confined to areas on and immediately surrounding airfields or to other surfaces capable of serving as runways and that should he find one v/STOL, others would not necessarily be located nearby.

Until the advent of the V/STOL fighter, there had been little reason to think that basing tactical fighters with Army helicopters or light aircraft might be possible in a tactical situation. Now, however, v/STOL makes operation from small forward sites feasible. Tactical advantages of improved coordination and reaction time could be gained if Air Force and Army aircraft were operated from the same sites. It seems reasonable to anticipate that many benefits could accrue, from logistics support and security viewpoints, particularly when less than a full squadron of v/STOL'S is to be operated from a forward location.

Two types of older aircraft have been modified to serve in a light attack role; however, these aircraft are capable of sharing few, if any, of the Army's light aviation sites and none of the helicopter facilities. Consideration is being given to designing and producing a new close air support (A-X) aircraft, perhaps capable of using forward operating bases. A V/STOL fighter designed for the close air support (CAS) role could operate from virtually any airfield in the world (including helicopter facilities), with the added flexibility of being able to use many other sites not built as airfields. V/STOL CAS fighters could thus provide more effective close air support because they are free from the basing restrictions of light attack aircraft and superior to the helicopter in speed, payload, and mission radius.

V/STOL advantages in dispersal capability

Since the v/STOL fighter is not runwaydependent, runway interdiction by the enemy would not be an effective tactic against v/STOL forces. While v/STOL'S would have many more opportunities to disperse nearby or far from a main base than would CTOL'S, CTOL fighters have the more compelling requirement to disperse away from main operating bases if runways are brought under attack. This is easier to visualize, perhaps, if one imagines the

situation that could have existed during the 1967 clash in the Middle East had the Egyptian Air Force been equipped with v/STOL fighters instead of MIG's. Even if the V/STOL fighters had been located on main bases, Israeli bombing of runways could not have grounded them for the ensuing attack. Obviously, Israeli attacks would have been made on the aircraft themselves. Since probably only a portion could have been destroyed on the first pass, the remainder would have been scrambled and saved. Thus, the VTOL capability would reduce the need to disperse, while at the same time making dispersal easier. V/STOL may be operated solely from a main base posture. It could be dispersed for greater on-the-ground survivability except when returned to base for maintenance, rearming, and refueling. Or it could be dispersed for greater survivability or more effective operations and be supported and operated from that posture. CTOL fighters do not have these options.

V/STOL fighter basing alternatives include use of a wide range of small sites not necessarily built as air facilities or having that appearance. Among the latter are strips of highway, vehicle parking lots, barges, and prepared pads or surfaces at any desired location. Besides the obvious advantage of being able to operate from such locations, perhaps an even greater advantage is improved ground survivability because of v/STOL's enhanced ability to avoid detection. Airfields, being fixed installations, can, under most conditions, be easily detected by the human eye, radar, infrared sensors, or photography. Individual aircraft on airfields are fairly easy to detect, once the airfield complex has been located. Aircraft using sites other than airfields would not be so easy to find for several reasons. First, because they would be based away from an airfield complex and could use any of a large number of candidate sites, v/STOL would have to be searched for as a randomly located target. This does not mean that v/STOL would be individually and randomly scattered over a large area. On the contrary, essentially the same benefit could be achieved by dispersing the aircraft within ten miles or so of

the supporting facilities of a main operating base, thus limiting the adverse effect upon logistic support and command and control. Second, the aircraft could be "blended" into its surroundings by making it appear to radar or infrared sensors as a truck, a metal roof, or background clutter or by allowing it to have little or no contrast and no sharp lines when viewed against the local background by visual or photographic sensors. The use of a highflotation dolly for ground handling would permit the v/STOL to be moved to any location accessible by a route enough wider and higher than the aircraft. Thus, V/STOL could be moved away from its landing strip or pad, if necessary, to lower the chance of detection.

When an aircraft is repeatedly operated from an off-base site, telltale signs such as wheel marks or burned grass will provide clues to its position. To counter this problem, false wheel marks and burn patterns (and occasional aircraft decoys with radar reflectors imitating aircraft) could easily be scattered over a wide area in such numbers that the presence of the real signatures (unlike the presence of an airfield) would not greatly increase the chance of detection. Camouflage may also be employed to reduce detection, and of course a number of small sites would be much easier to camouflage effectively than one large operating location.

Undeniably, a fighter base of the kind used today would be an easy target for an enemy's nuclear weapons, and runwaydependent aircraft would be highly vulnerable. But the v/STOL fighter could be dispersed to the extent consistent with the threat, so that, at the extreme, each v/STOL would represent a separate aim point for the enemy. Thus, use of the VTOL option could improve survivability on the ground and increase operational effectiveness. The VTOL option, however, suggests further changes in the aircraft configuration and some unique basing and application possibilities.

omission of V/STOL landing gear

Aircraft wheels have been required on operational fighters primarily as a means of

facilitating takeoff and landing, secondarily for convenience in ground handling. Consequently, their presence has not been seriously questioned. What is the trade-off if skids or other ground-contact devices are substituted for the landing gear? As a corollary, how can the large payload-radius capability be retained if the aircraft is optimized to the VTOL mode?

The thought of omitting the wheeled landing gear from fixed-wing aircraft is far from new. A number of U.S. aircraft designs did not include wheels-the Curtiss F9C-2, operated from dirigibles in the early 1930s; the McDonnell XF-85 parasite fighter, carried by the B-36; two Navy experimental VTOL aircraft, the XFV-1 and XVY-1; a hydro-ski fighter, the YF2Y-1 (Sea Dart); and the X-15, which has main skids and a nosewheel. Foreign aircraft without wheels have included two World War II German aircraft-the ME-163, a rocket-powered fighter, and the AR-234A, a four-engine jet aircraft-and the French SE 5000 (Baroudeur), a lightweight jet fighter.

If the V/STOL fighter is operated exclusively in the VTOL mode, its landing gear would be used only for ground-handling purposes. The substitution of a dolly would substantially reduce aircraft weight, complexity, and cost and would increase performance. For a fighter aircraft, the reduction of each pound in the vehicle structure weight represents a saving of some 3 or 4 pounds in takeoff gross weight to perform the same mission. Since the conventional landing gear and its associated structural strengthening represent 15 to 20 percent of the total structural weight, the elimination or substantial reduction of landing gear weight would permit increasing the fuel and ordnance load by the same amount. If the aircraft is redesigned, then a smaller aircraft could do the same job and its takeoff gross weight would be considerably less.

In addition to the improved payloadradius obtained by omitting the landing gear, at least two more options are available to increase the payload-radius capability. One alternative is vertical takeoff with the ord

nance load aboard but with minimum fuel; then the aircraft would be refueled from a buddy aircraft or tanker shortly after transition to level flight. The other alternative is vertical takeoff with maximum fuel and ordnance by the use of jet-assisted takeoff units to enable takeoff. (A vertical landing is not a problem after the ordnance is expended and most of the fuel consumed.) JATO may seem an expensive solution; yet it more than pays for itself in the additional ordnance payload carried, and it would be used only when a combat situation required such additional payload. If a short takeoff strip is available, a properly designed ground-handling dolly could be used during the takeoff roll (as was done for the German ME-163 and AR-234 and the French SE 5000).

While these suggestions about landing gear have been made in the context of landbased aircraft, they are also generally applicable to v/STOL based on floating platforms, including aircraft carriers.

impact on carrier operations

The operation of conventional aircraft from carriers necessitates the use of catapults and arresting gear, with the result that both launch and recovery rates are limited by the sequential handling capacity of the installation. In addition, the aircraft are penalized by structural requirements and the associated increase in airframe weight which enable them to use such gear. In earlier days of carrier operations, technology did not permit carrierbased fighter aircraft to be designed with a sufficient thrust-to-lift ratio to provide any alternative to catapult and arresting gear. Now technology makes possible an attractive alternative that provides a release from the one-at-a-time capability.

V/STOL fighters would have the capability to take off from or land on ship deck without the aid of catapult or arresting gear. This suggests that, besides the possible elimination of the need for such gear, the launch and recovery rate could be increased (as it is with assault helicopter ships). It further suggests that v/STOL fighters might operate from float

ing platforms other than aircraft carriers. For carrier operations, since v/STOL fighters would not have to use the long axis of the flight deck for takeoff, multiple simultaneous takeoffs and landings would be possible and could accelerate carrier operations.

The Soviets have reportedly started construction of their third helicopter assault carrier, which will weigh about 23,000 to 25,000 tons fully loaded, with decks too short for fighter planes. In view of the demonstration of v/STOL fighters at the Domodedovo air show, can the use of these ships as carriers for v/STOL fighters be ruled out?

Supplies could be stored below the flight deck, and the barge could be moved to various other locations. When the barge is not occupied by the aircraft, its identity as a V/STOL site could be concealed from the enemy. When an aircraft is aboard, camouflage could reduce the evidence. At all times the barges used by v/STOL could be made to look exactly like barges normally used in the

area.

As an alternative to the use of barges as landing pads, a seaplane or amphibious V/STOL fighter might be feasible. Since the V/STOL hull need not be designed for the high dynamic forces encountered in conventional water takeoff and landing operations, a relatively lightweight aircraft is possible. Much smaller water areas would be adequate, and perhaps operations could be conducted in water conditions too rough for other aircraft. Closely related to the floating pad idea is the use of the Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ship as a V/STOL platform in coastal waters. If the FDL concept is put to use, selfcontained air protection could be provided as the FDL approaches a shoreline and later as it discharges its cargo.

other operational considerations

While the helicopter is doing a marvelous job of rescuing crew members downed fairly near friendly territory, an improved capability to rescue aircrew members downed deep in hostile territory is an urgent requirement. The V/STOL fighter offers a rapid deeprescue capability without requiring escort.

The value of high speed for survival in penetrating to the target is universally recognized, but the delivery of ordnance during a high-speed pass suffers in accuracy. The

V/STOL fighter could penetrate at high speed, and then, if advantageous for accurate ordnance delivery, it could shift to a slow-speed pass on the target by partially transitioning to the hover mode. Even if additional defense suppression effort is necessary to offset the increased vulnerability to ground fire of aircraft using this attack mode, the trade-off may still be profitable, especially for important isolated targets.

V/STOL FIGHTERS, through their ability to take off and land vertically, can enjoy a combination of the better performance capabilities of the helicopter and the fixed-wing fighter. Critical appraisals of the utility of the V/STOL fighter have usually been confined to

its direct substitution for the conventional fixed-wing fighter under the constraints of the prevailing operation and logistic concepts. So it was when our Army considered and acquired its first aircraft. V/STOL fighters may. however, have much more than an incremental effect upon air operations, as did the jet fighter (the German ME-262) beginning late in World War II. Historians cite the jet fighter as the one weapon that could have restored air superiority to the Third Reich and point out the failure of Adolf Hitler to recognize its greatly improved potential soon enough for it to be produced in quantity. We are again faced with the knowledge that we do not lead the world in a new area of fighter development-v/STOL. In fact, we have not yet investigated many of the implications and possible advantages associated with a v/STOL capability. Prompt action is needed to correct this situation. History may not be as forgiving to the United States in the future as it has been in the past.

4

Falls Church, Virginia

Notes

1. "U.S. and Germany End Plane Effort," New York Times, 10 February 1968, p. 2.

2. Robert R. Rodwell, "The Bomb that Won a War," Flight International, 22 June 1967, p. 1007.

3. "3d Soviet Carrier Believed on Ways," New York Times, 14 February 1968, p. 10.

4. Alfred Goldberg, ed., A History of the United States Air Force (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957), p. 71.