I would not argue whether we are bound by international law; I really don't know that. I would not argue the merit or demerits of the United Nations. This is a debatable thing. But it is clear we did, when we had the opportunity to veto, instead voted for these resolutions in each case, first the partial, and then the full ban.

So we were very much parties to an international agreement and commitment which we saw fit later by public law to, in part, violate. Why do I think we should change this posture now?

Mr. Chairman, like the present President, the former President, the Secretary of State, and it is my understanding the Secretary of Defense, I do not believe that this will violate the national security interests of the United States, and I do believe it to be in our national interest to repeal the Byrd amendment at this time.

I believe so first of all because I think we can at this moment get along without Rhodesian chrome at the levels I have just discussed.

But I would agree with all of those who say we will have a very difficult time in the long run, doing without the chrome from the country that has the world's largest reserves, the lion's share of the total world reserves of chrome. I would agree in the long run we are going to have a hard time doing without Rhodesian chrome.

But if our view is long-run, rather than short-run, then there are certain other things we ought to take into consideration beyond our present reliance. First of all, the government which now controls Rhodesia. I think, will have to go against all the tides of history to long survive.

The recent history of Africa and of the remaining vestiges of colonialism in Africa, I think, underline the impending doom of the Ian Smith regime. Whether one believes it to be good, bad, or indifferent, the entity in Rhodesia which is really sitting on powder keg is the government itself.

There are strong feelings, not only within the country but throughout the continent of Africa, about the illegality of this regime, and about its nature.

At this point in history a moderate leader, Bishop Muzorewa, who is a nonviolent type, is attempting with the British to negotiate a new arrangement within Rhodesia that would spell greater participation for the black majority and greater equity for black citizens within that country. But he has made it very clear he does not seek to throw the white minority out or to dispossess them or to violate their rights, only to negotiate an arrangement that is just from a black majority view for all the people of Rhodesia.

Now, at this point in history, if those negotiations could succeed. there would be a change for a stable, moderate government, protecting everyone's rights in Rhodesia.

If, however, those negotiations are frustrated, then there are extant in the country and in the area those revolutionary forces which may well bring about a violent solution, and which is very apt to bring as an end result a more revolutionary, more leftist, more extreme government whose policies would certainly be more adverse to the United

States.

We are concerned about our present reliance on the Soviet Union, and I don't like that situation, but the fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, that we can well find ourselves confronted down the road with a

situation where a radical regime by violent men has taken over in Rhodesia, where there is possibly a leftist regime, where we will bear the total of our reliance on either the Russians or that counterregime in Rhodesia. I think that is a very adverse contingency.

Mr. BENNETT. And of course that overthrow wouldn't necessarily have to be indigenous.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No, sir; it would not.

Mr. BENNETT. In fact, it probably would not be.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Probably would not be because of the revolutionary movements in the area.

Mr. BENNETT. If you see something boiling and want to take it over, that is the time to take it over.

Mr. BUCHANAN. We are certainly aware a certain group of international conspirators have used this method before and it could be used in Africa. In any case I see that prospect being the most disturbing for our country's long-term interest.

We have interest in Rhodesia, and not only are we dependent in part, at this point in history in small part, but in the longer run much more, for Rhodesian chrome, but we have other items that are valuable to us, such as copper and oil, supplied from Africa.

I don't know what we would have done without Nigeria, which has become one of our leading sources of petroleum during this time of crisis. Although a member of OPEC, as you are aware, the Nigerians continued to supply us during the embargo and they have been good friends to us in the matter of oil supply.

But there is very strong feeling in Nigeria and other African countries that are important sources of copper and other such materials against the U.S. position vis-a-vis the Rhodesian matter. While I would agree with the Chair that we very seldom get rewarded for good things, I think it is a little more typical of the world where we do something that is like waving a red flag at a bull, as far as the people are concerned they are apt to react and strike out at us in various

ways.

I think we stand to risk the wrath of Africa over this policy that could affect not only our long-run access to chrome, but to other vital materials as well and which could also cut off promising new markets of export for our country, because of the reactions to this public policy which the United States alone has of all the countries in the world that might be doing business with Africa.

So I would say from the long-run national interest point of view it would be in our best interest to be in line with the aspirations of the black majority in Rhodesia and Africa. To demonstrate friendship and compassion and understanding toward them, and to get our policies in the kind of shape that would put us on the historically right side toward countries that control these vital raw materials. I would add just one footnote to that idea, as a basic idea of my testimony, Mr. Chairman.

I personally am very much convinced that we would be moving to the morally right side in support of self-determination and human rights and human freedom and in support of the negotiating process that can succeed with our help but may well fail without it.

Thank you.

Mr. BENNETT. Mrs. Schroeder.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you. I think you made an eloquent statement, and I'm absolutely delighted you pointed out the long-term and the short-term implications.

Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

Mr. BENNETT. I want to thank you very much for your testimony. As usual you make a splendid appearance in anything you talk about. You are well-read, and you are conscientious, and you are a great Congressman.

Since I have to go to another meeting at 1 o'clock, I think we had better adjourn. We will adjourn until 2 o'clock and come back here at 2 o'clock. I am sorry we held some people up.

[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION-JULY 21, 1975

Mr. BENNETT. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are honored to have Congressman McDonald, if he will come up, to be our first witness this afternoon.

I'm glad that we are not in House session this afternoon, so we can be a little leisurely. This morning we were under some tightness because of the fact that the committee also was in session.

Dr. McDonald is a member of the subcommittee. We're glad to hear from you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY MCDONALD, REPRESENTATIVE

FROM GEORGIA

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly appreciate the opportunity to testify today on this measure. I am appreciative that the Rhodesian chrome issue has been before the Congress on several occasions, and that some of the arguments that will be set forth in my statement have been articulated before, perhaps in a better fashion.

The report of the bill by the International Relations Committee sets forth most of the usual arguments. Generally, I wish to associate myself with those signing the minority views as they most closely express my own feelings on the matter. However, in addition, I wish to expand on some of the points made in that report and add some of my own. The economic aspects of this problem probably have been thoroughly discussed as to the pro and con of sanctions. One economic aspect I will mention, and that is the stockpile question, which our committee looks after. We are all aware that the Ford administration wishes to reduce all stockpiles of critical materials from 3 years to 1 year, and this is very risky. The administration has presented no valid argument for this. No one can foresee into the future regarding a conflict as to how long we will have to fight. We do not want dependence on the country most likely to go to war with us. It is doubtful, and we would all agree, that we will ever go to war with Rhodesia. It is in the best interests of the United States to diversify as much as possible her

sources of raw material. And, as the minority views of the bill note, the Soviet Union has already raised her price for 1975 delivery of chrome to $160 a ton. Contrast this, if you will, with the $51.73 per ton price when sanctions were lifted.

But one other thing also stands out. During the hey-day of the socalled cold war, many persons told us that it was futile to erect trade barriers against the Communist nations and that that would only make them more hostile. Now we have some of these same people telling us we should lift our embargo against Cuba. Trade reduces tensions, we are told. Now if this argument has any logic to it, wouldn't tension with Rhodesia be minimal if we maintained trade with her? Following on with the same line of reasoning, we are often told that only through dialog and more communication can we influence foreign nations. So, if our purpose is to influence Rhodesia, why embargo trade with her and maintain no diplomatic relations? We've paid our "pence to the British crown," I believe, and it is time to act in our own self-interest, in my view.

Now a great deal has been made of the point that we have to comply with the U.N. sanctions in order to have good relations with the black nations of Africa. There is no doubt that they want us to comply and would like us to do so. But, I can think of none of them that will be more friendly or who would be our ally in time of need, if we did so. Most of these same nations trade with South Africa, but they don't talk about it.

I think we should look at what has happened. It has now been 10 years and Rhodesia has not fallen. It has now been 10 years and no great guerrilla movement has developed in Rhodesia amongst the population. And, let's face the fact that if the Rhodesian blacks are so discontented, they so outnumber the whites to the point that their position would quickly become untenable if the blacks joined the Marxist-inspired and Communist-armed guerrilla raiders coming across their border on occasional forays. But what has happened? The Rhodesian blacks have assisted the authorities in most cases in rounding up the raiders. This is not to say that Rhodesia is perfect, but it is also far from having the most problems in the world.

Last, I rebel at having to follow the dictates of the largest floating cocktail party on the Hudson. The sheer hypocrisy of a United States that declares Rhodesia a threat to the world's security but can look the other way when the U.S.S.R. crushes Czechoslovakia, and North Vietnam invades South Vietnam. and admits a terrorist to its platform from the so-called Palestine Liberation Front, says something indeed about the sanity and wisdom of this organization, which we ought to withdraw from forthwith.

I am unalterably opposed to this bill.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you very much, Dr. McDonald.

Mr. Hicks.

Mr. HICKS. I'm here for learning purposes. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, you can also ask questions.

Mr. HICKS. I have to learn something before I can ask questions.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Daniel.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. I have no questions.

Mr. BENNETT. I want to compliment you on coming forth today and assuming real leadership in things that have to be looked at.

I'm not going to ask you any questions at this point. Come join us, if you will.

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENNETT. We have before us Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State. If you will come forward. Thank you.

I understand the latter title I gave you describes the substance of your present work and the former refers to your previous position. The title of Ambassador is given to certain people who once had responsibilities within the Department of State. Is that correct?

Mr. DAVIS. I would say the Ambassador is slightly like a Kentucky colonel. I was an ambassador, but I'm now an Assistant Secretary. Mr. BENNETT. I understand. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. If perhaps I might introduce my colleagues here and with your permission, they might join me?

Mr. BENNETT. Yes. Why don't they join you at the table?

Mr. DAVIS. This is Mr. Haverkamp, our director of southern African affairs: and Mr. David Christensen, who is our economic officer. Mr. BENNETT. You were Ambassador to Rhodesia?

Mr. DAVIS. Not to Rhodesia, sir. I was Ambassador to Guatemala and to Chile.

Mr. BENNETT. We're glad to have you with us today. Chile might have been a little harder.

Proceed.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR NATHANIEL DAVIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss H.R. 1287, a bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 so as to halt the importation of chrome ore and certain other materials from southern Rhodesia.

As the subcommittee is aware, such importation is permitted, in violation of U.N. economic sanctions against Rhodesia, under section 503 of the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1972-the Byrd amendment. This legislation has as a stated major objective the lessening of U.S. dependence on the Soviet Union as a source of chromium ore imports.

In fact, since the enactment of the Byrd amendment, imports of chromium ore from the Soviet Union have remained above 50 percent of total U.S. imports, while imports of the same ore from Rhodesia have climbed only slightly, from 10 percent of the total in 1972 to 13 percent in 1974. The Byrd amendment has not accomplished its stated objective of lessening our dependence on Soviet supplies. It has, instead. provided the illegal Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia with much needed foreign exchange and psvchological support. In providing assistance to the Smith regime, this measure had acted to undercut our basic foreign policy objective of encouraging a negotiated peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, acceptable to the population of Rhodesia as a whole. It has also made our relations with the overwhelming majority