except as part, and seldom the principal part, of an allied force. Such glories as may accrue under such conditions must be shared in greater or less degree with most nations in Europe.

'Our troops were always a tower of strength to, and often the mainstay of, the army of which they formed part. None the less, the glory even of Blenheim and Waterloo is not solely our own, any more than were the fruits of these victories; indeed, our allies in either case had an equal share in the credit, and reaped far greater profit, if only for the reason that the battles were fought and won on soil in which their interest, in contradistinction to our own, was direct and immediate.'

Our military affairs, Captain Sheppard adds, have prospered best where we have exploited most fully the advantages which sea power has placed in our hands. The chief of these advantages are secrecy and speed. Throughout our history it has been possible for us, with command of the sea, to take our enemies by surprise by sudden landings of troops at points where they were not expected, thus securing for ourselves an initial superiority of force, and to maintain our predominance by transporting reinforcements more rapidly by sea than they could be moved over land. An ideal, frequently realised, has been to throw overwhelming forces upon some hostile force which is cut off from hope of reinforcement or rescue. The greater part of the British Empire, with its 'humanising and civilising influence unique in the world's history,' has thus been acquired.

Whatever opinion may be entertained about the relative importance of Europe and of other parts of the world as theatres of operations for the British army, a strong case is made out for the need to consider sea and land operations as parts of one subject, the subject of war and its influence upon history; but before such study can be undertaken satisfactorily it is highly desirable that writers on sea and land operations should come to some agreement about a common phraseology. Take, for instance, the word 'contain,' as it is used by writers on strategy. Referring to the operations at sea against Prince Rupert in 1649, Prof. Callender writes of Blake that first he made it his business to discover

Rupert's base, and afterwards to contain or (to use the modern word) blockade it.' A naval blockading force must be stronger than the force blockaded. Military strategists attach quite a different meaning to the word 'contain.' A small force on land is said to 'contain' a larger hostile army, if it delays that army's movements, and so keeps it away from a scene of decisive battle. Discrepancies of this kind constantly confront the student who tries to consider sea and land war as one subject.

Then we have that bewildering word 'objective,' to which writers on the strategy of armies used to attach one simple meaning. It meant something definite, preferably a hostile army, but sometimes a geographical destination, such as a town or a fortress. Now no writer seems to know what it means, or how to distinguish it from the word 'object.' Confusion reigns confounded, not only in the writings of lay historians, but even in technical military manuals. In one of these * we find it used, in its old sense, in a statement that troops should know the 'object in view and the direction of their objective '—usually the enemy's army, or a portion thereof. Elsewhere, in the same manual, we find the 'maintenance of the objective' described as the first principle of war.t When doctors disagree with each other, and even with themselves, it is not surprising that the student abandons the study of war operations in despair, looking upon it as a question for 'experts.' These two examples suffice to illustrate the need for an agreed vocabulary for war historians.

The next point that arises is the question of the part to be taken by the 'expert' in writing war history for the general student. As examples of such work the name of the late Admiral Mahan stands out amongst naval historians. Amongst British military historians the late Colonel Henderson is probably the best known to the general student, through the medium of his 'Stonewall Jackson.' Both of these officers held, for long periods, Chairs in History at service educational establishments while they were serving on the active The time spent in such appointments in this

list.

'Field Service Regulations,' Part II, p. 209.

+ Ibid. p. 2.

There is a

country has since been so curtailed that no leisure is afforded for research work, so it is not probable that a successor to Colonel Henderson will be found from that source. Prof. Callender, at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, is in constant touch with naval experts,' and his work is almost free of technical error. slip in spelling, where he refers (p. 36) to a square sail with circular holes in the 'clues' (? clews). In another passage (p. 64) we read that the Armada, on its northward voyage, 'after labouring ineffectually to weather Cape Finisterre, put into Coruña' (that place being to the northward of Cape Finisterre). And (p. 253) Scapa Flow is placed in the Shetlands.' Such slips are easily condoned, and will doubtless be corrected in future editions. It may be as well here to take note, in passing, of the value of expert volumes like Admiral Sir Reginald Custance's War at Sea,' with its lucid expert explanation of Salamis and other ancient sea-fights, to the student of Greek history. It may be that the expert naval or military historian will find his best scope, in reaching the widest range of students, by working in conjunction with the general historian, but no general rule would be applicable. If we accept the view that the treatment of naval and military operations in isolation has hampered the understanding of war history, especially from the British point of view, the risk remains that the expert in each, the seaman and the soldier, would with difficulty avoid accentuating unduly the effect of the operations with which they were best acquainted, and that both would experience a difficulty in acquiring a wide enough grasp of political, social, and economic influence upon the issues. Examples are not lacking in expert naval and military histories of ignoring what Lord Grey of Fallodon, in his definition of the shortcomings of militarists,' defined as the soul which exists in nations.' In the forty years which preceded the Great War, there was a tendency in the British army to base instructions upon the teachings of German military experts, who are now acknowledged to have come within Lord Grey's definition, and thus to have brought their country to disaster.

Of the two short histories which have furnished materials for comment in this article, the Naval Side of

British History,' written by a whole-time historian, shows more traces of original research than does the 'Short History of the British Army,' which is an ambitious undertaking for the spare hours of an officer serving in the army under present-day conditions of work therein. Captain Sheppard, in spite of these drawbacks, has produced a book of great value for the purposes indicated. Readers who wish to study the subject more thoroughly will find useful notes for further reading at the end of each of his chapters. Both books, read in conjunction with each other and with general history, form a useful equipment for a preliminary study of the periods covered, but only as an introduction to more intensive study by those who look upon knowledge of history as a useful aid to the conduct of public affairs, or to guiding public opinion.

Mention has been made of the need for further research work before war histories can be written to be of value for purposes of practical application of past experience to present-day needs. Statesmen who have held office in the past, as we have noted, have been constantly accused of incompetence in their conduct of operations of war, but few historians, with the exception of Fortescue in his standard history of the British army, throw much light upon the personal responsibility for the initiation of war-plans, or upon the machinery for putting them into execution. Nor is it easy to discover the objects in view, the data upon which the plans were based, the ends which were to be achieved, or the extent to which political needs destroyed strategical plans. It might be advanced that research into such matters would be hopeless, judging from the failure of Parliamentary Commissions to bring home to any individual statesman or public body the responsibility for initiating various subsidiary operations in the Great War, but those inquiries were conducted in a political rather than a historical atmosphere, and the complete Great War archives bearing upon such subjects are closed to trained historians, whereas the bulk of those affecting earlier times are available for historical research.

A special feature of Prof. Callender's book is the chronological table with which the work concludes. A similar table would be a valuable addition to Captain

Sheppard's summary of the operations conducted by the British army, more especially by reason of his grouping of the campaigns on a geographical and not upon a chronological basis. The student is left to make out some such table for himself, as an essential aid to studying the distribution of different portions of the British army about the world on given dates, and the reaction of different operations upon each other. One of the most interesting aspects of the study, from the strategical point of view, of British military history would otherwise be missed. Resources in military manhood have always been limited. It should be possible to ascertain, at any given period, the distribution of those resources, and without such guidance it is not possible to judge of the wisdom or foolishness of the authorities (whoever they may have been) who have launched expeditionary forces on their missions. An operation, wise in itself if sufficient resources are available for its execution, may embody the height of folly if it uses up military manpower urgently required in some more important theatre of operations. The general effect of the naval and military situation, with its influence upon political and economic developments, holds a direct appeal to the lay student, while the details of individual campaigns possess a special value to those aspiring to handle the combatant forces.

In conclusion, it will be well to take note of one function of British armies, which is not shared to an appreciable extent by British fleets. I refer to police work in aid of civil power, and the suppression of riots and disturbances before they come within the category of civil war. Captain Sheppard traces the hatred and distrust of all standing armies which has endured to this day,' to the New Model Army raised by conscription from 1645 to 1651, from which date, till 1660 the army was the Government, and Cromwell, its chief, the recognised head of the State.' Thenceforward, in the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement, and the Mutiny Act, the Houses, by taking under civil control all questions of finance, administration, and supply, and leaving only the actual command to the King, they ensured for themselves a means of averting any possibility of using troops for the purpose of a coup d'état.' It is interesting to note