infinite ages of pleasure. And thus the blessed mind, you see, by its perfect dependence upon God, consummates its own heaven, and secures itself for ever in a most quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of it.

By all which I think it sufficiently appears, how much each of these divine virtues, which as rational creatures we are obliged to exert and exercise upon God, contributes to our heavenly happiness; and consequently, how indispensably necessary our present practice of them is to dispose and capacitate us to enjoy it.

SECT. III.

Concerning the social virtues, shewing that these also are included in the heavenly part of the Christian life, and that in their natures they very much contribute to our heavenly happiness.

MAN, of all sublunary creatures, is the most adapted for society: for though the greatest part of other creatures do covet society as well as he, yet he alone is furnished with that gift of nature which renders society most pleasant and useful, and that is the gift of speech: by means of which we can express our thoughts, and maintain a mutual intelligence of minds with one another; and thereby divert our sorrows, mingle our mirth, impart our secrets, communicate our counsels, and make mutual compacts and agreements to supply and assist each other and in these things consists the greatest use and pleasure of society. And as of all creatures we are the best fitted for society, so we stand in the greatest need of it: for as for other creatures, after they come into the world, they are much sooner able to help themselves than we; and after we are most able to help ourselves, there are a world of ne

cessaries and conveniencies, without which we cannot be happy, and with which we cannot be supplied without each other's aid and assistance; which in an unsociable state of life we should, of all creatures in the world, be the most indisposed to render to one another. For as Aristotle hath observed, Ὥσπερ γὰρ τελειωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζώων ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. As man in his perfect state is the best of all animals, so separated from law and right he is the worst. For out of society we see his nature presently degenerates, and instead of being inclined to assist, grows always most salvage and barbarous to his own kind. Since therefore we have so much need of each other's help, society is absolutely necessary to cherish and preserve in us our natural benevolence towards one another, without which, instead of being mutually helpful, we should be mutually mischievous. For as the same philosopher hath observed, 'O dè un δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν, οὐδὲν μέ ρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός ε. He that cannot contract society with others, or through his own self-sufficiency doth not need it, belongs not to any commonwealth, but is either a wild beast or a god. We being therefore so framed for society, and under such necessities of entering into it, it hence necessarily follows, that being associated together, we are all obliged in our several ranks and stations so to behave ourselves towards one another as is most for the common good of all; and that since the happiness of each particular member of our society redounds from the welfare of the whole, and is in

e De Repub. lib. i.
p. 298.

VOL. I.

K

f Id. ibid.

volved in it, we ought to esteem nothing good for ourselves that is a nuisance to the public: because whatsoever this suffers, I and every man suffer; and unless I could be happy alone, that can never be for my interest in particular, that is against my interest in common. Now in such a mutual behaviour, as most conduces to our common benefit and happiness, as we are in society with one another, consists all social virtue; the proper use and design of which is to preserve our society with one another, and to render it a common blessing to us all. And hereunto five things are necessary, viz.

1. That we be charitably disposed toward one another.

2. That we be just and righteous in all our intercourses with each other.

3. That we behave ourselves peaceably in our respective states and relations.

4. That we be very modest towards those that are superior to us in our society, whether it be in desert or dignity.

5. That we be very treatable and condescending to all that are inferior to us. Under these particulars are comprehended all those social virtues upon which the welfare and happiness of human society depends. Now that the practice of all these is included in the Christian life, and doth effectually conduce to our everlasting happiness, I shall endeavour particularly to prove. And,

I. As rational creatures associated and so related to one another, we are obliged to be kindly and charitably disposed towards each other. For the end of our society being mutually to aid and assist one another, it is necessary, in order hereunto, that we

should every one be kind and benevolent to every one, that so we may be continually inclined mutually to aid and do good offices to one another. And so far as we fall short of this, we fall short of the end of our society: for to be sure the less we love one another, the less prone we shall be to promote and further each other's welfare, and consequently the less advantage we shall reap from our mutual society. But if instead of loving we malign and hate each other, our society will be so far from contributing to our happiness, that it will be only a means of rendering us more miserable: for it will only furnish us with fairer opportunities of doing mischief to one another, and that mutual intercourse we shall have, by being united together in society, will supply us with greater means and occasions to wreak our spite upon each other. For society puts us within each other's reach, and by that means (if we are enemies) renders us more dangerous to one another; like two adverse armies, which when they are at a distance can do but little hurt, but when they are joined and mingled, never want opportunities to destroy and butcher one another. So that hatred and malice, you see, renders our society a plague, and we were much better live apart poorly and solitarily, and withdraw from one another as beasts of prey do into their separate dens, than continue in one another's reach, and be always liable, as we must be while we are in society, to be baited and worried by one another.

And as hatred and malice spoils all our society in this life, and renders it worse than the most dismal solitude, so it will also in the other. For whensoever the souls of men do leave their bodies, they

doubtless flock to the birds of their own feather, and consort themselves with such separate spirits as are of their own genius and temper. For besides that good and bad spirits are, by the eternal laws of the other world, distributed into two separate nations, and there live apart from one another, having no other communication or intercourse but what is between two hostile countries that are continually designing and attempting one against another; so that when wicked souls do leave this terrestrial abode and pass into eternity, they are presently incorporated by the laws of that invisible state into the nation of wicked spirits, and confined for ever to their most wretched society and converse; besides this, I say, likeness doth naturally congregate beings, and incline them to associate with those of their own kind. Now rancour and malice is the proper character of the Devil, and the natural genius of hell; and consequently it is by a malicious temper of mind that we are naturalized beforehand subjects of the kingdom of darkness, and qualified for the conversation of furies. So that when we go from hence into eternity, this our malignant genius will render us utterly averse to the friendly society of heaven, and naturally press and incline us to consort with that wretched nation of spiteful and rancorous spirits, with whom we are already joined by a likeness and communion of natures. But O! much better were it for us to be shut up all alone for ever in some dark hole of the world, where we might converse only with our own melancholy thoughts, and never hear of any other being but ourselves, than to be continually plagued with such vexatious company. For though we who are spectators only of cor