SPECIFIC FUNCTIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The focus of the Advisory Panel continues to be on the needs of local and State response entities. "Local" response entities-law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical technicians, hospital emergency personnel, public health officials, and emergency managers will always be the "first response," and conceivably the only response. When entities at various levels of government are engaged, the responsibilities of all entities and lines of authority must be clear.

1. Collecting Intelligence, Assessing Threats, and Sharing Information. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should foster the development of a consolidated all-source analysis and assessment capability that would provide various response entities as well as policymakers with continuing analysis of potential threats and broad threat assessment input into the development of the annual national strategy. That capability should be augmented by improved human intelligence collection abroad, more effective domestic activities with a thorough review of various Federal guidelines, and reasonable restrictions on acquisition of CBRN precursors or equipment. The National Office should also foster enhancements in measurement and signature intelligence, forensics, and indications and warning capabilities. To promote the broadest possible dissemination of useful, timely (and if necessary, classified) information, the National Office should also oversee the development and implementation of a protected, Internet-based single-source web page system, linking appropriate sources of information and databases on combating terrorism across all relevant functional disciplines.

2. Operational Coordination. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should encourage Governors to designate State emergency management entities as domestic preparedness focal points for coordination with the Federal government.

The National Office should identify and promote the establishment of singlesource, "all hazards" planning documents, standardized Incident Command and Unified Command Systems, and other model programs for use in the full range of emergency contingencies, including terrorism. Adherence to these systems should become a requirement of Federal preparedness assistance.

3. Training, Equipping, and Exercising. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should develop and manage a comprehensive national plan for Federal assistance to State and local agencies for training and equipment and the conduct of exercises, including the promulgation of standards in each area. The National Office should consult closely with State and local stakeholders in the development of this national plan. Federal resources to support the plan should be allocated according to the goals and objectives specified in the national strategy, with State and local entities also providing resources to support its implementation.

4. Health and Medical Considerations. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should reevaluate the current U.S. approach to providing public health and medical care in response to acts of terrorism, especially possible mass casualty incidents and most particularly bioterrorism. The key issues are insufficient education and training in terrorism-related subjects, minimum capabilities in surge capacity and in treatment facilities, and clear standards and protocols for laboratories and other activities, and vaccine programs. A robust public health infrastructure is necessary to ensure an effective response to terrorist attacks, especially those involving biologic agents. After consultation with public health and medical care entities, the National Office should oversee the establishment of financial incentives coupled with standards and certification requirements that will, over time, encourage the health and medical sector to build and maintain required capabilities. In addition, Federal, State, and local governments should clarify legal and regulatory authorities for quarantine, vaccinations, and other prescriptive measures.

5. Research and Development, and National Standards. The National Office for Combating Terrorism should establish a clear set of priorities for research and development for combating terrorism, including long-range programs. Priorities for targeted research should be responder personnel protective equipment; medical surveillance, identification, and forensics; improved sensor and rapid readout capability; vaccines and antidotes; and communications interoperability. The National Office must also coordinate the development of nationally recognized standards for equipment, training, and laboratory protocols and techniques, with the ultimate objective being official certification.

6. Providing Cyber Security Against Terrorism. Cyber attacks inside the United States could have "mass disruptive," even if not "mass destructive" or "mass casualty" consequences. During the coming year, the Advisory Panel will focus on specific aspects of critical infrastructure protection (CIP), as they relate to the potential for terrorist attacks. In our discussions thus far, we have identified several areas for further deliberation, including CIP policy oversight; standards; alert, warning,

and response; liability and other legal issues, and CIP research. We will make specific policy recommendations in our next report.

AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT WITH THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM

Mr. Chairman, the charters and objectives of the Bremer Commission and the Gilmore Commission are, for the most part, very different. The Bremer Commission focused on international terrorism. The Gilmore Commission's clear mandate is on domestic preparedness-deterring, preventing, and responding to terrorist incidents inside the borders of the United States.

There are, nevertheless, several overlapping areas of interest between the two reports and the attendant findings and recommendations.

Both panels agree on the increasing nature of the threat of international terrorism, including the potential for more attacks from international groups inside the borders of the United States.

Both panels specifically agree that certain measures must be taken to improve intelligence collection and dissemination on terrorists, including:

Repealing the 1995 Director of Central Intelligence Guidelines as they apply to recruiting terrorist informants

Reviewing and clarifying, as may be indicated, the Attorney General's Guidelines on Foreign Intelligence Collection and the Guidelines on General Crime, Racketeering Enterprise, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations

• Directing the Department of Justice Office of Intelligence Policy and Review not to require a process for initiating actions under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that are more stringent than those required by the statute

Both panels agree that significant improvements must be made in the ability of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to collect, analyze, disseminate and share intelligence and other information more effectively.

Both panels agree that there must be a comprehensive strategy or plan for dealing with terrorism, including the ways in which both the Executive Branch and the Congress develop and coordinate program and budget processes.

Both panels agree in principal that the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Armed Forces may have a major role in preventing or responding to a terrorist attack, especially one involving a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear device. We likewise strongly agree that insufficient planning, coordination, training, and exercises have been developed and implemented for the possibility of major DoD and military involvement. The one area in which we disagree has to do with "lead agency." The Bremer Commission suggests that a response to a catastrophic attack may indicate the designation of DoD as Lead Agency. While we agree that DoD may have a major role, we firmly believe that the military must always be directly under civilian control. As a result, we recommend that the President always designate a Federal civilian agency other than the Department of Defense (DoD) as the Lead Federal Agency. Many Americans will not draw the technical distinction between the Department of Defense-the civilian entity-and the U.S. Armed Forces-the military entity. Although the Department of Defense and every major component of that department have civilian leaders, the perception will likely be that "the military" is in the lead. This recommendation does not ignore the fact that the DoD, through all of its various agencies-not just the Armed Forces-has enormous resources and significant capabilities for command, control, communications, intelligence, logistics, engineer, and medical support and may play a major role in response to a terrorist attack, especially one with potentially catastrophic consequences. Those resources can still be brought to bear but should, in our view, always be subordinated to another civilian agency.

SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman_ and Members of the subcommittee, the members of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction are convinced that the essence of its recommendations are essential to the national effort to combat terrorism: the promulgation of a truly national strategy; the appointment of a senior person at the Federal level who has the responsibilityimportantly, who can be seen as having the responsibility-for coordinating our national efforts; improvements in the way Congress addresses this issues; and the implementation of the functional recommendations dealing with: • improving intelligence, threats assessments, and information sharing; ⚫ better planning, coordination and operations;

• enhanced training, equipping, and exercising;

improving health and medical capabilities;

promoting better research and development and developing national standards; enhancing efforts to counter agroterrorism; and

• improving cyber security against terrorism.

With the exception of the one dissent on the issue of a lead role for the military, our recommendations are as firmly unanimous as we believe that they are reasonable and specific.

This is not a partisan political issue. It is one that goes to the very heart of public safety and the American way of life. We have members on our panel who identify with each of the major national political parties, and represent views across the entire political spectrum. We urge Members on both sides of the aisle, in both Houses of the Congress, to work with the Executive Branch to bring some order to this process and to provide some national leadership and direction to address this critical issue. Thank you again for this opportunity.

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much, General. There is so much that we will get into as we pull pieces out of your report that we think might help us to legislate in the area.

Let me first of all address something that you said because I think it is recognized by all of us here in Congress. We have talked about it, that our failure to organize Congress in a coherent and focused way on the problem is somewhat a mirror image of our view that the administration hasn't focused very well either.

It might be the fact that we have the same kind of operational issues; that is to say, our appropriations people are the operational group for funding. The Judiciary Committee, of which this is a subset, is the operational group with respect to changing the law_and evidentiary gathering or sharing, and so on. The Intelligence Committee, of which I am a member, has certain other operational functions.

However, that isn't to suggest that we couldn't create a select Committee along the lines of the Intelligence Committee which would pluck people from each of those operational committees to provide the same kind of oversight that you are suggesting would be appropriate at the executive level, and I think that is something that we are going to try to pursue.

Let me just ask you this general question to begin. When people think of trying to prepare for terrorism, we divide the issue into two parts; No. 1, preventing it, the intelligence-gathering, the other kinds of things that we will talk a little bit more about, and then the aftermath, the response.

As to that second aspect of it, there seems to be a sense, at least in the people that I have talked to, that while it is inevitable that there will be terrorist actions here in the United States, and while we can generally try to prepare at least the first responders in our largest communities on how basically to respond to these kinds of emergencies and perhaps even given them some equipment that would be unique to the kinds of challenges they might fact, the reality is that the country is so big, the opportunities so great in so many different places that it would be impossible to adequately prepare in every potential community for every potential threat. Therefore, there seems to be just sort of a general throwing up of the arms of what can we really do.

How do you respond to that sense of almost a sense that we really can't do much about it if, in fact, the terrorist event occurs, except to have some general agency in Washington that would direct the response of the local entities to the extent they needed help?

General CLAPPER. Well, sir, I think there are capabilities already resident in the Government which can be embellished, coordinated better, where we can be certainly in a better posture to respond. I think more can be done from an intelligence perspective in the context of prevention.

A lot of great work is going on as we speak. I think the CIA and the FBI-I discussed this earlier today-have made giant strides in their recognition of the fact that the jurisdictional boundaries are not always respected by terrorists.

If, in fact, our ability to detect and preempt an attack fail, then I think there is more that can be done to respond. What we have in mind here are exercises, training, equipment, standards, medical coordination. There is a lot of just sort of grunt work that if the commitment is made to do it could be done which would put us in a better posture to respond.

To say that if we spend "x" billions of dollars or take some sort of administrative action, that that will provide an iron-clad guarantee to the citizenry that we will never be confronted with a terrorist attack is obviously unrealistic. But we can certainly do more to posture ourselves to detect the potential for terrorism, acknowledging the fact that in the context of terrorism we are always going to be dealing with ambiguous intelligence, but also be prepared to respond.

Now, the reason this is important, in my view, is because if we do that, that in itself serves as a form of deterrence. If we have a capability after the fact, for example, the forensic capability to determine a return address, to use the phrase, of a terrorist and the terrorist knows that and that we will, if we determine who did it, reach out and touch, that has a very compelling message and, as I say, serves as a deterrent.

So I think there are things we can do to put ourselves in a better posture, but to say that that will ensure that we are never attacked, no, sir, we can't do that.

Chairman KYL. Well, I think there is-I don't want to use the word a sense of fatalism, which is what I started to say before, but a sense that while you can train to a certain level to respond, once it has gotten to that point our abilities are significantly limited. That is why I tend to focus, plus the fact that this committee's jurisdiction is more focused on the prevention side, the intelligencegathering, the intelligence-sharing, and so on.

I would like to get to some of your recommendations with respect to sharing of intelligence which you just alluded to between the FBI and the CIA. In this country, of course, the FBI is much more limited in what it can do than the CIA would be in gathering intelligence abroad, for example, and that puts some limits on what the FBI feels it can share, particularly if it has got an ongoing investigation in terms of what it can share with the CIA or with other agencies.

Would you speak to that and the recommendations of the panel? General CLAPPER. Well, sir, I don't know that I have anything new and profound and dramatic, other than to endorse what is already going on. An example is the formation and organization of the Counterterrorism Center, which is an intelligence community entity which involves all the intelligence community agencies, to

include the FBI, which is a structural mechanism to ensure visibility and coordination between and among the intelligence agencies.

The important thing to me is that I think we have to be mindful and sensitive to the legal boundaries between the purview of the FBI in collecting domestic intelligence and the purview of the intelligence community in collecting and using foreign intelligence, and the relationship of those two activities as it applies to protection of our civil liberties, et cetera.

So I think those sensitivities have to be attended to, but at the same time we need to ensure that the information baton is not dropped as it is handed off in the case of terrorism which originates overseas from a foreign source but is reaching out and touching us domestically in the United States. I think the mechanisms and the structures and organizations and the processes that the FBI and CIA have come up with go a long way toward doing that.

An issue where I think we can improve is in the area of dissemination. I think there are mechanisms that we can establish whereby certain State and local officials in certain conditions should be afforded access to any of this intelligence if it affects their jurisdiction.

In my active duty days as an intelligence officer, I was involved in or presided over many, many intelligence exchanges with our friends and allies. It seems to me if we can build mechanisms to do that, we can certainly build mechanisms whereby intelligence can flow to, say, State Governors or the senior emergency planner in each State or other senior fire, rescue, et cetera, people who need to have access to that kind of information. Now, if that entails some sort of a special classification system or whatever, then that is fine. We should do that. We have it within our capability and it is strictly essentially a policy issue.

Another thing I have been a proponent of is capitalizing on a system I think you may be familiar with, sir, in the intelligence community called InteLink, which is roughly analogous to the intelligence community's very own internet. I have been a proponent for exporting this same kind of thing to the so-called first responder community on a selected capability.

One of the recurrent themes that we have heard in our dialogs with State and local people over the last couple of years is a hunger or thirst or requirement for threat information, and we have made some recommendations on how we think that can be effected. So I think in the areas of coordination between the two agencies, focusing more on the analytic capability, and most importantly of all, I think, is disseminating information, where appropriate, to selected State and local officials.

Chairman KYL. Let me just ask you two more questions here, both related to that. Last year, Senator Feinstein and I both cosponsored a bill that would have clarified current law regarding the ability of the FBI and the Justice Department to share certain criminal wiretap information pertaining to terrorism with the CIA and other Government agencies.

Did the Commission discover any instances where law enforcement information was not shared due to legal interpretations about