SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD Prepared Statement before Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information Of the Senate Judiciary Committee "Protecting the Homeland: The President's Proposal for June 25, 2002 By Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Destler* Madame Chairwoman, Senator Kyl, members of the committee, it is a great pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the president's proposal for reorganizing the homeland security effort. This and the many other hearings that are taking place on Capitol Hill are vitally important for making sure that the Congress and the president together reach the right decisions on how to reform our federal government effort. The president earlier this month proposed a massive reorganization effort-larger than any other such effort since Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 resulting in the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. The president's proposal, even by its own account, was drawn up hastily and without expert input. It is therefore incumbent on you and the other members of Congress to give the proposal the thorough scrubbing and expert analysis it needs. Doing so, is likely to take some time-months, rather than weeks. The President's Reorganization Proposal By its own account, the Bush administration only seriously considered the possibility of reorganizing the federal government in late April 2002-more than seven months after the horrible events of September 11. Up to that point, the administration The authors are, respectively, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland. They have collaborated on the issue of homeland security organization since last September. Among their most recent writings on the issue are: (with others) Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis (Brookings, 2002); "Advisors, Czars and Councils: Organizing for Homeland Security," National Interest, No. 68 (Summer 2002); "Enhancing Homeland Security: Organizational Options," Paper prepared for The Century Foundation Task Force on Homeland Security (May 2002); and "Congress is left with the hard task of shaping a Homeland Security Department that works," San Jose Mercury Homeland Security Testimony -2-July 3, 200207/03/02July 3, 200207/03/02June 24, 2002 believed that the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), the Homeland Security Council (HSC), and the appointment of former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as Director of Homeland Security by executive action in October 2001 met the organizational needs of the federal government. There was some interest in consolidating border security functions—but an effort by Ridge to convince key Cabinet members of the value of merging Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)was rebuffed the Department heads most immediately affected by such a merger. Worried that Tom Ridge was losing out in internal bureaucratic battles, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card suggested to the president that he lead a small, secret White House effort to examine reorganization options. That effort started in late April. It was conducted in absolute secrecy, involving only a very few White House aides. It received no input from experts within the administration, the Congress, or outside the government. And it was completed even before the administration had decided on its homeland security strategy, which Ridge promised he would deliver to the president some time this summer. The result of this effort is the proposal that is now before us. Despite the hasty way in which the president's proposal was developed, the administration now wants Congress to move expeditiously in giving its approval. There are even voices in Congress hoping that legislative action can be completed by the time of the one-year anniversary of the World Trade Center and Pentagon's attacks-now just a few legislative weeks away. However, it would be a mistake to move without a thorough review of the particulars of the president's proposal. Congress and the president need to get it right the first time. It is unliekly that anyone will get a second chance-and certainly not one that will enable a look at the problem and opportunities in as much detail and as comprehensively as is possible right now. If that means a few months of delay, so be it. The president and his administration waited more than seven months to examine these issues-Congress now needs to take the time to get it right. Getting Some Things Right Several elements of the president's proposal meet an important need. This is especially true for the proposed consolidation of border security functions-bringing into a single agency six critical tasks that are presently housed in five different government departments. Every other reorganization proposal-from the Hart-Rudman Commission in early 2001 to Tom Ridge last December to legislation introduced by Senator Lieberman, Representative Thornberry, and others last year to the proposal we at the Brookings Institution put forward in April-called for consolidating border security functions in a single agency or department. The need for a "common face at the border," as Governor Ridge has frequently argued, is both widely agreed upon and urgent. Homeland Security Testimony -3-July 3, 200207/03/02July 3, 200207/03/02June 24, 2002 The administration's decision to include critical transportation functions in this mix is also very much to be welcomed. Although borders may be static, the people and goods that cross them use the air, rail, road, and sea transportation routes to move from points abroad to the U.S. interior. Border security is of necessity a dynamic, not a static activity. Take the example of foreign visitors. It clearly makes sense for the new department to decide who should be allowed entry into the United States by determining whether or not a person can get a visa, to control border crossings to make sure only those with a valid visa actually enter, and to make sure that persons having entered the country do not overstay their visas. The committee should therefore revisit the administration's decision not to include the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs in its proposed merger, even though consular officers are responsible for administrating the visa issuance process. On its own, consolidation of the border and transportation functions is already a massive undertaking. Over 90 percent of all the people to be housed in the president's proposed Department of Homeland Security will be responsible for just these two functions. And nearly 65 percent of the proposed department's budget will go to these tasks. If on top of that, the critical infrastructure protection tasks-which are functionally akin to transportation security-were also to be included, then much of what the president has proposed to consolidate will have been accounted for. That, in turn, raises real questions about some of the other components of the president's proposal. Some Real Questions Remain It clearly makes sense to consolidate into a single entity those agencies responsible for the security of our borders, transportation routes, and critical infrastructure that are now widely dispersed throughout the federal government. But the president did not stop there. Other key functions related to the terrorist threat at home-from intelligence analysis to training first responders to chemical, biological, and nuclear countermeasures-are also to be included in the new department. And with all these agencies come tasks and functions that have nothing to do with terrorismfighting counterfeiting, ensuring the health of zoo and circus animals, rescuing mountaineers, responding to national disasters, and researching infectious diseases, to name but a few-all of which are now to become the responsibility of the Secretary for Homeland Security. Before Congress moves to accept the administration's proposals wholesale, it needs to take a careful look at some of the specifics and the consequences that might flow from them. Three issues in particular stand out: the scope of the department, the information analysis function, and the role of the White House in ensuring governmentwide coordination of the homeland security effort. Homeland Security Testimony - 4-July 3, 200207/03/02July 3, 200207/03/02June 24, 2002 Should the Department Mix Apples and Oranges? Although the vast bulk of the proposed department's personnel and much of its budget will go to secure the nation's borders and transportation infrastructure, most of the agencies and functions the Bush administration proposes to merge into the new department address other aspects of the homeland security problem. Thus, a second pillar of the proposed department (built around the Federal Emergency Management Agency) deals with responding to attacks that have taken place, a third addresses chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBR&N) countermeasures, and a fourth responds to the need for integrating analysis of law enforcement and intelligence information. While each of these pillars are responsible for some aspect of homeland security, it is not immediately obvious that all of them need to be responsive to a single Cabinet secretary. Take FEMA. This is one of the best run federal government agencies. It has excellent record, gained through years of responding to natural disasters, of dealing with state and local government entities and first responders. In its FY2003 budget, the Bush administration proposed that FEMA take central control of all training and grant programs for first responders, providing state and local authorities with the kind of one-stop shopping and integrated training program they have long demanded. Why, then, tear an agency with such a successful record from its roots and integrate into a much larger bureaucracy, with new command and control lines? Much of its day-to-day responsibility has nothing to do with terrorism-and whatever responsibility it does have for this area is fundamentally different from the preventive and protective counterterrorism functions of other parts of the proposed department. No one proposes to merge the diplomatic functions of the State Department with the military functions of the Pentagon, even though both have a role in national security policy—including in countering terrorism. Might it not be better, then, to leave FEMA be, and coordinate its counter-terrorism role as part of a well-functioning interagency process? A similar set of questions arises in the case of the proposal to merge various CBR&N countermeasure activities into the department. To be sure, as the anthrax mailings showed, terrorism using weapons of mass destruction is a serious problem demanding our government's highest attention. We need to do much more in making sure terrorists cannot get their hands on such weapons or the materials needed to manufacture them—be it through more intensive non-proliferation measures abroad or tighter controls of dangerous chemicals, pathogens, and radiological/nuclear materials here at home. But none of these efforts is to be the responsibility of the proposed new unit, which is instead to coordinate the research and development of technologies and other measures to counter this threat here at home. In so doing, the proposal at times move in the opposite direction of what is needed-for example, when it proposes to take some of the bioterrorism work being done under the auspices of the Department of Health and Human Services, but not other parts, thus splitting functions that are now bureaucratically consolidated. It may well be the case that the federal government needs to consolidate its many, dispersed activities for dealing with the threat of Homeland Security Testimony -5-July 3, 200207/03/02July 3, 200207/03/02June 24, 2002 weapons of mass destruction. But it is not at all evident that this should be done as part of a new department dealing with homeland security. These are but two particular areas where the Bush administration proposes to mix different functions within a single department. There are others, notably all the non-homeland security functions that are now part of agencies to be merged. Congress needs to take a careful look at each of these proposals and determine whether the costs of change are worth the supposed benefit of integration. Can Information be Analyzed without Access to Raw Data? Responding to recent revelations about data sharing problems within the FBI and between it and the CIA, the administration proposed to include in the new department an information analysis unit that would provide the fusion of disparate pieces of intelligence and other information data that until now was so evidently missing. This fusion is a good idea in principle. Today, there is no single entity in the government that has access to all the data collected by the intelligence community through wiretapping, spying, and other means abroad, by the FBI and law enforcement community through interrogation, surveillance, bugging, cybersurfing, etc. at home, and by the various border agencies through visa screening, manifest recording, and various other data gathering activities. The new information analysis unit is supposed to fill that niche. But will the new unit be able to do its assigned task? As proposed, the answer is no. The new unit will have access only to FBI and CIA "reports, assessments, and analytical information relating to threats of terrorism in the United States," but not to any of the raw intelligence or law enforcement data on which these analyses and assessments are based. But that defeats the whole purpose of the new unit, for the analyses it receives are themselves based on incomplete information-reflecting, in the CIA's case, only the raw intelligence data the intelligence community has collected plus whatever other data the FBI and others may have shared with it and, in the FBI's case, only the law enforcement data it has collected and whatever other data the CIA decides to share with it. In other words, the analyses the information unit will receive and that are to form a major basis of its own assessment may be faulty because the underlying data would not have been adequately shared. The only way in which the data sharing problem can be overcome-and a true fusion of intelligence and law enforcement information can occur-is if the department's proposed unit were to have access to all the data that forms the basis of the assessments and analyses it otherwise is to receive. Recognizing this problem, the administration suggests that the Secretary of the Homeland Security Department can request copies of specific pieces of raw data-but, of course, one cannot ask for information that one doesn't know exists! Only if the proposed unit has access to all relevant raw intelligence and law enforcement data is there a chance that someone can connect the dots that might otherwise remain unconnected. Given the amount of data that comes into the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies, this is mammoth task that will likely take |