences of Versailles and with the food problems of the German people.

If I dispute the fact that this German foreign policy planned and prepared for a war of aggression, that is not an excuse on my part. This truth is proved by the strength that we showed in the. course of the Second World War and how weak we were at the beginning of that war.

History will believe us when I say that we would have prepared a war of aggression much, much better even if we did not intend to carry it through. What we intended was to take note our most elementary conditions of life, in the same way that England noted her own interests in that she made one-fifth of the world subordinate to her, and in the same way that the United States and Russia brought the largest continents of the world under their hegemony. The only difference between the policies of these countries as com

pared with us that parcels of land such as Danzig and the Corridor were demanded of us against our rights, whereas the other powers are accustomed to thinking only in terms of continents.

Before the establishment of the Charter of this Tribunal, even the signatory powers of the London Agreement must have had different opinions about international law and politics from those held by them today. When I went to Marshal Stalin in Moscow in 1939, he did not discuss with me the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict in the background of the Kellogg-Briand Pact; but rather he let me see that if in addition to half of Poland and the Baltic countries and Lithuania he did not receive the harbor of Lithuania, I might as well return back. The conduct of war in 1939 was not considered an international crime against peace. Otherwise I could not quite explain Stalin's telegram at the end of the Polish campaign. This reads, "The friendship of Germany and the Soviet Union is based on blood which has been shed commonly, and has all prospects of being enduring and steadfast".

I should like to emphasize that even I at the time ardently wanted their friendship. Today the nuclear problem remains for Europe and Asia; who will dominate Europe and Asia, or will the influence of Russia on the Elbe, in the Adriatic or at the Dardanelles be held back.

I shall state that Great Britain and the United States today face this same dilemma as Germany faced at the time when the negotiations were being carried out by me with Russia. I hope with all my heart for my country that they will be more successful in their result.

Just what has been proved in this trial about the criminal character of German foreign policy? Out of more than 300 Defense documents, more than 150 have been turned down without cogent reasons. But the archives of the enemy and the German were inaccessible to the Defense.

Churchill's friendly hint to me that if Germany were to be too strong it would be destroyed will be declared irrelevant in order to judge the motives of the German foreign policy. The revolution cannot be understood the more if it is to be considered from the point of view of a conspiracy.

Fate made me one of the exponents of that revolution. I mourn these awful crimes which are soiling this revolution. But I cannot measure all of them according to puritanical norms, and all the less for I have seen that even the enemy even though after total victory, neither could prevent nor wanted to prevent atrocities.

With regard to the sphere of the soldier I should like to make some fundamental statements.

There have been repeated references here to the concepts of soldierly conduct, obedience, loyalty, performance of duty and patriotism. It is my belief that all men recognize these concepts to be good. But is it permissible to say that not all of these concepts are unequivocal. Thus are confronted:

"Best soldierly conduct" and "militarism",

"natural obedience" and "despicably blind obedience",

"the categoric imperative of the performance of duty" and "the exaggerated sense of responsibility",

"the deep love for the country" and "chauvinism".

We see that all these concepts can run through the scale of good and evil. The origin and the essence of these concepts is everywhere the same, but the form they take on through tradition and education, and thus the effects they have, vary greatly.

However, if this is the case, who then should differentiate and decide whether the feeling is still in the realm of good or has already reached the sphere of evil?

We are all of us living in a world whose century old striving has aimed at the creation of order. Order is certainly a relative concept, too, but it is everywhere the establishment of the relationship of human beings to each other which guarantees the best possible means of living peacefully side by side in view of the intrinsic character of each country.

This holds true both for the state and for the relationship between nations.

Who should determine in this order what is right and what is wrong? The criterion for this might be, according to hitherto acquired knowledge, only a constitutional, i.e. a national one. The drawing closer of the nations in world traffic and general civilization brought with them the result that the various national concepts became adjusted to each other in spite of many differences. It must be admitted that this process of adjustment suffered a harmful set-back through certain National-Socialist doctrines and their methods. Nevertheless, the principle remains inviolable that the criterion of right or wrong must be a national one if order is not to be dissolved. The only thing worth striving for is the adjustment of nations and national fundamental concepts to each other as is now being attempted through world organization.05

If the national criterion, i.e. the national judgment of good and bad, right and wrong, was well-established in any case up to now, the concepts were never deprived of their relativity, especially when national differences existed for other reasons. A con

vincing example of this is the opinion expressed about the resistance movement.

All countries celebrate what is considered to be the highest form of patriotism when someone risks his life for his country. and exposes himself to the greatest danger. According to the Hague Rules of Land Warfare it is a fact that such a resistance movement is forbidden. We have here a clear example of the contrast between ethical and legal evaluation. This proves that there are no absolute concepts of good and bad, or right and wrong, and that above all written law there are unwritten laws which aquit the wrong doer because he obeyed higher laws. These higher laws, however, also depend on subjective and national-i.e. collectively subjective considerations. If men believe something to be good or right this faith may come into existence out of an actually higher law, a truly, higher idea, but it may also grow out of a misled faith, out of a false idea. Who wishes to or who is able to judge whether a faith or an idea was or was not right? History has proven that usually the successful idea is recognized as right, to a certain extent because it is the judgment of God. I do not wish to decide whether that is always true. The question here, however, is whether the people whose guilt is to be judged, acted in good faith, in accordance with such an idea and such a faith. If divine judgment has shown this faith to be wrong the question remains open whether it was for comprehensible or explainable reasons that people could believe the idea to be good.

This question constitutes the problem which concerns not only defendant Keitel but also the entire German nation. According to the speech of the French prosecution not only the defendants in this trial are the really guilty ones but the entire German nation.

The extent and importance of this thesis are tremendous. Should the Tribunal-if only in the grounds for its decision-come to the conclusion that the entire German nation is guilty, every German for incalculable time will bear the brand of Cain which finally must lead to the destruction of this people, and its dissolution.

It has been stated most authoritatively that there is no intention here of accusing the entire German people. Through unconditional surrender we are left entirely to the mercy of the victorious powers. It was said however, that the verdict of this Tribunal is to be just. Here in this court it is not clemency or inclemency which are to be the guiding principle, but justice. Justice does not mean mildness. A verdict, however, will only be just if it takes into consideration all the circumstances which underlie the actions and conduct of the defendants. There is no excuse for