gressional Committee on Defense Production, called this proposal "an excellent example of the willingness of the Executive branch to rely heavily on foreign sources of supply or unrealistic estimates of domestic production for meeting military and civilian requirements." 33 In 1974 America consumed 894,708 tons of metallurgical grade chromite ore. If the stockpile is reduced according to Mr. Nixon's plans there will not be enough chrome on hand to last half a year at the present rate of consumption. As of January 1, 1975 there were 1,962,000 tons of usable metallurgical grade chromite ore in the national stockpile. This should be kept. There are no serious natural reserves of chrome on the North American mainland. If we ever ran out of this material during a war it would have to be imported by sea from countries thousands of miles away Chrome is vital to the health of a modern industrial economy. We should also remember that the stockpile has economic as well as strategic significance. It's the best guarantee we have against arbitrary rises in the prices chrome exporters choose to charge us. It gives us the option to refuse to purchase chrome that is not offered at a reasonable price. The Arab oil embargo and the subsequent price rise by fiat of the OPEC cartel have shown the dangers of not maintaining adequate stockpiles of critical imported materials. In the case of chrome the supporters of H.R. 1287 have apparently chosen to ignore these dangers. Can the American people afford to do likewise? VI. FERROCHROMIUM AND RHODESIA The main end use of chrome in America is stainless steel. Metallurgical grade chromite ore cannot be turned directly into stainless steel. It must first be turned into ferrochromium. One of the major economic trends of our time is the move by developing countries to process the raw materials they export, thus generating more foreign exchange. This is apparent in Mideast where the oil exporters are involved in a major refinery building program. 33 It is apparent in Africa and the Caribbean where Guinea 36 and Jamaica 37 have announced plans to build huge plants that will convert bauxite into alumina for export. Rhodesia and South Africa have followed this trend. Both have built major ferrochromium plants. Needless to say it is cheaper to process a raw material near its source than thousands of miles away. Thus the processing industries of the producing countries will be able to undercut the processing industries of the consuming countries. It is also important to note that it is more profitable to export a semi-finished product than a raw material so the producers are likely to emphasize the export of the former at the expense of the latter in the future. What all this means is a change in the world economic order. It means more money flowing from the more advanced nations toward the developing world. The rise of the Rhodesian ferrochromium industry is part of this change. It is not due to "slave labor" as supporters of H.R. 1287 claim. According to the London Economist the black workers of Rhodesia are among the highest paid in Africa. The price difference comes from the low costs of transportation and the cheap hydro-electric power generated by the Kariba Dam. Cutting America off from chrome and ferrochromium from Rhodesia will not save the U.S. ferrochromium industry. South Africa is engaged in a massive expansion of its ferrochromium facilities. It's unlikely the Russians will stay out of such a profitable business for long Sanctions failed to help the US. ferrochromium industry in the past. While they were in effect, the US. production of ferrochromium fell from 313,793 short tons in 1967 to 244,030 short tons in 1971,39 the last year of the sanctions. The repeal of the sanctions raised US ferrochromium production to 304,952 tons in 1974. 40 It's difficult to see how their restoration will be of much help in this area of the economy. VII. RHODESIAN SANCTIONS AND U.S. UNEMPLOYMENT While it's unlikely that the passage of H.R. 1287 would do much good for workers in the American ferrochromium industry, there is serious evidence that this bill would be a disaster for workers in the U.S. stainless steel industry. According to a detailed study of the situation by the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Mi ami, a renewal of U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia would reduce the amount of work in the American stainless steel industry by 2,000,000 manhours. Thus, it is likely that the passage of H.R. 1287 would accentuate the worst aspects of the present "stagflation". It would increase both inflation and unemployment. VIII. WILL TRADE WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA LEAD TO EMBARGOES FROM BLACK AFRICA? This is a possibility but not a very likely one. In the eyes of black Africa the U.Š. is not the major violator of the sanctions. At the annual meeting of the Organization of African Unity in 1974 Japan was named as the "most notorious sanctions buster". France was labeled as the second biggest villain." The black African states do not like the fact that in 1971 America joined Switzerland and South Africa in openly repudiating the UN sanctions but they are well aware of who is doing the most sanctions breaking. The black states have shown little inclination to go beyond rhetoric in punishing western states for their trade with southern Africa. France, for instance, has very good relations with black Africa. French corporations today 42 dominate the Nigerian auto industry. Yet France is also the major supplier of foreign arms to South Africa" as well as a violator of the Rhodesian sanctions. Even if the black states chose to punish America for its trade with Rhodesia they would not be in a very good position to do so. Unlike Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait the mineral-rich black African states need every penny of the revenues they earn for internal development. They could not very well afford a campaign of economic warfare against the U.S. Furthermore, if they mounted such a project, it would not be very effective. A look at the major mineral resources they control shows why. In the case of manganese Gabon's reserves are equalled by those of Brazil and South Africa,47 and manganese may also soon be mined from the sea floor.4 Furthermore, there is a current excess mining capacity among the world's major producers. 49 At present Guinea's large bauxite reserves are not important to us since we do not import much of this material from Guinea. Even if we did it is important to keep in mind that Australia has just as much bauxite as Guinea.51 Contrary to Senator McGee's totally fallacious claim during the 1973 Senate debate 52 we do not get most of our copper from Zambia. The overwhelming majority of our imports come from Canada, Chile and Peru. Furthermore, America has the largest copper reserves in the world.54 They supply 90% of our current demands.55 53 try as a whole has still not recovered from the ravages of the recent civil war. Nigeria needs all the money it can earn from the sale of its oil. We should also keep in mind that Nigeria does not represent a large percentage of the world's total oil reserves. It has 3% of the world's total supply of petroleum.5 On the other hand, Rhodesia and South Africa control almost all the chrome in the world - 96%. Together they control 89% of the world's reserves of metallurgical chrome, and Rhodesia alone controls 67%.59 All the black African states together do not control any major mineral so completely. While there are viable alternatives for every major mineral we get from black Africa, there are no long range viable alternatives for the chrome from southern Africa. Thus, if we had to choose between trade with black Africa and trade with southern Africa, the choice would have to be in favor of southern Africa. Furthermore, we should not allow American policy to be changed by foreign economic blackmail. Rather than dumping raw material stockpiles as Nixonomics decried to cover up a failure to fight inflation, we should build up stockpiles of raw materials we lack at home and institute a strict recycling program to make the most efficient use of what we do import. We should try to diversify our sources of raw materials giving particular preference to those nations who pursue generally friendly policies toward the U.S. Appeasement has never been a very good method of dealing with aggression be it military or economic. 4. Ibid., p 251 5. Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. 7 March 1974 6. Andrei Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks. Knopf, NY. 1974, p. 45 7 The Daily Telegraph London, 7 June 1974 8 The Manchester Guardian (Weekly International Edition), 22 March 1975 9. The Economist London), 16 November 1974 10. The New York Times, 4 August 1974 11. The Washington Post. 18 March 1975 12. Jack Anderson in The New York Post. 14 March 1974 13 Roger Morris. Passing By The United States and Genocide in Burundi 1972. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1974 14 The Washington Post, 6 July 1974 15 United Nations Office of Public Information. UN Monthly Chronicle. May 1974. p 34 16 The New York Times, 25 April 1974 17 TIME. 17 March 1975 18. The Economist (London, 16 November 1974 19 The Daily Telegraph London, 18 April 1975 20. Fortune. April 1971 21 The Financial Times (London) 2 July 1974 22 The Rand Daily Mail, 10 December 1974 23 The Africa Research Bulletin London, 30 June 1973 24 The National Materials Advisory Board, op cit. p 16 25 US Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook and Mineral Industry Surveys 26. The National Security Council and the Council on International Economic Policy. Special Report Critical Imported Materials. December 1974, p 17 27 US News and World Report, 29 May 1972 28 The New York Times, 16 October 1973 29. Victor Zorza in The Washington Post. 20 November 1973 The New York Times, 13 March 1974 30 CBS News, 8 February 1974 argument for not trading with Rhodesia? Is it logical to consider the Soviet Union a reliable source for a strategic raw material when it breaks agreements with us within months of signing them? Is it practical to cut the U.S. consumer off 67% of the world's reserves of metallurgical chrome? Should we fuel the present high rate of inflation in America by actions which will most surely drive up the price of a commodity we import? We think not. We most strongly urge the House to kill the Rhodesian chrome bill when it reaches the floor. 48 Newsweek, 24 June 1974 49. The National Security Council and the Council and the Council on International Economic Policy. op cit. p. 33 50 US Department of Commerce, Imports Commodity by Country. December 1973 51 US Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbook 1971. Volume III p 35 52 The Congressional Record. 18 December 1973, p S23195 53 US Department of Commerce, op ett 54 The Morgan Guarantee Survey, March 1974 55 The New York Times. 22 April 1974 56 The Washington Post, 24 October 1974 57 The Manchester Guardian weekly International Edition 12 October 1974 58. The Oil and Gas Journal, 30 December 1974 59 US Bureau of Mines. Bulletin 650, 1970. p. 251 60 The Washington Star News. 21 December 1973 61. The Neu York Times, 18 July 1974 APPENDIX VI COMMUNIST SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO NATIONALIST POLITICAL GROUPS IN RHODESIA This material was prepared and circulated by the Rhodesian Information Office, 2852 McGill Terrace, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008 which is registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as an agent of the Ministry of Information, Government of Rhodesia, Salisbury. This material is filed with the Department of Justice where the required registration statement is available for public inspection. Registration does not indicate approval of the contents of this material by the United States Government. Communist leanings of Rhodesian Nationalist groups which are now combined under the aegis of the African National Council In December, 1974 the Rhodesian Government released leaders of two African nationalist political parties banned in Rhodesia from their restriction so that they could attend a meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, with the Presidents of Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Mocambique, neighbours of Rhodesia, in an attempt to unify Rhodesian black nationalists under one banner. As a result of the meetings the Rhodesian nationalists agreed to submit to the leadership of United Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa under the banner of the African National Council. They also agreed to abolish their former political parties the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). In the months that followed this agreement it became obvious that the factions within the African National Council were still at odds with each other and pursuing the ideologies developed during the early sixties. There has been frequent contact with communist countries by members of the banned political parties and Rhodesian blacks have been trained, both in ideology and sabotage. They have received through the 0.A.U. and directly generous gifts of weapons of communist origin. The purpose of this paper is to show the communist support, both ideological and military, that these factions are receiving. Links to Communist Countries The Rhodesian Government has been aware since the early 1960's of numerous visits to Moscow and Peking by leaders of the nationalist groups. The pattern that emerges here is of close links between ZAPU and the USSR and between ŽANU and the PRC. During this period the external missions of ZAPU were known to be coming under increasing communist influence, especially in London, where the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was actively engaged in organising "platforms" on ZAPU's behalf. Advertisements of communist content also appeared in the "Zimbabwe Review", a Party propaganda organ published in London. The following are countries in which it is known that Rhodesian nationalists have undergone para-military and sabotage training under communist direction: RUSSIA Groups of Rhodesian African nationalists have NORTH KOREA CHINA GHANA Rhodesian African nationalist have been Groups of Rhodesian African nationalists have Large groups of Rhodesian African nationalists were trained at Half Assini and Abenamadi Camps in Ghana during 1965. Instruction was given in guerrilla warfare, weapon training, explosives and sabotage technique by thirteen Chinese instructors. To bring the situation into the seventies, the following is extracted from a report by the American African Affairs Association, Inc., of 303 Fifth Avenue, New York. The report was written by Professor Walter Darnell Jacobs of the University of Maryland. extract follows: The relevant "In order to judge the extent of Communist support of ZANU and ZAPU ZANU and ZAPU have been under some pressure from the OAU and several leading African politicians to merge their efforts. In spite of the split between the USSR and PRC, Moscow and Peking have not appeared averse to |