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lacking that, an insight into the processes of means something more than hurling every change that participants in the events, blinded available element of physical force into the by the exigencies of the moment, were unable fray; it also involves the total ordering behind to grasp. (Cynics, of course, point out that that effort of society in all its parts-political, this is what keeps historians in business.) But economic, social, scientific, and psychological. the major question is unavoidable: Is Verrier's The chapters on the psychological and analysis on the whole correct? This reviewer scientific dimensions of the war cover ground takes a charitable (wishy-washy?) position
that has been worked before in great depth and suggests that it is closer to the mark than if not within integrated narratives of the war we might wish it were. A close reading of the as a whole. But other chapters provide cogent records justifies the late Major General Orvil summaries of less familiar aspects of the war, A. Anderson's observations that during World its "economic dimension,” for example, and War II (1) air warfare advanced from infancy “Europe's response to conquest: the Resistance to adolescence, and (2) what evolved over movements.” The economics chapter treats the Europe was “an improvised air war.” Perhaps following general topics: the economics of the really relevant question is whether the sort blitzkrieg; the Western Allies, from complaof control and review of policy whose absence cency to action; economics as an offensive Verrier deplores is even possible in the throes weapon; the Soviet economic effort; and the of total war. The Herman Kahns among us economics of total war in Germany. Here one either think so or hope so. If the former, let finds, just as an example, a comparative analyus be skeptical; if the latter, we can only join sis of what lengths each country went to in them.
supporting its war effort. If the German side of the story is well known to many Americans,
the Soviet and British sides are not. Here, CONTROVERSY and provocative in- however, the mysterious workings of Britain's terpretation take second place to dispassionate Ministry of Economic Warfare involved in narrative in Gordon Wright's truly excellent commodity control, pre-emptive buying, seand quite unusual history of the war in lection of targets for the bomber offensive) are Europe.f Wright's volume is the twentieth in explained and evaluated. The chapter on the justly famous “Rise of Modern Europe" Resistance movements covers each country, series, edited by William L. Langer and pub- from Norway to the Balkans, and does not lished by Harper & Row. What makes this omit the part played by such organizations as volume so unusual (and valuable) is the the Special Operations Executive, Britain's author's decision to concentrate not on the equivalent of our Office of Strategic Services military, air, and naval conduct of the war but (oss). rather on what was going on behind the fight- It is this broad-gauge treatment that gives ing fronts, how the war affected the lives and the book its special dimension. The student fortunes of the peoples of Europe as a whole. concerned to find out what was going on in True, he begins in the standard manner: Hungary or Czechoslovakia during the Nazi Chapter I, “Europe on the Brink”; Chapter II, occupation can find out quite a bit if he is a “The Expansion of German Power.” But be- patient researcher and can read a number of yond this point he departs from the normal languages. But he cannot normally find such pattern, and only 37 of the remaining 224 matters in a general history of the war-not, pages of narrative are devoted to the resurg- that is, until now. And as with all the volumes ence of Allied power and the defeat of the in this series, the Bibliographical Essay, arThird Reich. Total war, Wright reminds us, ranged under 28 subheadings in 37 closely
Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968, $7.95), xviii and 315 pp. (Also available in paperback, Harper Torchbook, TB 1408, $2.25.)
packed pages, is a significant contribution in that began to infect the Great Coalition once ts own right.
victory seemed assured. These concluding All this is not to say, however, that the chapters contain many of the most thoughtful oldiers' war finds no place; it is merely con- pages yet addressed to questions of lasting lensed and placed within a larger context, one importance. Not only to end where we began vhich most veterans of that war never saw but, more importantly, to give Professor yut which European civilians can never forget. Wright's own eloquence its due, it seems apThe bomber offensive, for example, is covered propriate to conclude in his words: n only nine pages, but, interestingly enough,
The changes for which men consciously thirst ts contribution to final victory is rated higher
and work and die are not the only ones prohan its frequent critics would allow. It “un
duced by a great war. More profound and more loubtedly hampered the German war effort in
sweeping, perhaps, are those that are unnuch more than a marginal way. What it intended and even unforeseen. . . . Thus the ailed to do was to destroy civilian morale- Second World War seems to have initiated or o break the German people's will to work and reinforced trends toward a mood of lawlesso endure.";
ness, toward a confusion and corruption of Wright concludes with two chapters in
values, toward a decline in man's belief in a vhich he tries to show, first, how the war it
rational universe. ... The battlefield, no longer elf, particularly the conflicting purposes of
limited and defined, was everywhere; it was he Allies, prepared the way for the cold war;
occupied by civilians and soldiers alike. . ; .
Old beliefs in causality tended to dissolve beind second, the impact of the war on the
fore these evidences of chaos; there was a ocial, cultural, and psychological stability of
growing sense that irrational forces rule man's he European peoples. Calmly, dispassionately, fate. No scientist, no historian has yet disnd with no trace of the rancor that bedevils covered a technique for measuring the endurhe “revisionists” who try to show that the cold ing after effects of war; but no thoughtful man var was entirely the fault not of the Russians can doubt their severity or their persistence. out of the Western Allies, he traces in detail
United States Air Force Academy he misunderstandings and mutual distrust
1. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The irmy Air Forces in World War II (University of Chicago Press, vols., 1948–55).
2. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Stra?gic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945 (London: ler Majesty's Stationery Office, 4 vols., 1961).
3. The U.S. counterpart to Britain's Ministry of Economic Varfare was our Foreign Economic Administration. While lmost all histories of the war refer to the FEA's main responsiility, the Lend-Lease program, rare indeed are those that treat s other, rather more clandestine, activities. Very secret at the ime and involving activities somewhat at variance with those ormally associated with a free-enterprise system, the whole tory of the FEA (like that of the Economic Warfare Division f the U.S. Embassy in London) will probably never be told.
4. To wit: published or microfilm source materials; periodials; general accounts; immediate background; the problem of Litler's war aims; military aspects, general; Polish campaign; Torwegian campaign; Western campaign; Battle of Britain;
editerranean and North African campaigns; the war in Russia; he campaign in Italy; Normandy and the invasion of Germany; var in the air; war on the sea; espionage and intelligence operaions; civil-military relations in wartime; economic aspects of he war years; science and technology; psychological warfare; sychological impact of the war; German occupation policies; lazi persecution of “racial" and political enemies; Resistance
movements (5 pages on this alone); wartime diplomacy; intellectual and cultural aspects of the war period; domestic events in the nations of Europe.
5. This view accords with that of Webster and Frankland and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The latter's report on morale concludes that morale was affected, but nowhere does it go so far as to suggest that morale was destroyed. Craven and Cate pretty much skirt the question. Among Verrier's five specific conclusions (pp. 312–23) is one that states: “... the collapse or even the deterioration of enemy civilian morale should not be included as an objective.” This conclusion is labeled a “factor” pertaining to air warfare as demonstrated in World War II. The other four conclusions are that control of operations must be concentrated; intelligence of enemy strength must be reliable and up to date-more so than is required for ground operations; command of the air is more than the capacity to continue operations; and “precision bombing" is a term of art only, making for false optimism and inaccurate estimates of the ratio of force to target.
6. Chapter X abounds with examples. One to which Wright gives special place is the U.S. and British refusal to allow the Soviets to participate in the Italian settlement in 1943. In Stalin's eyes, he suggests, here was the cordon sanitaire being re-established. “Although Stalin's charges of bad faith were unfounded, he was doubtless convinced of their validity.”
Military Airlift Command. He was commissioned in 1940 and spent the war years in B-17 and B-29 training and command assignments. Since then he has served in Hq Far East Air Forces as Chief, Cargo Traffic Control Section and Transportation Division, to 1949; student, Air Command and Staff School, continuing there as an instructor until 1953; in Hq USAF as Chief, Traffic Division, and of Requirements and Allocations Division, to 1956; as Deputy Commander and Commander, 1502d Air Transport Wing, Hawaii, to 1959; ADCS/O, Hq Military Air Transport Service, Scott AFB, to 1964; Commander, 63d Troop Carrier Wing, at Hunter AFB, Georgia, to 1966 and at Norton AFB, California, to August 1968, when he assumed his present position. General Curtis is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
GENERAL JOHN PAUL MCCONNELL (USMA) was Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, from 1 February 1965 until his retirement on 1 August 1969. After flying training in 1933, he served for a time as a fighter pilot; other early duty was in operational, engineering, and administrative assignments, including Assistant Executive to the Acting Chief, Army Air Forces; Chief of Staff, AAF Technical Training Command; and Deputy Chief of Staff, AAF Training Command. Assigned to the China-Burma-India Theater in 1943, he saw combat in Burma and held training, staff, and command positions in India, Ceylon, and China, where he was Senior Air Adviser to the Chinese Government, until 1947. Subsequent assignments have been in Air Force Headquarters as Chief, Reserve and National Guard Division, later of Civilian Components Group, DCS/0, to 1950; in England, where he commanded the Third Air Force and 7th Air Division, to 1953; in Hq Strategic Air Command as Director of Plans, to 1957; as Commander, Second Air Force, SAC, Barksdale AFB, to 1961; Vice Commander in Chief, SAC, to 1962; and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, France, to August 1964, when he was appointed Vice Chief of Staff, USAF.
GENERAL HOWELL M. ESTES, JR. (USMA) was Commander, Military Airlift Command, for five years preceding his retirement on 1 August 1969. After three years with the cavalry and in flying training, 1939–40, he served in various training and command assignments during World War II. Other assignments have been at Hq USAFE, in chief and deputy chief roles in plans and operations, to 1948; at March AFB, California, as Commander, 1st Air Base Group, 22d Bomb Wing, and 44th Bomb Wing, to 1951; on combat duty and as Vice Commander, FEAF Bomber Command, 1951; at March AFB as Commander, 105th Bomb Wing, later 12th Air Division, to 1953; Commander, Air Task Group 7.4, Joint Task Force Seven, Operation CASTLE, Eniwetok, 1954; at Wright-Patterson AFB as Director, Weapons Support Operations, later Assistant Deputy Commander for Weapon Systems and Commander, Detachment 1, Hq ARDC, and Director of Systems Management, to 1957; at Hq USAF as ACS/Air Defense Systems, later ADCS/O, to 1961; in Air Force Systems Command as Deputy Commander for Aerospace Systems, Los Angeles, 1962; and as Vice Commander, AFSC, Andrews AFB, Maryland, to 1964. General Estes is a 1949 graduate of the Air War College.
MAJOR GENERAL COURTNEY L. Faught is Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Hq Military Airlift Command. Commissioned from Aying training in 1942, he served in the Southwest Pacific Theater as a flight leader, er. ecutive officer, and commander. Postwar assignments have been in combat crew and troop carrier training and operations, 1945-46; Professor of Air Science and Tactics, Ohio University, 1947-49; Commander 8th and 7th Troop Carrier Squadrons, 1950–52; Commander, 6th Troop Carrier Squadron, Japan, 1953; Director of Operations, 315th Air Division, FEAF, to 1956; and since 1957 in Military Air lift Command in staff or command positions, except in 1960–65 at Hq USAF in DCS/O or P&O for tactical and transport forces and JCS matters. General Faught is a graduate of Air Command and Staff School and National War College.
MAJOR GENERAL GILBERT L. CURTIS is Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Hq
MAJOR THOMAS A. STUDER (M.S., University of Utah) is Chief, Aerospace Modification Division, DCS/ Aerospace Sciences, Hq Air Weather Service (MAC). After earning a B.A. degree from St. John's University, Minnesota, and his commissioning in 1953, he served in various AWS assignments, providing weather support to the Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Command, and Aerospace Defense Command. Major Studer is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and a professional member of the American Meteorological Society. His current assignment involves the study of techniques and tools for environmental modification to enhance military mission performance.
MAJOR WILLIAM R. SIMS (M.F.A., Architecture, Princeton University) is Course Director, Base Civil Engineer Course, Air Force Institute of Technology, where he specializes in base master planning. An AFROTC graduate of the University of Kentucky, he has served in maintenance and civil engineering assignments at Andrews AFB, Maryland, 1958-61; RAF Station, Bentwaters, England, 1963–67; and at Don Muang RTAFB, Thailand, 1967–68, where he was also Chief of Programs. Major Sims is registered in Kentucky as a land surveyor, engineer, and architect. His “Architecture of the Lunar Base" was published in Proceedings of the Lunar and Planetary Space Exploration Colloquium (1963).
ments were as Chief, Scientific Liaison Section, DCS/Materiel, Hą USAF; student, National War College, 1950; Assistant for Development Planning, Hq USAF, to 1954; Assistant to the Commander, Air Research and Development Command, and Commander, AF Ballistic Missile Division, ARDC, to 1959; and Commander, ARDC, until creation of the Air Force Systems Command in 1961. General Schriever is now Chairman of the Board, Schriever & McKee Associates, Arlington, Virginia. He is also president of the Air Force Historical Foundation.
COLONEL WILLIAM C. MOORE (USMA) is Chief of Staff, Headquarters Command USAF, Bolling AFB, D.C. After flying training and B-24 transition, he joined the 494th Bomb Group, spending the last year of World War II in the Pacific Theater, where he commanded the 867th Bomb Squadron. Postwar assignments have been as Director of Statistical Services, Fourth Air Force, 1949; as Commander, 29th Troop Carrier Squadron, Germany, during the Berlin Airlift; Chief, Combat Operations Center and Combat Operations Plans Division, Hq Eastern Air Defense Force, 1952; Member, Strategic Plans Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1956; Director of Requirements, Far Eastern Air Forces, Japan, and on the war planning staff, CINCPAC, 1960; as student, National War College, 1961; Director of Operations, 810th Air Division (SAC), 1963; and in Plans and Policy Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), until joining Headquarters Command, 1966.
CAPTAIN ANGELO J. CERCHIONE (B.A., Michigan State University) is Chief, Information Division, 4510th Combat Crew Training Wing, TAC, Luke AFB, Arizona. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1952 and served aboard the aircraft carrier USS Midway, reverting to inactive reserve in 1956. He enlisted in the Air Force in 1958, attended Michigan State University in 1962 under the Airmen Education Commissioning Program, and was commissioned in 1963. He served as Information Officer, 81st Tactical Fighter Wing, RAF Station, Bentwaters, 1964-67. In 1966 his unit received the American Ambassador's Award for Community Relations. He has attended the Air Force Course in Public Relations and Communications, Boston University.
University) is Chief, Communist World Branch, Air Command and Staff College. Commissioned from AFROTC upon graduation from Southern Methodist University, he has held assignments in Strategic Air Command, Air Training Command, USAF Security Service, Hq USAF, and Air University, as crew member (navigator), provost marshal, squadron commander, and instructor. He was Assistant Air Attaché in Moscow, 1966–68. Colonel Clark is a graduate of the Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College and is a frequent lecturer on the U.S.S.R. in the civilian community as well as Air University.
HARRIET Fast Scott lived and traveled extensively throughout the Soviet Union as the wife of Colonel William F. Scott, U.S. Air Attaché, 1962–64. Her fluency in the Russian language and her familiarity with Russian military writings have been reflected in articles in Military Review and Air University Review and in selections and translations from the Soviet military press appearing in the Pentagon's Current News and The Friday Review of Defense Literature. Mrs. Scott is coauthor, with Dr. William R. Kintner, of The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (1968).
MAJOR Davm MACISAAC (A.M., Yale University) is an Assistant Professor of History, United States Air Force Academy. Since his commissioning in 1957 from AFROTC, his assignments have been as Chief, Personnel Control Branch, 4245th Strategic Wing, Sheppard AFB, Texas, 1959–61; Chief, Officers Branch, Military Personnel Division, Hq Sixteenth Air Force, Torrejon AB, Spain, 1961–64; Instructor in History, USAFA, 1964–66; and Ph.D. candidate in history (AFITsponsored), Duke University, 1966 68. His dissertation on the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1944–47, is nearing completion. His articles have been published in Air University Review, and he is on the Editorial Board of Aerospace Historian.
DR. CHARLES A. LOFGREN (Ph.D., Stanford University) has been an Assistant Professor of American History at Claremont Men's College, California, since 1966 and also teaches at Claremont Graduate School. He served as an enlisted man in the U.S. Army Reserve, 1957-63. While completing his doctorate, he was an instructor in history at San Jose State College, California, 1965–66, and in 1968–69 he held an appointment as Visiting Assistant Professor of History at Stanford University. With interests in American diplomatic and constitutional history and recent U.S. history, Dr. Lofgren has published articles in Military Affairs, Military Review, and The Review of Politics.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONALD L. CLARK (M.A., George Washington
The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “A New Vitality in Soviet 'Defense' Posture” by Major William T. Wilson, USAF, as the outstanding article in the July August issue of the Review.