2

It must not, however, be forgotten that

an European character. Should the war, degree to injure most seriously our military either during the present year or hereafter reputation. extend to the centre of Europe, and lead to an appeal to nationalities and to the re- we shall have to commence the war in sults to which such a contest must inevita- Asia under very great disadvantages. If bly give rise, it will be entirely owing to two years ago we had taken measures the policy which the German Powers and either to strengthen the Turkish army in Austria have hitherto pursued. They will Armenia, or to prepare for operations have to pay the penalty which history which we ought to have foreseen would teaches us has ever been inflicted upon have been sooner or later inevitable, we those nations which have not had the wis- should not now be compelled to enter upon dom or the courage to throw the weight of a campaign to rescue the Turkish provinces their strength and influence boldly into the of Asia Minor, but we should have been in scale when called upon to engage in a war a position to advance boldly into the eneof principles, and in a struggle affecting, my's territory with every chance of a however remotely, their own independence. speedy and brilliant result. We have, by A question upon which we have already our unpardonable negligence, and the utter touched-the successful advance of Russia incompetency of our rulers, enabled Russia in the Asiatic provinces of Turkey-is of to occupy the great plateau of Armenia, no less importance than the position of and to gain possession of the passes which Prussia and the German Powers. What-lead to it, whether from the south or from ever may have been the obstacles which the north. Her Cossacks have appeared have hitherto stood in the way of a military at the gates of Erzeroom. She holds Van, expedition on the part of England into and can consequently command the whole Asia Minor, they must now be overcome. of the Christian population of Armenia. The influence and successes of Russia in We are even assured that Russian detachAsia can no longer be treated by the most ments have already been pushed as far as prejudiced as a mere English question. Moosh, on the high road into the low counWe have pointed out the vast and indeed try of Assyria and Mesopotamia. It now essential importance to Russia of territorial only remains for her to seize the great acquisitions in the East, as the only coun- roads which lead to the coast of the Black terbalance to any success of the Allies in Sea, and she will possess an almost imthe West. It is absolutely necessary that pregnable position. As the severities of a England and France should come to an im- winter season did not impede the operations mediate understanding as to the means of of Prince Paskiewitch, it is not probable preventing any further progress of Russia that they will interrupt an enterprise of in that direction, and of remedying the evil such vast importance to Russia as the comwhich has already occurred. We have plete conquest of Armenia, and the securlittle doubt that the course to be pursued ing the means of access to it. There are in effecting this object will form one of the no military roads whatever between the principal subjects of the conferences to be coast and the interior. The passes are held at Paris, when it will be determined equally few and difficult. From Batoun to to which nation shall be assigned the duty Trebizond there are none which permit of of meeting the enemy in those regions. the passage of an army. That leading We can scarcely doubt that we shall be from Batoun into the interior is not only called upon to undertake it, and that whilst difficult, but we believe impracticable. The the French continue the contest, and un- three caravan tracks from Trebizond to dertake new expeditions against the enemy Erzeroom are carried over lofty mountains in Europe, the English army will be trans- or through narrow and difficult ravines, ferred in great part, if not entirely, to the which could be held by a mere handful of Asiatic shores of the Black Sea. Such a men.* There are no passes between Tredistribution and division of the power of bizond and Samsoun, as far as we are the Allies we deem on many accounts to aware, which are practicable to beasts of be highly important and necessary, not burden, and consequently available for only with reference to the immediate ob- troops. To the west Armenia is defended jects in view, but to the success of any fu- by mountains no less lofty and difficult of ture operations in whatever part of the world they may be pursued. A divided command has hitherto been a source of undoubted disasters, and has materially interfered with the perfect success of our arms, whilst it has contributed in no slight

*A description of the Highlands of Armenia mia and the Sea will be found in Layard's Nineveh and of the passes leading to them from Mesopota and Babylon and in Mr. Curzon's account of his residence at Erzeroóm.

passage than those to the north. To the then be made to enter Armenia and to carry south there are but two or three caravan on the war in those provinces. Even, tracks, leading through deep and narrow mountain gorges into the plains and valleys of Mesopotamia. If it be true that Russian troops have already advanced as far as Moosh, these lines of communication will soon be in possession of the enemy, and will be rendered impassable to an army marching from the southward.

however, if we could penetrate to Erzeroom in spite of the enemy, or even if Omar Pasha should succeed in reaching it, we must remember that a stronghold fortified by British skill, and rendered still stronger by additional works raised during the winter, would be in the hands of the enemy and would require for its reduction Russia, having thus secured this portion a long and arduous siege, whilst the Rusof Asiatic Turkey, can now either hold the sians might be overrunning the provinces. plateau containing the rich and important to the south. An expedition undertaken provinces of Kars, Van, Moosh, and Erze- by the troops of the East India Company room, with the other districts which form from the Persian Gulf, would have very the ancient Kingdom of Armenia, or she considerable, though not insurmountable can take advantage of her almost impreg- difficulties to contend with in attempting nable position to descend the banks of the even to reach the seat of war. Moreover Euphrates and Tigris, and thus to threaten the distance of the march would be so Mesopotamia and Baghdad. There is noth-great, the season for an expedition through ing to render such an enterprise impossible the burning plains of Assyria and Mesopoto a daring and able general, and its incal- tamia is so rapidly passing away, and our culable advantages to Russia may lead to own counsels are marked by so much indeits attempt. Those provinces are without cision and so great a want of energy, that troops for their defence. They have no the possibility of attempting on that side fortified cities of any strength. Their popu- any effective diversion during the present lations are disaffected, and probably neither year need scarcely be taken into considercould nor would oppose any considerable ation. Such an expedition would have reresistance. They are rich in corn and the quired the foresight of a wise government necessary supplies for an army, and every and the energies of a great_commander. successful conqueror who has hitherto in- We have to deal with men who think that vaded them has depended entirely upon statesmanship and military genius consist their produce and resources for the support not in forestalling difficulties and disasters, of his followers. The winter will be em- but in finding some expedient, however ployed in collecting the materials and miserable, to escape from them when they means for such an undertaking, and in occur. An Indian army might, it is said, preparing the inhabitants for its execution. be marched through Persia; but has our In case of check or defeat the Russian for-policy in Persia been so conducted that we ces can fall back upon the Armenian highlands, through the passes of the Taurus, which will be rendered impassable to an advancing or pursuing army.

Such then is the position of Russia- -no less threatening to Turkey and to English interests than it is to the cause itself of the Allies. It is distressing to reflect how a little foresight or prudence might have prevented a loss of territory and influence, which we shall now have to regain by a fearful sacrifice of life and treasure.

can hope for her assistance, or that we can call upon her to forfeit her neutrality in our favour? Unquestionably not. A silly quarrel has again interrupted our good understanding with the Shah, and even if adjusted, will have added to those acrimonious feelings which have unfortunately embittered for some time, through neglect and mismanagement, our relations with that Power. The fall of Kars will have confirmed the government of the Shah in its dread of the power of Russia, and we have now remains to be considered how our little doubt that means will be taken, troops can undertake a campaign against through the Persian embassy now at St. Russian Asia with the fairest chances of Petersburg, to bring Persia entirely into success. It would undoubtedly be a great her interests. We cannot, therefore, hope advantage to our future operations, if Omar to receive that friendly aid from Persia Pasha could succeed in crossing at once the which could alone render a military expepasses from the Black Sea to Erzcroom, dition, through her provinces, one of safe and could thus save that place from falling or easy accomplishment. into the hands of the enemy. Supposing There may indeed be reason to fear that Russia to be in possession of Erzeroom Persia may afford material aid to our eneand the passes by the spring, it is more my, if she should not even openly declare than doubtful whether an attempt could against us. The recent change of rulers

It

in Herat is believed by some to be the re- | Armenia in order to defend her own prosult of Persian intrigue, whilst the new vinces, and to secure the safety of her own chief of that place is stated not only to be army. It has been somewhat the fashion devoted to Persian interests, but to have to speak of an invasion of Georgia as a declared himself tributary to the Shah. matter of easy accomplishment, and of the We are so ill able to obtain accurate, and sympathy and support of its inhabitants, trustworthy information as to the events and of those of Mingrelia and Imeritia, as which occur in those remote regions of a certain element of success. Whatever Asia, that we are not as yet in a position to may have been the case two years ago, it form an opinion as to the truth of these is very doubtful whether the facilities which statements. If the revolution .which has then existed will now be found. Russia taken place in this important frontier city has had ample leisure to prepare herself should have been produced by one of those for defence, and our experience has shown intrigues so common in Eastern courts, it us that she has been able to avail herself may be of little consequence as bearing of her resources and her opportunities, in upon our relations with Central Asia, or on whatever part of her vast territories, from the war. But should it be the result of an the Baltic to the Pacific, she has been exunderstanding between Persia and Russia, posed to attack. The fall of Kars will and be merely the prelude to a further ad- have made a deep impression upon the popvance by either of those powers, the con-ulation of those provinces, and has assisted sequences can scarcely be foreseen. It is deeply to be regretted that at a time so critical, when it is of the utmost importance that our Government should have the fullest information as to what is passing both in Persia and Central Asia, and should be able to exercise all the influence possible at the court of the Shah, the interests of Great Britain in that quarter should be entrusted to a gentleman of undoubted abilities, but of no experience or knowledge of Persian affairs, nor of the politics of Central Asia, while so distinguished an officer as Colonel Rawlinson, especially qualified for the post of minister at Teheran, by a long residence in Persia, by great personal influence, by his having been officially employed both in Affghanistan and Turkish Arabia during most critical events, and by his perfect acquaintance with the languages of the East, is left unemployed in this country.

From the preceding remarks it will be seen how slight hope we entertain of any material assistance from our Indian army, during this year, in prosecuting the war in Asia, although it is probable that steps may be taken, by landing forces in the Persian Gulf, to prepare for another year's campaign. Not that much could not be even yet effected by an energetic and prudent policy, by one man in power who understood the question, could appreciate our resources, and was acquainted with the condition of Asia. But as we have Mr. Vernon Smith still at the Board of Control, and there is no prospect of a change in the policy of the Government, we cannot hope for any successful check to the advance of Russia on the side of Southern Turkey,

Russia in frightening or conciliating those upon which we might have relied for support. We have to a certain extent aided her in her endeavours, by our own mismanagement and neglect. By employing Turkish troops alone in the invasion of the Christian Provinces of the Caucasus we have confirmed the suspicion, which Russia has so well known how to raise and encourage, that they are to be placed again under Mussulman domination. We have not made a single demonstration nor have we given a single pledge which might induce them to believe that they were to be preserved from religious persecution hereafter, or that their nationality should henceforth be respected. It has been shown by a traveller not unacquainted with the inhabitants of the Caucasus, that so far from having as yet succeeded in exciting sympathy for our cause amongst the various tribes, we have hitherto only encouraged distrust, if not hostility, by invariably employing Mussulman troops where Christians should have been sent, and Christians where the presence of Mussulmans would' have secured our objects. Having neglected to avail ourselves of the Circassians at a time when their coöperation would have been useful to us, and when, by judicious operations at sea, we might have secured as prisoners of war every Russian garrison on the Circassian coast without any loss whatever, we expect them, now that their country is liberated from their oppressors, to unite with us in an aggressive war upon Russia, to cross their boundaries and to furnish contingents to our army.

There remain a campaign in Georgia, *The Transcaucasian Provinces the proper Field and such operations in the Caucasus as of Operation for a Christian Army, by Lawrence would compel Russia to abandon Kars and Oliphant.-Preface to second edition.

Any man acquainted with the character to those operations in the Baltic which must and habits of Asiatic tribes would have form an essential portion of this year's camknown that this was a hopeless expectation. paign in the north. The ill success of our The Circassians have succeeded in their im- expeditions into that sea during the two last mediate object, the expulsion of the Rus- years has much shaken the confidence of sians from their coasts, and they have not the country in our naval resources, yet the that enlightened appreciation of true large addition which has at length been policy and that foresight which appear to made to our fleet of vessels of light be equally wanting to some of the more draught, of gunboats and floating batteries, civilized states of Europe, which might lead leads to some hope that as soon as the them to understand that the best mode of season again permits of access to the Gulf securing their future independence, and of Finland we shall be able to inflict serious preventing a return of their enemy, would damage upon the enemy, and to destroy his be by aiding the Western Powers to destroy principal strongholds. It must, however, or to curtail altogether Russian ascendancy be always borne in mind that the mere in the Caucasus. As to Shamyl and his bombardment of a fortress, and the destrucwarlike tribes of Daghistan, it is doubtful tion of magazines and arsenals, however whether we can hope for any assistance from them. There are, indeed, strong grounds of suspicion that the Russian Government has succeeded in making such terms with that chief as will ensure his neutrality if not his support during the

war.

Nevertheless we are disposed to think that with proper management and with due precaution the Caucasian provinces afford the best field for operations to counteract and check the progress of Russia in Asia Minor, whilst at the same time any decided success in that quarter might seriously endanger the power of the Czar in Central Asia. But at the same time we must not underrate the difficulties with which we shall have to contend, and which will only be increased by delay.

We fear that our means of transport for an army taking the field are still very defective, notwithstanding the urgent representations which have been made to the Government on the subject, and the fatal results of this want last year. Unless we have ample land transport it will be useless to undertake a campaign in the Caucasus; not, however, that we are inclined to agree in the preposterous notion, which we can scarcely believe to be really entertained by our military authorities, that it will require a camp following and beasts of burden equal to the number of our combatants!

vast and important, will not strike such a blow upon Russia as will compel her to yield to our demands, unless followed up by further operations on land. The loss may be enormous, but it will not be irreparable. It is not by isolated attacks and by the mere destruction of that which money and industry can replace, that a great empire like Russia will be brought to renounce her ancient policy or to make real concessions and restitution for the wrongs she has done.

Such, then, are the present results and prospects of the war. Although we may look back with satisfaction to many things, we have still much to deplore in the past, and grave cause for anxiety in the future. That the war will continue, and assume far greater dimensions than it has hitherto done, we can have little doubt. We are equally persuaded that the country will not tolerate any ministry which is not prepared to prosecute it with vigour, and for adequate objects. It is only by yielding to the unanimous feeling of the nation that an administration, in itself one of the weakest and most incompetent England has ever seen, is able to retain the conduct of public affairs. But unfortunately from such a government we can scarcely expect any of those efficient measures which alone will enable us to take our share in this great contest with an honour and success worthy of the nation. We may aid our allies by the indomitable courage of our soldiers and the vast extent of our material resources, but at the same time we bring discredit upon ourselves by the inferiority of the position we have assumed. At the end of two years' war there is still no man to whom the country can look with confidence to restore her military fame and to wield her vast naval power. We can turn, it is true, to the deeds of our soldiers and regiWe have purposely avoided any allusion | mental officers as some balm to our wounded

It is fervently to be hoped that the urgency and absolute necessity of checking the progress of Russia in Asia will be so evident to the country that the Government will at length be driven into taking such steps as may be necessary to effect this object, as it has been driven by the stern expression of the popular will to undertake almost every energetic and decisive measure since the breaking out of the

war.