personally talked to displayed a determination quite equal to that found in Germany, and much fiercer and more vivid in expression; yet this talk is not strident, loud, or boastful, but instead tense, quiet and desperate. It is reasonably safe to say that at the very least the French are an absolute unit in their resolve to drive the Germans from French territory, take back the lost provinces and secure, for France, a permanent peace, and that to these ends pauper and millionaire are as one man, ready to sacrifice fortune and life.

Also, it should be said upon the issue of supporting the war, political parties have merged into one, although on other questions there still are, it was said, party divisions. In the early part of March, 1915, the government was attacked in the Chamber of Deputies because Paris was kept under martial law. Such nagging as this promises to be not infrequent; but it does not mean that there is any division in prosecuting the war. While the form of parliamentary government is observed, yet at bottom France, one was informed, is under a military dictatorship. "What Joffre says goes," was the statement of one of the most competent and dependable Americans whose home is in France. It appears that the commander-in-chief indicates what is necessary; the government takes measures accordingly; and parliament sustains the government.

It is among the higher classes, however, that the French spirit burns brightest and with purest flame. Within the intellectual circles especially does this patriotic fire blaze in its noblest radiance. It is quite impossible to overstate the exalted ardor of these French men and women. If their heart and soul are those of

the whole French people; if the bon bourgeois feels as deeply as the descendant of the old nobility; if in the peasant's mind there is the militant resolve which dwells in the mind of the French scholar; if the emotion of working man and tradesman is as deep and simple as that of the French philosopher and thinker, then indeed is France embattled for a war to the uttermost. Certain it is that for the immediate object of expelling the invader from French soil, the valor of the rank and file of the French troops has written an immortal record.

month of the war. They present what may be called

the statesmen's view as to the basic cause of the conflict; and also what should be termed the popular opinion of the source of the struggle.* The same method was followed as in the talks with representatives of

*The first of these opinions was that the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe was necessary to the self-respecting dignity, importance and even safety of the various continental nations which are known to the world as first Powers. This, declared French statesmen, was being disturbed by the growing strength of Germany united with what the French call her aggressiveness. It was to maintain, said French statesmen, this principle that the English-French-Russian arrangement called the Triple Entente was made.

The popular view, held also by the intellectual circles, was that Germany had designs upon the territorial integrity of France. Germany said these Frenchmen, who voiced this view, had intended for a long time to seize portions of French territory. What the French asserted to be Germany's arrogant and even militant bearing ever since the Franco-Prussian War, excited French imagination. "We have been living in apprehension for years," was a common expression of the feeling of many thoughtful Frenchmen.

French belief seemed to be that if France had let Germany defeat Russia, Germany then would have crushed France. So that while, of course, France's alliance with Russia bound France in

various classes in Germany and the same types of men were selected.

Out of a number of conversations the following have been chosen as giving the current of French thought as it was expressed during the last week of February and the first week of March, 1915. Each of the conversations here narrated was written out and submitted to the gentleman interviewed, who very carefully verified the same, making such changes as he desired and authorized publication.

A French Statesman's Exposition

"The deep cause of the war is the effort to maintain the equilibrium of Europe," said one of the most eminent statesmen of France, whose name I am not permitted to give, but whose word is weighty. "This is the principle that no one Power shall become so strong as to disturb the equilibrium of the Powers. In other words, that no one nation shall be the first, or dominating, Power.

"I have seen this war coming for a great many years," he continued. "Germany was growing so

honor to come to Russia's aid, the French idea of what the French believed to be their self-preservation was an equally compelling force driving France into battle. Publicist, scholar and thinker entertained these views as well as holding the additional opinion concerning the equilibrium of Europe, already mentioned. Back of both the statesmen's and the popular view and powerfully effecting both was the French resentment for the taking of Alsace-Lorraine and the purpose, dormant in recent years but never dead, to recover those provinces. In the minds of the majority of the common people, especially the peasants, it seemed probable that this, together with the presence of the enemy on French soil, were the master thoughts which caused them to fly to arms willingly.

strong as to disturb or threaten the equilibrium of Europe. That fact is the greatest reason for the Triple Entente. France and England began to understand each other. They found that their interests were not antagonistic, but reciprocal.

"Common commercial dealings was the first step to this understanding. England and France were heavy purchasers one of the other. For instance, France does not produce enough coal for her own use, and therefore bought her extra supply from England; and England bought great quantities of products such as foodstuffs and objects of art and luxuries from France. But England bought over one billion francs' worth of products from France more than France bought from England. On the other hand, the trade between Germany and England nearly balanced.

"It was chiefly to carry out the great principle of the equilibrium of Europe that the Russian alliance was made. Of course, the conditions which produced the entente grew stronger all the time, and the Russian alliance fitted into this entente perfectly."

"I have heard it said," I observed, "that it was England's traditional policy, running back as far as the Spanish supremacy, to oppose that continental nation which showed the greatest strength-first Spain, then France, then Russia and even Holland in between. Is that the source of England's opposition to Germany now?" I inquired.

"Well, why not?" quickly answered the French statesman, and continued, "Why is it not the wise policy on England's part to see that no one nation becomes dominant? That is simply maintaining the equi