knew and which had to be straightened out by an appropriate attitude on the part of England.

That Goering's aim was not to separate England from Poland has been clearly proven by the fact that Goering, to begin with, had transmitted to the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, the text of the note which contained the proposition made by Germany to Poland-propositions which were called moderate by Henderson-and that, hereby, he tried to come to direct negotiations with Poland. Poland, however, obviously did not want an agreement with Germany. Several circumstances point to that.

a. The conflict with Poland existed for almost one year. Why did Poland not ask for a decision by a court of arbitration on the basis of the concluded arbitration agreement? Why did Poland not appeal to the League of Nations? Obviously Poland did not want any arbitration regarding Danzig and the corridor.

b. The utterance of the Polish Ambassador Lipski to the Counsellor to the Legation Forbes, which was stated by the witness Dahlerus is even more proof for the unwillingness of Poland to come to an understanding. Lipski said he was not interested in any note or proposition by Germany; he was convinced that, in the event of a war, there would soon be a revolt in Germany and the Polish Army would march in triumph to Berlin.

This intransigent and incomprehensible attitude of Poland obviously finds its explanation in the fact that she felt too strong and secure by England's assurance.

The reference to the imminent revolt makes one believe that Poland was informed of the plans of the Canaris group to bring about a revolt. There can therefore be no question of an ambiguous attitude or false play on the part of Goering.

The serious will of the defendant Goering to maintain peace and to restore good relations with England is expressly recognized by Ambassador Henderson, who due to his thorough knowledge of the German conditions and his connections with the leading men of Germany had the right opinion also of Goering. I refer here to his book "Failure of a Mission", in which on page 83 it says verbally: "I would like to express here my belief that the Field Marshal, if it had depended on him, would not have gambled on war as Hitler did in 1939. As will be related in due course, he came down decisively on the side of peace in September 1938."

Lord Halifax also, according to the information he gave, had no doubts that Goering's efforts for the prevention of war were sincere.

That after the outbreak of the war, which he had wanted to prevent with all the means at his disposal, but had been unable to

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practical policy resulted from the requirements of the living development.

Economic Warfare

The defendant is accused of having ruthlessly plundered the territories occupied by Germany and thus to have violated the Hague convention concerning land warfare. This accusation is not justified.

During his examination, the defendant Goering has explained in detail with absolutely noteworthy reasons that the Hague conventions on land warfare from the years 1899 and 1907 respectively cannot be made to apply to a modern war since they had become obsolete and insufficient in some respects at the beginning of World War II. At the time when they were worked out, aerial warfare, economic warfare, and psychological warfare were still unknown. Total war, which put the entire people and the entire national economy without exception at the service of the war, was also not known. Especially, economic warfare was not considered at all. Because of this gap, there is no international law which has been generally recognized for economic warfare. Therefore, the old statement of Hugo Grotius applies to economic warfare that everything is permitted in war "quod ad finem belli necessarium est". Naturally, this principle only applies so far as it has not been affected specifically by a differing settlement through treaties.

The following is to be said for the legal situation as it stands: Until the beginning of World War I, it was generally acknowledged in international law-in any case as far as land warfare is concerned that the war does not affect any private legal relations between the citizens of the belligerent states, that private property on principle was inviolable, that the war would only be pursued with arms, and that the enemy civilian population would not be affected by it. This method of warfare suffered a basic change at the outbreak of World War I, when England, in the field of naval warfare, applied her interpretation of war of people against people. At that time, the enemy powers went over to the course to paralyze the entire German national strength, disregarding all established rules of the law of naval warfare and of neutrality law, by cutting off the necessary raw materials and import of food. This new type of warfare corresponded to the Anglo-Saxon interpretation which was joined by France at the beginning of World War I, that war is not only fought against the fighting troops, but against the entire population of the enemy. The citizen of the enemy state is the enemy of England, his property is enemy property which is subject to seizure by the British Government.

With this, naval warfare was not only directed against the

combat forces, but also against the peaceful subjects of the belligerent enemy.

This goal was achieved by the total blockade carried out by England. The Hague convention did not contemplate a total blockade in the form in which it was carried out by England. This blockade made any supplying of Germany through neutral countries impossible.

This economic warfare which has also been applied to Germany during World War II in the same manner by the enemy states is not a legal method of warfare; it involves a violation of established international law.

Under these circumstances, Germany cannot be blamed for applying the method used by England with means of her naval power for the warfare on land accordingly.

This fact leads to the following consideration: The rules of land warfare (LKO) applies according to its sense to land warfare. There the principle of protection of private property dominates. In naval warfare, however, private property is unprotected. It is therefore possible that the rules of land warfare (LKO) with their restrictions apply also to a combined sea and land war? Would it be just that goods are taken away from one at sea while he would not be allowed to touch the same goods from the one taking the goods on land?

According to established international law, the principle exists now as before that private property is actually inviolable during war. This principle only suffers exceptions insofar as the Hague convention of land warfare permits certain encroachments on private property-I point out here articles 23g, 52 and 53, paragraph 2—and insofar as encroachments may also have been caused by a state of emergency in which the state may find itself which then would be justified to the extent in which they appear necessary in the interest of self-preservation of the state. In this scope therefore, actions are also permitted during war which would otherwise not comply with the laws of war, and would thus be contrary to international law.

By the fact that enemy warfare disregarded the established rules of naval warfare, Germany was driven into a state of economic emergency.

If the enemy powers would have observed this established law of naval warfare, then Germany could have supplied herself through neutral countries. Therefore the state of economic emergency during the war would not have occurred if the blockade of Germany would not have been carried out by means contrary to international law. As the enemy powers did not however observe

the established blockade regulations, they cannot expect then for Germany to observe the regulations on requisitioning which form part of the rules of land warfare (LKO).

Thus, wherever the life interests of a state are threatened in this manner, there prevails a national state of emergency which has the legal effect that the state does not act illegally when committing a violation of international law which is necessary for the repelling of imminent danger.

The economic situation of Germany was extremely threatening during the course of World War II by the action of the enemy powers. Any connection with neutral countries was made impossible for Germany by the total blockade, since a sufficient supply of raw materials necessary for the conduct of the war, and of food for the feeding of the civilian population, was made impossible. Germany also had to take care of the food supply of the enemy civilian population in the occupied territories. Germany was therefore forced for the sake of supporting her own economy, which would otherwise have collapsed, to use the stocks of raw materials and food available in the occupied territories, and all other items necessary for the continuation of the war for herself, whereby the interests of the population in the occupied territories were given due consideration. In this, the principles, established in the preamble to the convention concerning the rules and customs of land warfare, dated 18 October 1907, as they result from the customs existing among civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and from the demands of public conscience, were strictly observed. A resignation of the right to use these sources of assistance in the occupied territories would have meant the abandonment of the independence and existence of the state, it would have meant unconditional submission. An emergency which necessarily leads to submission during war is the highest and most genuine emergency in the life of a nation.

By referring to the state of emergency, however, only such actions are covered which are necessary for the alleviation of danger which could not be repelled otherwise. The limitations naturally fluctuate, and the establishment, whether a genuine emergency act is concerned, cannot be easily made in individual cases. Here the Tribunal will have to consider in favor of the defendants the special circumstances and the conditions which were partly hard to view during the time of war.

It has not been proven that the limitations have remained unobserved by the defendant intentionally or carelessly.

It must be left to the examination of the Tribunal whether the defendant personally can be responsible for a violation, possibly