Aside from raising serious questions as to their reliability as a supplier, the Russian embargo also had the effect of further injuring an already weak American ferrochrome industry. Several American ferrochrome facilities were closed due to the unavailability of Russian ore.

With the development of an indigenous ferrochrome industry, the Soviet Union will inevitably become less willing to sell chromite to the United States at any price.

If the Soviet Union, then, is an unrealiable source of chromite ore the domestic industry has only one feasible alternative. It must rely on ore in the stockpile as a backup source. Let us now take a look at this alternative source.

Government Stockpile: Since 1962, the national stockpile of metallurgical grade chromite has declined over 60 percent and is currently at the lowest level in 20 years. The apparent size of the stockpile is further diminished by the fact that 20 percent of available inventories are officially classified "nonstockpile grade”— these inferior stocks cannot be economically used to produce stainless steel and cannot legitimately be included in total stockpile availability. The Administration has recently proposed further liquidating the chromite stockpile retaining less than 6 months' supply in the national inventory.

1 Includes National Stockpile Defense Production Act Stockpile, and Supplemental Stockpile.

2 Source: Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook.

3 Includes 1,668,000 tons nonstockpile grade.

5 Includes 1,594,000 tons nonstockpile grade.

4 Includes 1,482,000 short dry tons nonstockpile grade.

6 Amount of nonstockpile grade included in these figures is not specified by the Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook. 7 Source: GSA.

8 Includes 1,483,175 tons nonstockpile grade. Includes 1,451,708 tons nonstockpile grade. 10 Includes 551,758 tons nonstockpile.

Industry stocks are practically insignificant that the supply of metallurgical grade chromite ore is sufficient for only about 4 months' consumption at the current rate. The Government stockpile with its inadequacies is, however, a back-up source of ore for a limited period of time. If the domestic industry is placed in such a vulnerable position as it will be if the sanctions against Rhodesia are reimposed, the stockpile may provide some relief if it can be released. I urge the committee to consider an amendment that would make the effectiveness of H.R. 1287 dependent upon the release of moderate amounts from the stockpile.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD H. ICHORD, REPRESENTATIVE

FROM MISSOURI

Mr. ICHORD. I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to testify on H.R. 1287, about which I have strong feelings.

In fact, I would submit that H.R. 1287 should receive the first prize for the most hypocritical piece of legislation to be introduced in this parliamentary body in this century. It is not only hypocritical in its substantive aspects, Mr. Chairman, it is hypocritical procedurally in that it is actually an amendment to the Stock Pile Act under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, but drafted as an amendment to the United Nations Participation Act in order to obtain referral to the International Relations Committee, rather than the Committee on Armed Services.

The measure, Mr. Chairman, will have an adverse impact upon our defense posture, as conceded by the State Department witness before the International Relations Committee, in that it will have an adverse impact on the stainless steel industry, which is a very critical defense industry.

Military forces, as you know, Mr. Chairman, are not the sole deterrent to war. A nation's industrial capacity, its industrial readiness, is also a national asset which can strengthen or weaken its military capability.

It is estimated by the Department of Defense that our total defense industry needs amount to 8 or 10 percent of our total domestic consumption of metallurgical grade chrome and ferrochrome.

It is used in everything from jet engine blades to sterile hypodermic syringes.

South Africa and Rhodesia, Mr. Chairman, possess 96 percent of the world's chrome reserves; and even more important, Rhodesia alone has 67 percent of the metallurgical chrome reserves, the important type of chrome for defense purposes.

We have no chrome in significant amounts in the United States of America. We haven't mined a pound of chrome since, I believe, the year

1961.

This legislation would transfer an important measure of control over not only chrome, but other strategic minerals to the United Nations, to the President, and to the State Department.

The measure does mention chrome in its title, but you will observe there is no mention of chrome in the bill.

I would emphasize that this measure is not limited to chrome. It concerns other strategic minerals, also, and it would make us primarily reliant upon Russia, the nation which causes us to spend almost $90 billion annually for defense purposes, and which has not proved to be a very reliable source for chrome.

If my memory serves me correctly, Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union cut us off from chrome during the Korean war. It also, during the occupation of Czechoslovakia, cut us off from chrome. And more recently, when the United Nations sanctions were in force in this country, they substantially raised the price of chrome.

And even more recently, last year, when it looked like this bill might fly, they did it again by raising the price of chrome, this time doubling the price of chrome from about $70 a ton to about $160 a ton.

So you can see why this measure can very easily have a very serious impact upon the defense posture of this Nation.

My attention, Mr. Chairman, was attracted to this measure in the first instance because of its hypocrisy.

I received a letter from the Zambian Ambassador urging me to vote in favor of repeal of the Byrd amendment. This disturbed me somewhat, that a foreign diplomatic official should write me on a measure pending in the U.S. Congress; but I was even more disturbed, very greatly disturbed, when I read a newspaper account that the Zambians were carrying on substantial trade with the nation of Rhodesia.

And I would ask my staff member if he would go back to the office and get some pictures that I would like to show you, pictures of the

new Fiats, the new Volkswagens that I saw over Easter in Rhodesia, as well as on the train going into the nation of Zambia.

So, Mr. Chairman, I met with Congressman John Dent, who is vitally concerned with this measure, as he has considerable chrome industry in his district and also a stainless steel industry, and with Congressman Harold Runnels, a member of this committee, and decided to go to Rhodesia to see for myself.

I might state that we were discouraged by the State Department from going to Rhodesia-both in this country, and also in South Africa. In fact, you cannot buy a ticket direct from the United States of America to Rhodesia, because that is a part of the sanctions in effect against Rhodesia. We only trade with Rhodesia in chrome and another strategic mineral or two as permitted by the Byrd amendment.

I only wish, Mr. Chairman, all the Members of Congress could have had the same experience. I am quite sure that this measure would not receive one-half of the votes that it will receive if the Members of Congress had the experience of going over there and taking a look and making up their own minds before they vote.

The State Department supports this measure on what it says are political grounds and foreign policy grounds. It says: "We must support the sanctions, because we are members of the United Nations."

I can't buy that reason, Mr. Chairman. We are Members of the U.S. Congress, and as such we have a responsibility to our constituents. We have a vital interest in the stainless steel industry. We have a constitutionally mandated responsibility to provide for the national defense for this country.

The State Department also says that Rhodesia is on its last legs. It asserts that if we are going to assure ourselves of a future supply of chrome from black Rhodesia, we must pass this bill to repeal the Byrd amendment.

Mr. Chairman, they have been saying that for almost a decade nowthat Rhodesia was on its last legs. I don't have a crystal ball to see what is going to happen in the future. Rhodesia is indeed in a precarious position, and I am sure that our forefathers in this country were in a precarious position, and I am sure if the State Department had been around in the 1700's, the State Department would have made the same conclusion that we were not going to last very long.

It may just well be, Mr. Chairman, that the State Department may be underestimating the unity, strength, courage, and determination of the Rhodesians.

But even if they are right as to the future, I can't accept the rationale that we have to repeal the Byrd amendment to assure a future supply. Commonsense, judgment, and experience lead me to believe, Mr. Chairman, that when one has any commodity to sell, and someone else wants that commodity and has the money to buy it, it is going to move. And that is exactly what has happened in Rhodesia since the United Nations sanctions.

The Rhodesians have been carrying on very extensive trade with all of the major nations of the world in chrome, with the exception of South Africa and Switzerland, who wisely do not go along with the U.N. sanction-even though we are the only ones supposed to be trading with Rhodesia.

I will pass to the members of the committee, some of the pictures that I took on the streets of Salisbury, showing all of the new Fiats, Volkswagens and French automobiles, as well as a picture that we took of a trainload of supplies going into Zambia just below Victoria Falls, going across the bridge over the Zambesi River. About four trains a day, I was advised, pass over that entrance to Zambia each day.

The situation in Rhodesia, Mr. Chairman, is a very complex one. The Rhodesians do have some very serious social, economic, and racial problems, as we also have in this country.

I do not presume to be an expert. As I understood the situation after visiting there, the policy of the Rhodesian Government-and I saw nothing to refute this policy-is that they will have complete sociopolitical integration of the races, on the basis of merit, while the position of the black leaders is immediate black rule on a one man, one vote basis.

They are faced with some very difficult problems. Really it is a merger of Western civilization with tribal civilization. The white Rhodesians are outnumbered better than 20 to 1. There are about 200-someodd thousand whites, and between 5 million and 6 million blacks. I say it is the merger of two civilizations, because you have two main tribes in Rhodesia-black tribes-the Matabele and the Mashona.

These of course in terms of history are really recent visitors to Rhodesia. In fact, they came into Rhodesia by conquest.

As I state, I don't have a crystal ball, but I will predict at this time, if the State Department is right, and you do have black rule on a one man, one vote basis, you are going to see in Rhodesia black genocide, as well as white genocide.

Because there are tremendous tribal differences. Most of the blacks in Rhodesia live in a tribal civilization.

For example, they still practice labolo, which is a custom of selling your daughter to the young male. All of the fathers in Rhodesia like to have a lot of daughters. In fact, I visited one protected village, Mukumbura, which is on the Mozambique-Rhodesian border up in the area where there is considerable guerrilla activity, and the Rhodesian Government advised me that they had been so very successful with the pill in Mukumbura-more than 100 women had gotten on the pillthat they were having real difficulties with the men. They were protesting this measure of birth control.

We traveled very extensively, Mr. Chairman, in Rhodesia. We met with both black leaders and white leaders, with Ian Smith and most of the ministers of the Rhodesian Government.

Contrary to a lot of thinking, Rhodesia does not practice apartheid, as does South Africa. And contrary to a lot of thinking in this country, Mr. Chairman, the Rhodesian black has the best working conditions and the best pay of any country for black men in all of Africa, including Egypt.

We went through some of the ferrochrome plants, and the chrome mines in Rhodesia. We saw black men being trained as crane operators, replacing white men in those plants at the same pay.

We visited the University of Salisbury, which is integrated-about 50 percent black, 50 percent white. We talked with Rev. Abel Muzorewa, the head of ANC, which pretty much operates as a blanket organization for the Zangu and Zapu and the Frolizi.

Contrary to a lot of thinking, Mr. Chairman, the blacks are not united in Rhodesia.

They have a lot of political parties. The Zanu, Zapu, and the Frolizi, are a part of those parties.

Of interest to this committee, Mr. Chairman, I spent quite a bit of time with the Rhodesian military and with the Rhodesian security forces up in the guerrilla country. It appeared to me that the Rhodesians did have the guerrilla activity pretty much under control at

that time.

Interestingly enough, you have the problems of Marxist revolutionary activity being carried out in Rhodesia, as well as you do in many other undeveloped countries in the world. It is sometimes difficult to separate Marxist revolutionary activity from black nationalism, but I was briefed by the military there, and they told me many of the leaders in the Zanu had been trained by the Red Chinese in Tanzania. In the Zapu organization, most of whose members come from the Matabele tribe, I believe, many of their guerrilla leaders have been trained by the Russians.

Rhodesia is in a very precarious position in that it is right next door to Mozambique, which is now headed by Prime Minister Machel who, as members of the committee may have read in the newspapers, has just announced he has formed the first black Marxist government in all of Africa. But at the time I was there, the Frelimo of Mozambique were very inactive. They were fed up with the Rhodesian guerrillas. And I was advised-and this went on while I was there-the local Rhodesian guerrillas had become fed up with the Zanu leaders back in Zambia. So they decided to go up to Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, up through Mozambique, into Lusaka, and capture some of the Zanu military leaders in Lusaka and bring them back into the guerrilla area to show them what it was like on the frontlines.

When that happened, other factions within Zanu-a general, I can't remember his name, got on his horse and traveled into Rhodesia, rescued the kidnapped victims, and executed the kidnappers.

While I was there I don't think it appeared in American newspapers-but while I was there in Rhodesia, several thousand demonstrators gathered in Zambia, in Lusaka, Zambia, to protest the presence of Rhodesian guerrilla leaders in Zambia.

I bring that out. Mr. Chairman, to show you that it is a very complex situation, and the blacks in Rhodesia are not united by any stretch of the imagination. And this is the reason why I would predict that if this displacement of the present Rhodesian Government did happen, as the State Department predicts will happen, you would have black genocide as well as white genocide in Rhodesia.

This measure, Mr. Chairman, poses a very difficult dilemma for this committee.

The Nixon administration proposed to reduce the stockpile to 445,000 tons of chromite ore. In 1974 this Nation consumed 894.709 tons of metallurgical grade chromite ore. We only have in the stockpile now 2.504,000 tons of chromite ore, if those figures are up to date. But of this amount, 551,758 tons are of nonstockpile grade. It is not economically feasible to use them for metallurgical purposes.

Since we have no chrome in this country. I can't see this committee. Mr. Chairman, reducing our chrome stockpile to only 6 months of