judgment as to what it can and should do, to develop and maintain its own capacity to resist and to help others. The judgment of the executive branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist the other countries in the pact to maintain their collective security. The pact does not bind the Congress to reach that same conclusion, for it does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment. It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment. Thus, if you ratify the pact, it cannot be said that there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.

I therefore earnestly trust that the Congress will see fit to enable this Government to carry out that aspect of its foreign policy represented by the proposed military assistance program. At the same time, I urge that both the treaty and the proposed military assistance program should be considered separately and on their own merits.

For my own part I believe that both the North Atlantic Treaty and the military assistance program will contribute to world-wide security.

THE TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The treaty is wholly consistent with the Charter and designed to strengthen the system of international law of which the Charter is the basis. It will give security and confidence to the signatory nations, whose common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs draw them naturally together, and whose well-being is vital to world re

covery.

The added security of these nations does not threaten or weaken any other nation or portion of the world. The principles which draw these nations into natural affinity and which they seek to defendfreedom of the individual, tolerance and restraint, and the rule of law are the principles which unite free peoples throughout the world.

The determination to provide defense for these principles by the 12 nations joining in this treaty-added to the other steps taken by these and other nations to wage peace-must be an encouragement to all free peoples who wish peace based on these principles.

PREVENTIVE EFFECT OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The treaty is the practical expression of the determination that an aggressor cannot divide these nations and pick them off one by one. History has taught us that the absence of such determination and of its clear statement in advance is gravely dangerous. The knowledge that armed attack will be met by collective defense, prompt and effective, will surely have a steadying effect on anyone from whom that transgression might come.

The political and moral strength which this treaty adds to the accumulating economic strength of a vital portion of the world will strengthen our ability to build a world in which freedom is maintained and expanded and in which the problems remaining and growing out of the war can be solved in an atmosphere free of the fear of aggression.

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In conclusion I should like to repeat to you words which the President used at the signing of the treaty:

It is a simple document, but if it had existed in 1914 and in 1939, supported by the nations which are represented here today, I believe it would have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two world wars.

For us war is not inevitable. We do not believe that there are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or the other. In our own times we have seen brave men overcome obstacles that seemed insurmountable and forces that seemed overwhelming. Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom-war or peace.

I have no doubt which they will choose. The treaty we are signing here today is evidence of the path they will follow.

If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and peace.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you are agreeable to questions at this time, are you not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my statement and I am at your service for questions.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THE TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I understand from your testimony and from our own knowledge of the matter that this is a defensive treaty, a defensive treaty aimed at the preservation of peace rather than at aggressive or offensive action on the part of the signatories to the treaty. Is that not true?

Secretary ACHESON. That is entirely correct, Mr. Chairman. It is wholly defensive. There are no aggressive designs of any sort openly stated, covertly concealed, or in any way connected with this treaty.

COMPARISON WITH OLD MILITARY ALLIANCES

The CHAIRMAN. It has been charged, and will be charged in some quarters, that this is a military alliance. I wish you would discuss and outline the military alliances in Europe and elsewhere in the last century or so and compare them with this particular treaty upon which we are embarking. The balances of power and things of that kind in the old world were commonly denominated military alliances. Would you mind doing that?

Secretary ACHESON. To the best of my ability.

The system of miltary alliances to which you refer was usually embodied in treaties which provided that if one of the signatory partiesthey were usually bilateral treaties became involved in war

The CHAIRMAN. It was not limited to attack on them, but extended also to an enterprise to make war on somebody else, is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. I think that is true; yes, sir. The idea of arrangements to prevent aggression is somewhat modern. In the old treaties it was if you became involved in war, then the other signatory party would come to your help.

Some of the treaties provided that the other signatory party should actually engage in war with military forces; still others provided that they should be benevolent, not neutral but nonbelligerent, and help in any way.

One of the oldest treaties of alliance in existence in the world today is the British-Portuguese treaty.

DEFENSIVE NATURE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The conception of this treaty, and the conception of the Rio treaty and the conception of the Brussels Treaty, is a newer one, and one which grows out of principles and procedures of the United Nations Charter. It is an arrangement entered into within the scope of article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Now I want to make clear that article 51 does not create the right of individual or collective self-defense. That is inherent in all nations. The United Nations Charter merely recognizes that right and says that nothing in the Charter shall impair it or interfere with it in any way.

These arrangements that I have referred to, the Rio Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and this treaty, are arrangements entered into as an exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. They are arrangements entered into by natural communities of nations, in one case by the community of nations in the Western Hemisphere, in another case by that community of nations which represents the Brussels powers, in the third case by the Atlantic community.

It has been pointed out many times that there is nothing contrived or created by the treaty. It is a naturally existing thing. There is a community of spirit, a community of history, and a community of interest in these Atlantic countries, and what they agree to here is that if an armed attack occurs on one of them, it is an attack upon the whole community, and the whole community would join in resisting it. The CHAIRMAN. There is no provision in the treaty, as I understand it, of an aggressive or offensive character whatever.

Secretary ACHESON. There is none, Mr. Chairman.

RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE INHERENT IN ANY STATE

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that without this treaty we would have the right to take the action that the treaty contemplates, if we so desire as a nation?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that in World War I and World War II, without any treaty, we did, because of the armed attack on other nations which we thought threatened the security of the United States, enter the war to resist the aggression by armed powers upon the peaceful nations of the earth, without any treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. We did, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is well to emphasize the fact that you brought out, that this treaty really does not create any new authority or any new powers; it simply is a recognition, under Article 51, of rights which we already possess to cooperate in behalf of peace.

Secretary ACHESON. That is very true. The rights which are exercised through action taken under this treaty are inherent rights, described as such in the United Nations Charter. They inhere in the very existence of nationhood.

The CHAIRMAN. To the nation they are the same as the inherent rights that individuals possess, applied to the nation as a whole. Secretary ACHESON. That is correct.

RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there is a good deal of discussion and confusion, I would say, about the relationship of the treaty itself to the future proposals to furnish arms. I notice you say in your testimony that you think that each one of these instruments should be separately considered and treated on its own merits. Is that correct? Secretary ACHESON. That, I think, is substantially what I said, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I haven't got the point in the testimony right before

me.

Secretary ACHESON. It is on page 9, Mr. Chairman, of the mimeographed statement. The sentence that you refer to is right in the middle of the page, where it says:

I therefore earnestly trust that the Congress will see fit to enable this Government to carry out that aspect of its foreign policy represented by the proposed military assistance program. At the same time I urge that both the treaty and the proposed military assistance program should be considered separately and on their own merits.

OBLIGATION OF VOTING FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AFTER

RATIFICATION OF TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. There is some argument and debate as to whether or not a vote for the treaty carries with it any obligation or duty to vote for the arms program at a later date. Is there anything in the treaty itself that binds the United States even to adopt the military program? I mean explicitly. The general phrase "mutual self-help" is that upon which I suppose they base their argument.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That question is one which it would be pleasant if one could answer "Yes" or "No." I think it requires a very clear understanding.

There is something in the treaty which requires each Member of the Senate, if you ratify this treaty, when he comes to vote on the military assistance program, to exercise his judgment less freely than he would have exercised it if it had not been for this treaty. No Member of the Senate, after the treaty is ratified, in exercising his judgment, can properly say to himself, "I do not believe in the principle of mutual assistance. I think that principle is silly and I will put it out of my mind." That should not be done, because by ratifying this treaty you accept that principle, and that principle exists.

However, when the Senator approaches the vote on the militaryassistance program, if his judgment is different from that which I have described as the judgment of the executive branch, if he thinks either that the United States is not able for financial, economic, or other reasons to help other countries, or if he thinks that it is not necessary to meet the situation as he sees it, there is nothing in this treaty which determines how he shall vote. The thing that exists in the treaty is that he must accept the principle of mutual assistance. He cannot repudiate that, and he must use his own best judgment within the confines of that principle to determine whether or not we can and we should, so far as the world situation is concerned, approve the militaryassistance program as a means of mutual assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true, though, that the Senator would be free, within his own conception of his duty, even though the treaty

does carry the clause of mutual assistance, to determine whether the exact measure which was proposed was within that general scope of mutual assistance that was necessary?

Secretary ACHESON. Of course, Senator Connally. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to make that clear, if I might, because some Senators seem to be bothered with that question. It seems to me that when we treat these two instruments separately that each Senator is under the duty of searching his own conscience and his own mind. as to whether or not the provisions of any particular measure come within the obligations which we will assume when we ratify the treaty. There might be a wide divergence of view in some Senator's mind as to whether it was necessary to adopt any particular measure to meet the general clause of mutual assistance. There might be mutual assistance in other ways besides armed force. So that is your answer on that.

THE TREATY IS NOT AIMED AT ANY STATE

Now, Mr. Secretary, you brought out rather clearly-it won't hurt to reiterate it a little that this treaty is not aimed at any nation particularly. It is aimed only at any nation or any country that contemplates or undertakes armed aggression against the members of the signatory powers. Is that true?"

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator Connally. It is not aimed at any country; it is aimed solely at armed aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, unless a nation other than the signatories contemplates, meditates or makes plans looking toward, aggression or armed attack on another nation, it has no cause to fear this treaty.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator Connally, and it seems to me that any nation which claims that this treaty is directed against it should be reminded of the Biblical admonition that "The guilty flee when no man pursueth."

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very apt illustration.

What I had in mind was, when a State or Nation passes a criminal act, for instance, against burglary, nobody but those who are burglars or getting ready to be burglars need have any fear of the Burglary Act. Is that not true?

Secretary ACHESON. Very true.

The CHAIRMAN. And so it is with one who might meditate and get ready and arm himself to commit a murder. If he is not going to indulge in that kind of enterprise, the law on murder would not have any effect on him, would it?

Secretary ACHESON. The only effect it would have would be for his protection, perhaps, by deterring someone else. He wouldn't worry about the imposition of the penalties on himself, but he might feel that the statute added to his protection.

NO SURRENDER OF SOVEREIGNTY

The CHAIRMAN. Some people contend that this is a treaty limiting our freedom of action and sovereignty and so on. Is it not true that the very organization of the United Nations is a treaty to which we