totality, but in part, the conclusions of the international intelligence community, so we leave open that option.

But let's go back to your other statement that you feel that perhaps as much as 85 percent of the work of the ISG has been completed. Am I correct in that?

Dr. KAY. I've said I think 85 percent of the major elements of the Iraqi program are probably known. That's not 85 percent of the total volume.

Chairman WARNER. But in our discussions you've emphasized that 15 percent yet to be done could yield productive evidence that's just as important to what you've accumulated or not accumulated to date.

Dr. KAY. Senator Warner, that's certainly true, particularly with regard to the foreign countries and individuals that assisted that program, which remain a continuing threat in other countries unless we know fully who they were and what they contributed.

Chairman WARNER. Clearly that at the outbreak of the war or prior thereto and during the war, an awful lot of destruction of documents took place and perhaps other tangible evidence. Today the persons who were most likely involved in weapons programs, most likely to have the knowledge, are refusing to talk. Does that not lend itself to an assumption that there had to be something there, otherwise they wouldn't have gone about, so methodically destroying all the records and refusing to talk?

Dr. KAY. You're absolutely-I think, and I think I've said, but let me be absolutely clear about it, Iraq was in clear and material violation of Resolution 1441. They maintained programs and activities and certainly they had the intentions at a point to resume their programs, so there was a lot they wanted to hide because it showed what they were doing that was illegal. I hope we find even more evidence of that.

Chairman WARNER. Part of that program was missiles clearly, clearly in defiance of the U.N. resolution in terms of range. They had the potential to incorporate in those warheads, although small quantities, nevertheless very lethal types of WMD. Am I not correct in that?

Dr. KAY. You're absolutely correct.

Chairman WARNER. Could you say that the work thus far of the ISG, and I recounted a number of things including the ricin and so forth in my opening statement, does not that lend itself to the understanding, the conclusion that Saddam Hussein and this military machine under his control posed an imminent threat, perhaps to the neighbors, perhaps to those beyond the perimeter of the neighbors?

Dr. KAY. Senator Warner, I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam Hussein. I have said I actually think this may be one of those cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought. I think when we have the complete record, you're going to discover that after 1998 it became a regime that was totally corrupt, individuals were out for their own protection, and in a world where we know others are seeking WMD, the likelihood at some point in the future of a seller and a buyer meeting up would have made that a far more dangerous

country than even we anticipated with what may turn out not to be a fully accurate estimate.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Dr. Kay.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Dr. Kay, on the question of stockpiles, you have stated, I believe, that in your opinion, Iraq did not have large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in 2002. Is that correct?

Dr. KAY. That's correct, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Do you have any evidence that they had any stockpiles, large or small, in 2002?

Dr. KAY. I simply have no evidence, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. You've not uncovered any evidence of small stockpiles?

Dr. KAY. We have not uncovered any small stockpiles, that's correct.

Senator LEVIN. Have you uncovered any evidence that they had small stockpiles in 2002?

Dr. KAY. We have evidence that they certainly could have produced small amounts, but we've not discovered evidence of the stockpiles.

Senator LEVIN. On the question of the vans, according to the New York Times on January 26, you indicated that there's a consensus in the Intelligence Community that the trailers that we found were intended to produce hydrogen for weather balloons or possibly rocket fuel, but not for producing biological warfare agents. Was that an accurate report of your position?

Dr. KAY. That's probably not my exact words, but roughly accurate. I think the consensus opinion is that when you look at those two trailers, while they had capabilities in many areas, their actual intended use was not for the production of biological weapons.

Senator LEVIN. Now, on January 22, just a week ago, Vice President Cheney said that we know, for example, that prior to our going in, he had spent time and effort acquiring mobile biological weapons labs and were quite confident he did, in fact, have such a program. We found a couple of semi-trailers at this point which we believe were in fact part of that program and I would deem that "conclusive evidence, if you will, that he did, in fact, have programs for weapons of mass destruction."

Now, those vans, according to the Vice President, 1 week ago are conclusive evidence that he had weapons, and yet you're saying that the consensus in the Intelligence Community is that those vans were for some non-weapons-related purpose, they were either for weather balloons, hydrogen, or rocket fuel, but not for weapons of mass destruction.

Do you know what intelligence Vice President Cheney is relying on when he tells the public a week ago, not before the war, everyone would-they were all wrong before the war-but now, a week ago still staying that those vans are conclusive evidence that there was a biological weapons program. My question: Do you know what intelligence Vice President Cheney was relying on 1 week ago when he made that statement to the American public?

Dr. KAY. Senator Levin, if you want the short answer, and the obvious answer, as you probably know, is, am I aware of what the Vice President was reading a week ago, I'm not.

Senator LEVIN. Have you seen intelligence which would support that conclusion?

Dr. KAY. Yes, I have. In fact, if you had asked me, as I think in fact you did, or members of Senator Roberts' Select Intelligence Committee certainly did in July and August, this has been a source of real struggle with regard to those vans. There was a point during the process when I would have said the consensus opinion is that they were for biological weapons. It's been an ongoing struggle to understand those two vans and it's been a shifting target in that regard.

Senator LEVIN. Now I understand that shifting target thing. I'm talking about right now. You've said that the consensus in the Intelligence Community is that those vans are not related. Is that a correct statement which you just gave here this morning? Is that the consensus opinion in the Intelligence Community now?

Dr. KAY. It is my view of the consensus opinion, but there are, no doubt given the nature of opinions, people out there who hold a different opinion.

Senator LEVIN. All right. But in your judgment, the consensus in the Intelligence Community now is that those are not biological weapons vans?

Dr. KAY. That is my personal judgment. Others may well hold a different one.

Senator LEVIN. All right. I think it's critically important that we find out the basis of the Vice President's statement. I'm saying this to our chairman, not to you, that we find out the basis of the Vice President's statement, because this is where intelligence becomes so important. If there's intelligence out there that still supports the conclusion with certainty, he deems this conclusive evidence that he had programs for weapons of mass destruction. This is a week ago.

Now, we have to find out what the basis, it seems to me, of that statement is. This is the Vice President's statement. I would ask the chairman that we ask the Vice President for the basis of that. statement which he made publicly just about a week ago.

Senator ROBERTS. Would the Senator yield on that point?

Senator LEVIN. I'd like to first, if I could, just ask our chairman whether or not we could ask the Vice President for the basis of that statement that was made a week ago?

Senator ROBERTS. I think I have an answer for you if you'd yield. Senator LEVIN. I'd like to hear it frankly from the Vice President in writing.

Chairman WARNER. We have to continue here, colleagues. I'm going to ask the indulgence of the committee while the chair requests that the committee act on the following list of military nominations. A quorum now being present, I ask the committee consider a list of 4,763 pending military nominations. The nominations have been before the committee the required length of time and no objection has been raised regarding them.

Is there a motion to favorably report the 4,763 nominations to the Senate?

Senator LEVIN. Support.

Chairman WARNER. Second? All in favor, say aye.
(A chorus of ayes.)
Opposed?

(No response.)

Motion carried.

Senator LEVIN. My final question, Dr. Kay, subject to the chair perhaps commenting on my request is this: Is it your judgment that the aluminum tubes that Iraq was trying to acquire were intended or used for a centrifuge program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons? Is that your view?

Dr. KAY. Senator Levin, this is an area which falls into what Senator Warner referred to, where I think it's important that the investigation continue. It is my judgment based on the evidence that was collected, but there clearly can be more, that it's more than probable that those tubes were intended for us in a conventional missile program rather than in a centrifuge program, but it's an open question that's still being investigated.

Senator LEVIN. All right. But that is your judgment that they were not related to uranium enrichment?

Dr. KAY. That is my personal judgment that they probably were not, based on evidence, but there's still more evidence possible to gain.

Senator LEVIN. One short final question, my second final question: In your judgment, had Iraq reconstituted its nuclear weapon program in the way you understand the word reconstitute?

Dr. KAY. It was in the early stages of renovating the program, building new buildings. It was not a reconstituted, full-blown nuclear program.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, I will take under consideration your request. I think Senator Roberts, when it becomes his turn, may have a statement that's relevant to it.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Kay, for your service to our country for many years. We're very proud to have people like you who are willing to serve the country.

Dr. Kay, you find yourself today in a very highly charged political environment, and you are by nature a scientist and not one who's familiar with these kinds of passions around an election year. I think it's important to establish your belief and that of the overwhelming body of the intelligence and the Intelligence Community, both here, overseas, and in the Clinton administration, the following facts. Saddam Hussein developed and used weapons of mass destruction. True?

Dr. KAY. Absolutely.

Senator MCCAIN. He used them against the Iranians and the Kurds? Just yes or no?

Dr. KAY. Oh, yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Okay. You and inspectors found enormous quantities of banned chemical and biological weapons in Iraq in the 1990s?

Dr. KAY. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. We know that Saddam Hussein had once a very active nuclear program?

Dr. KAY. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. He realized and had ambitions to develop and use weapons of mass destruction?

Dr. KAY. Clearly.

Senator MCCAIN. So the point is, if he were in power today, there is no doubt that he would harbor ambitions for the development and use of weapons of mass destruction. Is there any doubt in your mind?

Dr. KAY. There's absolutely no doubt, and I think I've said that, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Good. But it's important to emphasize this point when we look at what has obviously been an intelligence fail

ure.

Dr. KAY. I agree.

Senator MCCAIN. When you answered a question from Reuters, what happened to the stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons that everyone expected to be there, your answer was simple: "I don't think they existed."

So what needs to be established here is that when we -at least I hope is your-I believe is your view and certainly mine, that, as you just stated, America, the world, and Iraq is a far better and safer place with Saddam Hussein gone from power, and the sacrifice made by American citizens and that are serving and sacrificing today was not only worth it, but very important to the future of the Middle East and the world. Do you share that?

Dr. KAY. That's certainly true, Senator. I've probably learned not to speak to wire reporters and even to watch out for Senators who want one-word answers. It tends to compress.complex issues.

Senator MCCAIN. But you agree with the fundamental principle here that what we did was justified and enhanced the security of the United States and the world by removing Saddam Hussein from power?

Dr. KAY. Absolutely.

Senator MCCAIN. Okay. That's important to establish because now in this political season, those are attempted to be mixed, that because we didn't find the weapons of mass destruction, therefore, the conflict was not justified. That's why I think it's important to establish those salient facts.

But obviously we were wrong, as you said. Now why were we wrong?

Dr. KAY. Senator, I wouldn't pretend that I know all the answers or even know all the questions to get at that. I am convinced that that is the important forefront of the inquiry that quite frankly you must undertake. I have hypotheses of where I think things generically have occurred. I think we became almost addicted to the incredible amount of effort that United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and U.N. inspectors could produce on the scene and that flow of information

Senator MCCAIN. Including intelligence gained by the previous administration?

Dr. KAY. That's correct. Did not develop our own human intelligence (HUMINT) sources there. Now, this really goes back, quite