-15

I doubt that Congress intended or wants EPA to impose economic sanctions everywhere the standard is not met on January 1,

1988. I also doubt that a simple, uniform extension of the deadline for another five years would be enough to bring all areas of the country into attainment of the ambient ozone

standard.

In short, none of the actions that are sometimes suggested as the solution to the ozone non attainment problem come to grips with its complexity, variability, and long-term nature. We know that EPA has to continue to improve the technical tools used in the attainment planning process, and the States have to implement and enforce their SIPs. Careful thought must be given to how the nation as a whole is going to solve its most pervasive air pollution problem over the long term.

In the meantime, we should act to reduce VOC emissions as quickly as possible, especially in our urban areas. Those reductions may be painful. I am certain that Congress, EPA, and the State governments can work together in the months ahead to consider these issues and to develop solutions that are in the best interest of the country as a whole.

Mr. DINGELL. The subcommittee thanks you, Mr. Thomas. Our next panel member is Mr. Jeffrey Miller, Deputy Administrator for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Mr. Miller, we thank you for being with us. You are recognized for such statement that you choose to give.

[Correspondence with the Department of Transportation appears in the appendix.]

TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY R. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee.

We are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the motor vehicle safety aspects of EPA's plans with respect to controlling vapors produced by gasoline refueling.

As the chairman has indicated, I have here today with me other officials from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and also representatives of other DOT agencies, specifically the Federal Highway Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard, in accordance with the chairman's request.

EPA is currently considering the issuance of a proposal to reduce ambient ozone produced by gasoline refueling vapors by capturing these vapors with recovery systems on board new gasoline powered passenger cars, light trucks and heavy-duty vehicles. The Clean Air Act requires EPA to consult with the Department of Transportation on the motor vehicle safety consequences of these systems.

NHTSA's consultations with EPA on this matter began in October 1985 and are continuing. Among the factors which we believe need to be considered are the extent to which such systems will increase the risk of vehicle fires, both crash and noncrash; the safety consequences of such fires; the cost and complexity of the technical solutions to be developed in response to these potential safety problems; the amount of time needed in the past for technical development of similar levels of complexity; and the development and testing done to date.

Our initial assessment of the concept of onboard recovery systems is that the safety of these systems will depend upon which design and hardware alternatives are selected by the vehicle manufacturers. As a practical matter, the major safety implications of such systems on post-crash vehicle fires would be evaluated primarily in the context of the vehicle manufacturers' self-certification tests for compliance with NHTSA's Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301, Fuel System Integrity.

We currently consider the performance tests of Standard 301 adequate to assure a reasonable level of post-crash fire safety in the motor vehicles to which the standard applies, those with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less, and also schoolbuses over that weight range.

However, compliance with our standard is not the only measure of the safety of such systems. The Federal motor vehicle safety standards are minimum standards. They do not and indeed cannot protect motor vehicle occupants against all conceivable hazards.

Standard 301, for example, seeks to assure fire safety in several serious crash configurations, but it does not assess safeguards

against noncrash fires. Under the Vehicle Safety Act, a vehicle manufacturer must not only comply with all applicable safety standards, but must also remedy any safety-related defects, including those not related to aspects of performance covered by a safety standard.

For example, an increased risk of fire caused by installation of new devices in the fuel system or by location of certain components of the fuel system could result in a defect determination, even if the fuel system complied with our safety standards for fuel system integrity. Responsible manufacturers, therefore, seek to design and test their vehicles to prevent potential safety defects as well as to ensure compliance with NHTSA's safety standards.

Should EPA decide to require onboard vapor recovery systems, it appears that technological breakthroughs are probably not necessary to prevent any degradation of current levels of post-crash vehicle fire safety. However, our current assessments lead us to stress that adequate leadtimes must be provided so the manufacturers can test for potential safety consequences and incorporate the safeguards necessary to reduce any such hazards associated with the emissions compliance strategy they select.

I would like to emphasize that the possibility of a defect arising relating to crash fires and noncrash fires is more than simply theoretical. Our Office of Defects Investigation is currently investigating 13 separate vehicle fire cases. These are alleged defects involving vehicle fires.

Our experience in fire-involved defects investigations compels us to underscore the critical importance of providing manufacturers with adequate leadtime to develop and test the added complexities of onboard recovery systems.

For example, earlier this month, after having received over 150 reports of fuel expulsions and 3 reports of fires involving some Ford Econoline E-350's, which had been converted to ambulances, our Agency staff asked both Ford and the final stage body manufacturers to voluntarily recall these vehicles. That investigation remains open.

We believe that the problem with these vehicles is very much related to the generic problem of an increase in risk whenever complexity is added to a given system. Much of the problem with these vehicles can be traced to high under-vehicle temperatures resulting from exhaust system air pumps and closed-tank vent systems. This problem is further aggravated by the high vapor pressures of some currently available gasolines and further by modifications to the gasoline tank vent system undertaken by the ambulance body manufacturers.

Unless the vehicle manufacturers have adequate leadtime to design and test measures to safely accommodate onboard recovery systems, the added complexity of such systems could have a negative impact on the safety of fuel systems. NHTSA cannot, however, make specific predictions about the safety consequences of onboard systems until the vehicle manufacturers select the design and hardware alternatives for such systems.

We also note that for the next several years, the automobile manufacturers will be directing a major portion of their safety resources, including their staff, their funds and physical facilities, to

the development of occupant protection systems that meet the requirements of our vehicle safety standard on automatic crash protection, Safety Standard 208. Many companies have already advised us that their safety engineering resources are strained due to the need to tool-up for automatic restraint systems and that their crash test facilities are operating at or near full capacity.

Accordingly, we believe it is essential that EPA's leadtime estimates to ensure the safety of onboard vapor recovery systems fully consider the other demands and constraints on vehicle manufacturers due to the development of automatic restraint systems.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to sum up by reiterating that Section 202 of the Clean Air Act requires that EPA make the determination of the feasibility and desirability requiring new motor vehicles to utilize onboard vapor recovery systems. NHTSA's role is limited to consulting with EPA on the motor vehicle safety aspects of such systems. Our Agency has neither the statutory authority nor the technical expertise to make recommendations or otherwise comment on the various emissions control technologies themselves. However, we are confident that EPA will take our views into account along with information from other sources in developing any proposals or decisions with regard to these systems. As requested in your letter to Secretary Dole, I have attached to my statement detailed answers to questions you have addressed to NHTSA along with responses from the Coast Guard and the Federal Highway Administration on questions addressed to them.

That concludes my statement. My colleagues and I from the Transportation Department would be glad to answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.

[The attachment to the prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

RESPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Question 1: EPA, in question 2(a) [of EPA's February 19 letter to the Subcommittee], states that fuel systems of various vehicles "are fundamentally similar in design and structure and differ primarily in size only," thus EPA believes "that onboard controls are likely to be technologically feasible for all of them." EPA also believes that the cost-effectivenss of the controls was similar "for all vehicle classes." These are very sweeping statements, particularly since I understand that vehicle size was a great concern relative to the location of the canister which, presumably, would affect the connecting valves and hoses and the relevant safety considerations. I recall that Toyota was considering placing the canister in the trunk which raised special safety problems that may be different if it was in the engine compartment. I request NHTSA's comments.

Answer: As you point out, vehicle size may be relevant to safety concerns, especially regarding the options for the location of an onboard canister. However, the relevant NHTSA criteria, Federal motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) 301, Fuel System Integrity, is a "performance standard". It does not dictate the design of an automobile's fuel system. The effect of onboard controls on the crashworthiness of vehicle fuel systems would depend on the design and the hardware selected for the system chosen by a vehicle manufacturer. Some designs and hardware might have adverse safety consequences in some cars, while others might not.

We believe that manufacturers, in deciding upon the optimal location of the canister, must be provided adequate leadtime to address the safety consequences of canister placement. For example, were canisters to be removed from the engine compartment and placed in the rear of the vehicle, redesign of the fuel tank might be required. This, in turn, might necessitate additional durability and compliance testing. To assure adequate safety, the necessary time for such development work must be provided.

The similarity of fuel systems and the technological feasibility of vapor recovery systems are issues EPA is addressing, and must later address in connnection with its analysis of any comments on a possible future proposed rulemaking from the vehicle manufacturers on specific vehicle designs. NHTSA has consulted and will continue to consult with EPA on the safety consequences associated with these issues. However, the feasibility, complexity, and cost-effectiveness of onboard controls would appear to vary by vehicle size and class.

Question 2: Enclosed with our letter to EPA regarding this hearing is a document from a carbon_manufacturer who indicates that onboard technology is far from being feasible. Does NHTSA agree? Please explain.

Answer: NHTSA does not have the expertise to offer an opinion on the feasibility of vapor control technologies.

Question 3: EPA's reply to my question 2(b) [of EPA's February 19 letter to the subcommittee] discusses leadtimes and concludes that 24 months appears ample. I understand that NHTSA was not in agreement, particularly if this rule applied to existing models in production and offered for sale each model year, such as the present Ford Taurus or Dodge Omni. What are NHTSA's views? Has NHTSA reviewed the API prototype venicles mentioned in the reply? What were the safety findings?

Answer: It is the opinion of NHTSA's technical staff that technological breakthroughs with regard to onboard vapor recovery systems are probably not necessary to retain current levels of fire safety in case of vehicle crashes. They velieve that the need to incorporate the safeguards necessary to reduce any potential hazards can be accomplished with adequate leadtime. However, they are not convinced that a leadtime of 24 months is sufficient in this regard.

The EPA analysis that NHTSA's technical staff reviewed in November 1986 stated that safety compliance could be achieved with "sized-up" components and, therefore, a leadtime of 24 months would be adequate because additional development and testing time would be unnecessary. However, NHTSA's staff noted that most car models are redesigned every 5-6 years. To place "sized-up" components on an existing carline, such as the Ford Taurus or Dodge Omni, would necessitate new design and development which could require new certification and durability testing. In addition, placing larger canisters in the smaller car models could require a redesign of the trunk and/or fuel tank capacity for such vehicles. Such a redesign, with subsequent testing, could exceed 24 months.

WE also note that, for the next several years, the automobile manufacturers will be directing a major portion of their safety resources (including staff, funds and physical facilities) to the development of occupant protection systems that meet the requirements of our vehicle safety standard on automatic crash protection, Safety Standard No. 208. Many companies have told us that their safety engineering resources are strained due to the need to tool-up for automatic restraint systems, and that their crash test facilities are operating at or near capacity. Accordingly, we believe it is essential that EPA's leadtime estimates to ensure the safety of onboard vapor recovery systems fully consider the other demands and constraints on the manufacturers due to the development of automatic restraint systems.

NHTSA has not formally reviewed any detailed designs of vehicles with onboard vapor recovery systems for the purpose of making specific safety findings. However, our technical staff has informally considered a number of such designs in vehicles described and/or demonstrated by EPA, by vehicle manufacturers, by Exxon, by consultants, and others during the last year or so. The general safety concerns expressed by NHTSA's technical staff are identical to the concerns expressed above and to the concerns expressed in answer to Question 1.

Question 4: Please describe in detail NHTSA's consultations with EPA.

Answer: The following is a list of written comments that NHTSA has provided to EPA on the issue of onboard refueling vapor control systems:

*Letter of May 12, 1986, from Diane K. Steed, NHTSA Administrator, to Lee M. Thomas, EPA Administrator.

Letter of November 18, 1986, from Ralph J. Hitchcock, Director of NHTSA Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, to Charles L. Gray, Jr., Director of EPA Emission Control Technology Division.

The subcommittee has copies of these letters. There have been no other written comments from NHTSA to EPA on this subject area.

Since October 1985, EPA staff have initiated telephone and personal contacts with NHTSA technical staff on this subject area. All of these contacts, and the two written comments listed above, were informal and do not necessarily reflect NHTSA's official position. NHTSA's official comments will be submitted pursuant to our review of EPA's rulemaking documents.