bute to it only an apprehension of truths which natural reason is capable of discovering; and in the faith of Abel there can be no doubt that there was a certain eminence which peculiarly demands our attention. Faith, in its most common scriptural acceptation, respects the promise of God" things hoped for," of which it substantially assures. It cannot be denied, therefore, that Abel's sacrifice was of divine appointment, or it would not have been of faith. It equally appears, that it respected some good to be obtained, or it would not have been a thing hoped for. What, then, was this advantage? Clearly, the justification of his person. By it "he obtained witness that he was righteous."

Here, then, is the first of animal sacrifices ordained by God, and procuring the pardon of him that offered it, because offered in faith, steadfast trust, upon Him that had so promised. But even this does not reach the whole

of the case. The only promise of which the Bible gives us any account, before the transaction in question, was a promise of the seed of the woman, and his hostility to the seed of the serpent, through which he was himself at first

to be a sufferer, but ultimately a complete victor. That the terms of this promise are mysterious, will be readily admitted; but that Abel understood its real meaning, seems all but demonstrable from the fact, that upon this ground alone he offered a sacrifice for obtaining the pardon of sin.

There is also a peculiarity in the terms employed in describing the blessing which the faith of Abel succeeded in procuring. Not only was he righteous; not merely did his reliance upon the promise of God, and his consequent sacrifice, ensure his justification; but, as if God would show a peculiar and emphatic approbation of his spirit and conduct, it is added, "he obtained witness that he was righteous." He received the divine assurance to this effect, and to all ages secured the divine testimony. Hence, by our Lord himself, he is called "righteous Abel;" and St. John supplies a similar statement. Thus is his sacrifice presented to the continual observation of pious minds, especially in its prevalence.

Beyond this, it has the advantage of contrast to render it yet more impressive. He offered a more acceptable sacrifice than Cain.

If Abel's offering was rendered acceptable to God by faith, in his brother the absence of faith must have been the cause of his rejection. There may have been other causes combined with this; but we have nothing specific to this effect in Scripture. Now, Cain's unbelief operated in inducing him to offer to God a sacrifice of fruits; and had this act of the first brothers been merely eucharistic, I confess that, in my judgment, the elder would have had the advantage. Upon the rejection of Cain's sacrifice, God condescended to reason with him: "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door." Gen. iv. 7. The doing well here undoubtedly refers to the sacrifice in question, as there is no previous transaction in the life of Cain of which we have the slightest hint; and it cannot be supposed that the divine expostulation would have thus been placed in such peculiar prominence, if we had been left wholly unacquainted with the reasons upon which it was founded. And it must, therefore, be to this that St. John refers, when he says that the works of Cain were evil; because, except this, we have no part of

Cain's history before the murder of his brother; which flagitious act the Apostle refers to the hatred conceived by him against his brother, in consequence of the contrast between their conduct. The drift of the divine reasoning with Cain was this,-if he did well, and offered up a suitable sacrifice, he should most certainly be accepted, not his offering merely, but himself also; while, if he did not well, the fault was his own, and consequently he had no one but himself to blame for his rejection. Does not this, then, most distinctly imply, that God had given every needful instruction as to the nature and design of sacrifice? A departure from a prescribed mode would certainly incur guilt; but a mere error in judgment, where there was no adequate source of information, would not have been thus denounced. Cain must have known that God had chosen to be propitiated by the shedding of blood; and because he did not acknowledge the divine appointment, he and his sacrifice were rejected.

In the conduct of Abel we find a recognition of that great analogy which we are solicitous to establish. The promise of the Redeemer

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supplied the first impulse to his faith; the justification of his person through an analogical rite was its proximate object. Whether Abel understood all the circumstances which gave emphasis and force to the type of his own sacrifice, it is not now needful to inquire. That he had sufficient information for every practical purpose, will not be matter of dispute.

But whether Abel had or had not a clear discovery of all the points of analogy between the shedding of the blood of an animal, and the conflict of the seed of the woman, it is certain that such an analogy existed. Otherwise, faith in the first promise would not have led to a sacrifice, and there was no other promise of which we have any information. In the mind of God, therefore, there must have been a determination to institute this analogy for the instruction of all subsequent ages; and hence he gave peculiar publicity (so to speak) to the first practical acknowledgment of its existence. It is natural, therefore, for us to inquire into the meaning of the sacrifice of Abel, in connexion with the fulfilment of that first promise upon which his faith was founded,

The penalty of sin was death. This Abel