ings as the policies were implemented. The range of national security problems affecting military forces is more than matched by the variety of nonmilitary agencies and offices whose advice is sought on these problems. One could not expect even career officials in these agencies to be fully aware of the military impact of their recommendations. Less likely to be sensitive to such matters are the more itinerant, bright young men with whom the civilian agencies in Washington seem to abound. These occasional members of the bureaucracy, who move in and out of government or shift from agency to agency, may not remain long enough to experience the consequences of policies on which they render judgment. It is important, therefore, that military professionals, who have had to cope directly with the procedures and effects stemming from various policy decisions, be given opportunity to review and recommend positions on issues likely to affect them.

A second reason is encompassed in an observation of Karl von Clausewitz:

Wars are in reality. . . only the manifestations of policy . . . ; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the

reverse.+

If one substitutes “military action" for "war," the meaning is sharper; Clausewitz reminds his readers that policy judgments establish the intent and provide the direction for all military activity. It follows, therefore, that procedures are needed to ensure that military activities are carried out in ways appropriate for policy.

Military participation in the development of policy is one means of providing that assurance. Involving the military profession in the development of national security policy increases the likelihood that the full intent of the policy will be understood by a primary implementing agency. Thus, the implementing directives and command judgments can be more readily attuned to the purposes perceived by national leadership. Conversely, the likelihood can be lessened that the implementing actions might inadvertently convey to friend or enemy signals that conflict with the original policy intent.

A third reason for military participation is to ensure that policy decisions are based on realistic appraisals of the strategic alternatives available to the United States. To be sure, the military profession has no monopoly on wise uses of military power. Forward-looking military concepts and timely strategic judgments have also emanated from the civilian research community and from certain civilian officials. Moreover, excellent studies, like Elting Morrison's Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy and Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August, have appropriately illustrated the shortcomings of doctrinaire application of purely military rationale. Still, while perhaps not always proven correct in the strategies they recommend (And who is?), military officials are uniquely qualified to describe the resources and costs demanded by available strategic alternatives.

Realistic strategic appraisals are essential to help national leaders examine critically any schemes for scoring major international coups "on the cheap." While much has been written about the doctrinal biases and past errors of the military, little criticism has been directed toward these politically attractive, intellectually exciting strategies devised by highly persuasive but overly academic theoreticians. These schemes have great appeal for the policy-maker who feels the need and the pressures to take some initiatives, but who recognizes the severe penalties of overcommitment and the difficulties of rallying public support for less palatable though perhaps more assuring measures. The Taft-Radford proposals for relying on offshore air and naval power to contain Communist expansion provide one example. The Schelling theories and analogies on behalf of "compellence" are another." The initial wave of counterinsurgency tracts represents a third.

Such ideas have wide appeal. They give intellectually live persons an opportunity to spin out internally rational theories on matters of public importance. They provide public officials with hopeful ways of dealing with sticky national security problems when more conventional solutions are clearly unacceptable at the time. They may offer defense industries

and "think factories" new areas for research and development. They may also promise individual services an opportunity to regain prestige or support which they perceive as lost.

Not that these kinds of appeal are harmful in themselves. On the contrary, it is out of motivations like these that many sound ideas and effective policies emerge. The critical problem is that such multiple appeals and the pressures they generate have a tendency to obscure the hidden ultimate costs.

Unfortunately, the costs can be high. National military involvements that might be avoided in the face of risks and costs associated with more conventional solutions may be entered into-in the belief that desirable results can be obtained by the "cheap" approach. The plain truth, demonstrated repeatedly in history, is that major international successes seldom come cheap. And, once entered into, national commitments intended to achieve these successes seldom are short-lived. One need only consider the oft-repeated reference to the contributions of "three Presidents" to current Vietnam policy to realize how subtle and far-reaching seemingly "safe" international policy decisions can be.

Being long experienced and professionally involved in the real costs of overseas commitments, the military services must assist in evaluating the alternative strategies available to U.S. leadership.

Actually, the military does participate in the policy-making process-through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and unilateral service channels. As "the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense," the Joint Chiefs of Staff register policy viewpoints and recommend courses of action to deal with most major national security issues. This can occur either as a result of a request for JCS views, channeled through the Secretary of Defense, or as a result of JCS initiative. Their viewpoints are also injected into various interagency committees by high-ranking members of the Joint Staff. The principal bodies in which they are expressed at present are the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, one for

each major foreign policy area. Among other supervisory functions, these bodies are tasked with developing formal statements of U.S. policy objectives, in Country Analysis and Strategy Reports, and with recommending policies to deal with developing situations in the geographical region each group represents. Other Joint Staff officers participate in such interagency functions as the development of Country Internal Defense Plans, which provide guidance relevant for the U.S. Military Assistance Programs (MAP).

Aside from their routine staff contributions to the development of JCS policy positions, the individual services also have unilateral means of influencing policy. Legislation provides the service chiefs with procedures for making their own views known outside the regular JCS-DOD channels. The chiefs may appeal DOD policy recommendations through direct access to the President. They and their deputies are also enjoined to testify before Congressional committees and present their views irrespective of those recommended by the JCS corporately or by the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the individual services can transmit their unilateral views to the Secretary of Defense through their respective civilian secretaries. Concepts and arguments that become altered or beclouded in the process of joint staffing can sometimes be presented more clearly and persuasively through this channel.

However, in the past, the services have not tended to use these direct channels to express individual views on issues that would commit the nation as a whole. Rather, these channels have been used primarily to comment on specific force-related issues-for instance, whether or not to buy a nuclear carrier, whether or not to authorize additional tactical fighter wings, whether or not to create an airmobile division. Although such issues are important to the shape and thrust of national security policy, the commitments they would entail include providing certain levels of funds, supporting particular force levels, or structuring our defense establishment-all elements that can be redressed unilaterally (though perhaps not readily) through subsequent appropriations or legislation. Only indirectly

might these commitments move the nation toward or away from involvement in conflicts or in alliances that determine the thrust of national life for a generation or more in the future. The service chiefs have very rarely addressed this latter kind of issue through their privileged access to the nation's legislative and executive leaders.

Views of the chief military officers on the more deeply committing national policies usually are submitted by the corporate JCS body through formal Department of Defense channels. The Secretary of Defense may or may not forward the views of the Chiefs if they have not been specifically requested by another agency. Similarly, at his discretion, he may or may not explain to the Chiefs the reactions which their views have evoked from other high-level officials. However, the Chairman of the JCS is a regular participant in major policy discussions among principal agency officials, and he is a source of information for the services concerning policy positions taken by other agencies. He also has the opportunity to explain the views of the Chiefs to the other officials. Because of the corporate and formalized nature of the JCS inputs into the policy-making process, their views are stated as tersely as possible and in a way calculated to directly support recommendations for particular decisions or actions. Because theirs is the only regular opportunity for military inputs, the JCS try to present a united front as often as possible. In the process of developing a consensus that can be shaped into a direct recommendation, a compromise is frequently worked out among individual service positions, and many of the nuances and qualifications typical of complex policy issues are either omitted or submerged in language acceptable to all. Such procedures cannot always enable the military profession to contribute the kinds of judgment of which it is capable to the shaping of really critical national policies.

TO PLAY a more effective role in the shaping of policy involving long-term

national commitments will require at least two kinds of changes in the usual JCS methods of operation. One is the maintenance of a more responsible, independent position on such vital issues. The other is a deeper analysis of contemplated courses of action with respect to long-range costs and risks.

In the past, the JCS has operated according to a "good soldier" philosophy. Under this approach, an attempt is made to keep military matters distinct from political considerations. The latter are regarded as the prerogative of the State Department and the White House, so judgments on these matters are seldom rendered by the Chiefs. Accordingly, there has been a tendency to accept the political objectives stated by civilian authority as given. The JCS have then recommended military measures they consider best suited for achieving those objectives. In addition, when confronted with the decision or when anticipating that their preferred approach was not acceptable to higher political authority, the JCS have sometimes suggested lesser or compromise measures believed to be more acceptable. In such cases they usually have pointed out that the lesser measures would not be likely to attain the objectives; but on occasion they have used such discrepancies to argue more vigorously for that preferred course of action as follow-on measures. Rarely if ever have they questioned the initial objectives or suggested substitution of lesser objectives.

Moreover, when examining and rendering judgment on the outcomes to be obtained from recommended courses of action, the JCs normally provide only "first order" analyses. Their memoranda and annexes usually discuss the immediate results expected from U.S. and friendly actions. They also normally include the range of possible "enemy" responses and a description of those he is most likely to take. Joint Staff attempts to address the consequences of recommended actions or positions seldom include the next steps which the "enemy's" alternative reactions would require from the United States and its allies or the impact which the next round would have on his or our policy commitments. If dealt with at all, the long-term political implications of

these recommended courses of action are given only perfunctory treatment. Finally, and sometimes ultimately, the JCs discussion of consequences may be watered down and worded in such a way as to assure that it does not damage the vital interests of any one of the services.

In order to be effective in helping to shape policies involving possible long-term commitments, the military must take a stronger hand in helping to determine the nation's policy objectives where military activities are involved. In particular, they have an obligation to point out any incompatibility between the desired ends of policy and the politically acceptable means for implementing it-even to the extent of stating a wholly negative position if that be their corporate judgment. In addition, service differences or reservations with respect to this incompatibility must not be submerged in the interest of presenting a united front. Awareness of dissenting or minority views on the part of one or more services could serve to focus interagency discussion on issues that would result in a more realistic appraisal of national aims.

It is essential that this be done, because once objectives have been adopted and national programs initiated, resulting commitments are not readily reduced. Neither is their character easily altered. President Truman's decision to abandon the objectives of unifying Korea by force in 1951 demonstrated the great political cost risked by lowering policy objectives once U.S. forces are committed. It is doubtful that the domestic effects of that demonstration have gone unheeded by astute political leaders. Like military intervention, military alliances and foreign aid programs also constitute public commitments. These, too, cannot be abandoned without penalty of domestic or international political cost.

Public policy objectives cannot easily be compromised by a political leadership under fire from domestic and foreign critics, nor can national commitments be taken lightly. If valid initially, the nation's policy objectives should not be abandoned or emasculated simply because they prove difficult to achieve. Of course errors in judgment will occur, and the policy

making process ideally should permit a recasting of objectives if an Administration perceives that the costs of achieving them have turned out to be higher than can reasonably be borne. Normally, however, when objectives are realistic, it is to be expected that an initial lack of success will be followed by repeated or intensified attempts. Particularly when committed to assist another nation, a government of the United States-which historically has stressed respect for international agreements freely entered as a key principle of responsible diplomacy-cannot afford to discard such an obligation lightly. For all these reasons it is important that before public commitments are made our policy objectives be scrutinized and determined to be reasonable in the light of measures that the nation's leaders feel able to undertake.

In contributing to this vital policy function, the military professional should have an important role (primarily through the JCS) to define the proposed objectives clearly in operational terms. He should explain to other policy advisers and to decision-makers that, given their proposed statement of what the United States hopes to achieve, "the objective behavior patterns of enemy leaders and forces would have to consist of the following . . .” and "these are the kinds of military and political actions the United States would have to undertake to get them to react that way. . . . In addition, he should make explicit the kinds of enemy behavior likely to result from any lesser or different actions on our part. He should then describe in detail the ways in which such behavior would be different from the patterns corresponding to the proposed objectives. Hence, he would make clear that, if only certain kinds of action are agreeable to the President and his chief advisers, they must recognize beforehand that only certain objectives are reasonable for the nation to endorse. This process would be repeated for different formulations of our goals as many times as necessary to develop a set of operational objectives compatible with the prevailing political mood and the long-term national

interest.

Defining objectives operationally is con

siderably different from the usual JCS practice of saying, "This is what we stand a good chance of achieving, but on the other hand the enemy may do this." It is different, first, because usual practice is to say this and little more, at least until new ground rules are received from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Under this new approach, the JCS would in effect be helping to formulate the ground rules as they go along. It is different also because, through this iterative process, professional military judgments would play a major part in determining what the ultimately agreed-upon objectives would be. Instead of acting as a technical bureau, largely selflimited to providing narrow judgments on request, the JCS would be contributing its needed professional insights as a full partner in the policy-making process.

As a companion process to helping determine realistic national policy objectives, the JCS must also help stimulate systematic consideration of the long-term costs and risks incurred by contemplated courses of national action. With their own rather ample staff resources and with support from the service staffs, the JCS could set an example for other contributing agencies by making a deeper, more comprehensive analysis of the broad implications of proposed national security policies than has been the usual practice in the past.

The typical "first-order" analysis of expected results and likely enemy responses is inadequate because international politicalmilitary situations are extremely fluid. They contain too many variables and are too dependent upon day-to-day decisions in different governmental and military headquarters to enable sound policy decisions to be based on this kind of analysis alone. For example, in the context of military conflicts, there is ample evidence to indicate that even basically rational and stable considerations like a national commitment must be regarded as a variable. In addition to the expected motivation to try harder when denied a goal, governments may also raise their sights in response to success. Our own government illustrated this in September 1950, after MacArthur's successful

Similarly variable responses in national commitment may be precipitated by policy decisions short of actual conflict. A familiar argument is that noncommittal declaratory policies which permit modest, pragmatic responses to "enemy" initiatives only encourage him to engage in incremental aggression. Only firm policies, the argument goes, will discourage an aggressor from nibbling away at the position of the U.S. or an ally until he obtains a significant advantage. On the other hand, there are examples of reactions to hard policies that are quite different. U.S. policies toward Japan prior to Pearl Harbor have been interpreted as so frustrating to programs the Japanese government regarded as vital to its national interest that they in fact helped precipitate Tokyo's decision for war.10 The point is that the motivations of other governments and the compelling political interests of the future frequently are not predictable.

To compensate for these kinds of variables in political-military behavior, contemplated national courses of action must be analyzed carefully in terms of costs and risks. The JCS, in particular, should contribute to this process. The first step in their contribution would be a direct spin-off from a properly conducted effort to define objectives operationally. In the iterative process of determining realistic objective enemy behavior patterns, the JCS should identify several possible actions an enemy might take that would be different from those desired by the United States. They should then make explicit a number of formulations, like "If the enemy does the following... then we must take the following next steps or choose among the following remaining options

," provided we continue to pursue our basic objectives. In actual practice, a similar process would be used to refine and recast the