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product to the enemy country. The proposition is a totally unjustifiable extension of the doctrine of continuous voyage.

Mr. J. G. Pease, replying for the Crown: The butter is released when the materials for making margarine are brought into Sweden and the margarine is manufactured. That is enough to make the goods conditional contraband. The principle established by the cases is that if goods of the same kind are going to the enemy country it is not necessary to identify the particular goods. If the goods are of the same species and can be used for the same purpose, the doctrine of continuous voyage should apply. The articles are practically the same. Instead of being classified as "margarine" and "butter" they can all be classed as goods of the same kind, viz, "edibie fats." This may be carrying the principle of conditional contraband further than hitherto, but in view of the ramifications of modern commerce it is not going too far. (7 Lloyds Prize Cases, 367; L. R. [1918], p. 123.)

In the judgment on this case the president of the prize court, Sir Samuel Evans, said:

I do not consider that it would be in accordance with international law to hold that raw materials on their way to citizens of a neutral country, to be converted into a manufactured article for consumption in that country, were subject to condemnation on the ground that the consequence might, or even would necessarily, be that another article of a like kind and adapted for a like use would be exported by other citizens of the neutral country to the enemy. (Ibid.)

In the case of the Bonna the doctrine of continuous voyage by substitution was not supported. No authorities sustain such a position. The debates in the House of Commons, even when the strain of war was extreme, show little approval of such a doctrine. The practical application of such a policy would put an end to ordinary neutral trade and would tend to make war general.

Liability on account of substitution.-There were many propositions for restricting the exports from neutral to belligerent States during the World War. The theory of restricting or prohibiting trade with neutrals in articles which themselves might not go to a belligerent but which might release others which might go to a belligerent was advanced and received some approval. That a belliger

ent might decline to export certain goods to a neutral unless the neutral agreed not to export certain goods to the other belligerent was regarded as a lawful restraint. The Minister of Blockade said on March 27, 1917, of the British relations to Norway:

The position is this. Norway wants a great deal of copper of a particular refined kind for her electric works which she is establishing in all parts of the country. She has got copper in her own country, but it is in the form of pyrites, and contains a small quantity of copper in a large amount of sulphur ore. We have made an arrangement by which, in return for our providing electrolytic copper-refined copper-Norway will restrict her trade to Germany, and indeed to us, within certain limits. That is the nature of the bargain we made. It has been of great use to us, and I believe it has been of great use to Norway. That is the kind of negotiation which, as it seems to me, is the only way in which you can deal with the situation. (Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 92 H. C. Deb. 5 s. 260.)

Such a negotiation as mentioned above was unlike in principle to the theory of substitution though discussed in the same speech, where it was said:

I come to agricultural produce. Simple agricultural produce is different. My honorable friend (Mr. Peto) stated that in a very plausible way. He said, after all, you let maize come in. It goes to feed the pig, and the pig goes on to Germany. I have heard people put it in a popular way that the pig is merely maize on four legs. After all, when you arrest a cargo of maize you have to show to your prize court that it has an ultimate destinationGermany. What you can show is that it is going to feed pigs, part of which will be eaten in Holland or wherever it may be, part of which will be reexported to this country, and part of which will go, it may be, to Germany. It is very difficult indeed to say that any particular part of that cargo of maize has the ultimate destination of Germany, even if you disregard the fact that it is intermediately being changed into pig. I can only go on what I am advised I can do. That is one difficulty.

The question is whether we are entitled and how far we are able to stop maize or oil cake which is coming from a neutral country-the United States-and going to a neutral country and passing through our patrols upon the doctrine which I have tried to describe to the House. In the present condition of affairs I do not want to prejudge anything, but I rather doubt whether

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we could succeed in a prize court if we put forward such a doctrine as that. My honorable and gallant friend (Commander Bellairs) recognises the difficulty we are in, but says the time has come to put aside the prize court altogether. We are to proceed upon what he regards as a new European law. He told us in his notice that we are not to allow any supplies to neutral European countries unless there is an entire cessation of their trade with Germany. That would mean, I suppose, that we are to arrest all the cargoes of feeding stuffs, and fertilisers unless neutral countries will undertake that they will not export any agricultural produce to Germany at all-of course, from a neutral country. I have some doubt whether that could be easily defended. I snould have some little hesitation in repeating the perorations in which we have indulged about the defence of the rights of small countries.

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We have to consider-and I speak in very general terms herethe geographical and military position in these countries. Any honorable member can, if he chooses, by consulting an ordinary textbook, see what was the military power of Denmark, both on sea and land, before the war. I do not know what she may have done to improve that position since then. If he will try to consider what his position would be as a Danish statesman, faced with a demand of the British Government that Denmark should wholly cut off trade with Germany, I think he would begin to count up rather anxiously the number of soldiers and ships at his command. He would have to consider also the relation between Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries. He would have to consider the general effect of any action against her on other neutral nations. He would have to consider the effect of any such policy as that which my honorable and gallant friend recommends on the general war aims with which this country entered the war. We have above all to remember this, that we can not lay down this principle-and to do my honorable and gallant friend justice he does not lay it down-as applied to Denmark only. You have to consider what would be the effect of attempting to apply such a rule as that to all neutrals alike. (Ibid. 260-263.)

Later in the same debate, Sir Edward Carson, first lord of the Admiralty, said:

The policy of the country, whatever it may be, must be the policy not merely of the Foreign Office or of the Navy, but it must be the policy of the cabinet, and the cabinet having laid down the policy, the Foreign Office by negotiation, and the Navy by action, have tried to see that policy carried out. Somebody comes

and says, "Leave it to the Navy. The blockade will be all right, and nothing will go into Germany." Those who think that do not really see what that means. What they really mean by that is that the Navy will go just as they please, seize every ship of every neutral, bring it into port, and take the goods out of it that were intended for neutral countries, and all will be well. That is really what they imagine. They never imagine for a moment that we are dealing not with one neutral, but with two neutralsthe neutral who is exporting and the neutral who is importing. I would like to know where we would be if this kind of duty had been put upon the Admiralty, that we were simply to get an instruction that nothing was to go to Germany through a neutral country that was imported from another neutral country. The truth of the matter is that those who put forth that absurd doctrine mean that we should go to war with everybody. That is what it really comes to.

*

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Will any honorable member get up here, for instance, to say in this House "You ought to prevent anything going to Norway which, by any possibility, can go to Germany under any circumstances"? Will anybody get up and say that? What would be the result? Norway would say, "Very well, you shall no longer get from us what is essential for your munitions and other matters of this kind." Will anybody say that this is a course we ought to pursue? No; what the system of blockade that is carried out by my right honorable friend means is this-and we profess nothing more-not that we are able to prevent food and imports entirely from getting into Germany through neutral countries, but that this is the best system for minimizing imports from getting into Germany. My honorable friend who spoke last about the food cry took as an illustration feeding stuffs that go to the fattening of cattle in neutral countries, and suggested that we ought to do something to prevent the produce of those feeding stuffs from ever going into Germany. I do not know where our rights come in to do that. Will he tell me that we have a right to say to America that she is to have no trade with neutral countries? Does he say that? Of course he can not. The only way, leaving international law and international rights out of account, of doing this is by saying that what is really going into Denmark, or Holland, or wherever it may be, is really intended to go into Germany. That is what is called the doctrine of continuous voyage. Was there ever a more absurd theory put forward than that the doctrine of continuous voyage was to be treated in this way? You sent foodstuff into Denmark or Holland; it does not to go into Germany, but is used to feed pigs, and eventually the pigs when fattened may go into Germany, or may be eaten in

Denmark or Holland, and you are to go into court and say that by the doctrine of continuous voyage that food ought not to be ailowed to go into the neutral countries, because it is food which is used to feed the pigs which may or may not go to Germany. On the face of that you might starve the Danes, or the Dutch, or other neutrals. How do you know when bread goes into Norway that the Norwegian who feeds upon it may not join the German Army? There is continuous voyage for you! (Ibid. 271274.)

CONCLUSION

While the early decisions upon continuous voyage related to vessels engaging in time of war in trade which was not open to them in time of peace, later decisions greatly extended this doctrine. The destination of vessel or the destination of the cargo might make it liable to condemnation. The cargo might go forward by another vessel or by overland transport. In case of the cargo it was maintained that it made no difference as to how many intermediate means of transport or national boundaries might interpose, it was the ultimate destination that determined liability, and the doctrine of ultimate destination came to be accepted. The ultimate destination was viewed as an objective fact, regardless of the intent of the parties concerned. In the case of the Kim in 1915 Sir Samuel Evans, president of the British prize court, said:

I have no hesitation in pronouncing that, in my view, the doc. trine of continuous voyage or transportation, both in relation to carriage by sea and to carriage overland, had become part of the law of nations at the commencement of the present war, in accordance with the principles of recognized legal decisions and with the view of the great body of modern jurists and also with the practice of nations in recent maritime warfare.

The result is that the court is not restricted in its vision to the primary consignments of the goods in these cases to the neutral port of Copenhagen; but is entitled, and bound, to take a more extended outlook in order to ascertain whether this neutral destination was merely ostensible and, if so, what the real ultimate destination was.

As to the real destination of a cargo, one of the chief tests is whether it was consigned to the neutral port to be there delivered